"Free" to Express: Media Rights and Broadcasting Policy in Canada and the United States by Augustinavicius, Petras
“Free” to Express: Media Rights and Broadcasting 













presented to the University of Waterloo 
in fulfillment of the 
thesis requirement for the degree of 
Master of Arts  
in  





Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2017 




I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. 
This is a true copy of the thesis, including any final revisions,  
as accepted by my examiners. 
 

















Broadcasters occupy a unique space in Canadian and American societies. These actors are 
supposed to be able to inform, enlighten, and entertain Canadians and Americans alike. 
Moreover, both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the American Bill of Rights 
contain freedom of the press and freedom of expression provisions which appear as though they 
ought to protect broadcasters as well. In this thesis I explore how robust these protections are, 
and the extent to which Canadian and American appellate courts have been willing to empower 
these actors. To do this, I developed a typology for quantitatively evaluating the judicial 
empowerment of broadcasters in each country. What I found was that the United States Supreme 
Court has been more willing to empower broadcasters than the Canadian appellate courts have. 
This is evidenced by the rate at which American broadcasters have been empowered when 
compared with Canadian broadcasters. My quantitative findings are further supported by a 
content analysis of appellate level decisions in Canada and the United States. This thesis also 
seeks to draw a connection between the current understanding of media rights and the 
implications that understanding has for the new era of broadcasting in which digital and internet-
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     Broadcasting is of considerable importance to the lives of Canadians and Americans. 
Broadcasters disseminate content that is intended to inform, enlighten, and entertain. 
Broadcasters serve a critical function. For example, they hold governments to account and they 
produce politically satirical television shows. Canadians and Americans consume a variety of 
media ranging from newspapers to social media at staggering rates. In spite of their importance, 
the rights of broadcasters are not well understood.  
     Canadian and American citizens enjoy a number of freedoms including freedom of 
expression. Freedom of expression is “the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”.1 
Freedom of expression is important because “in order to maximize the benefits a society can 
gain…it must permanently commit to restraining dominant groups from their natural inclination 
to demand conformity”.2 The ability of private citizens to express themselves is therefore 
inscrutable.  
     Given that broadcasters also convey messages that are of considerable importance, the 
question is therefore not so much about the ability of Canadians and Americans to express 
themselves. Rather, the question is what ability do broadcasters have to disseminate a message 
without state interference. More specifically, how do the courts in Canada and the United States 
                                                   
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 (111), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13, UN DOC A/810 
(1948) 71 at 2. Note that free speech and free expression may be used interchangeably, with expression referring to 
the means of communication.   
2 Irene M. Ten Cate, “Speech, Truth and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses” (2010) 22 Yale Journal of Law & The Humanities 35 at 52.  
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understand the rights of broadcasters? It is that broad question which informs this thesis. Two 
specific research questions guide this project: 
(A) Empirically, how has jurisprudence in Canada and the United States 
defined the rights of broadcasters in those countries?  
 
(B) Based on jurisprudential definitions of the rights of broadcasters in Canada 
and the United States, which country’s broadcasters enjoy greater judicial 
empowerment?  
 
I would hypothesize that the United States Supreme Court is more likely to empower 
broadcasters than the Canadian Supreme Court and provincial appellate courts. This hypothesis 
is based on the relatively greater value that Americans place on freedom of expression than 
Canadians do.3 If this hypothesis is correct, broadcasters as a uniform group of actors in the 
United States will enjoy markedly greater success in the rights dispute they are involved in their 
Canadian counterparts.4 
     The rights of broadcasters in Canada and the United States are important for several reasons. 
Scholars have addressed the rights of broadcasters in Canada and the United States individually.5 
However, there is little comparative literature on the rights of broadcasters in Canada and the 
United States. The comparative aspect of media rights and broadcasting policy in Canada and the 
United States has not been addressed in any great detail since 1988.6 That research only narrowly 
addresses the freedom of expression issue. Additionally, other literature on the topic has only 
focused narrowly on broadcast licensing.7  My focus here is not solely on media rights, but also 
                                                   
3 I will explore this in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
4 Markedly refers to a success rate differential of ≥10%. 
5 See e.g. Owen M. Fiss, “Free Speech and Social Structure” (1986) 71 Iowa Law Review; Marc Raboy & Jeremy 
Shtern, eds, Media Divides: Communication Rights and the Right to Communicate in Canada (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2010); Richard Harding Davis, The Press and American Politics: The New Mediator, 3rd ed. (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 2001). 
6 Dorothy Zolf, “The Regulation of Broadcasting in Canada and the United States: Straws in the Wind” (1988) 13 
Canadian Journal of Communication 2. 
7 Corinne Schweizer et al, “Blast From the Past? A Comparative Analysis of Broadcast Licensing in the Digital 
Era”, (2014) 4 Journal of Information Policy.  
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on broadcasting policy in Canada and the United States. This includes, for instance, the 
regulations that govern broadcasters and how that affects the purpose that broadcasters serve, 
namely to inform, enlighten, and entertain. As I will discuss below, comparative media rights 
and broadcasting policy is situated at the nexus of a number of disparate bodies of literature. I 
will discuss this literature in greater detail in the chapters that follow.   
     Second, Canada and the United States are similar in many respects. However, comparing the 
approaches that Canadian and American courts have taken to the rights of broadcasters can be 
instructive. Such an approach not only provides insights about the rights of broadcasters but also 
about each country’s constitutional culture and the values of each society more broadly. For 
example, how do norms and values concerning the importance of free expression resonate in 
such a way that they influence, or have the potential to influence judicial perspectives on the 
rights of broadcasters? 8 
      Third, irrespective of the media they employ, broadcasters exert a considerable amount of 
influence on the lives of Canadians and Americans.9 Whether that medium is a newspaper or an 
internet-based platform, broadcasting is rather pervasive.10 Accordingly, broadcasting is of great 
importance, both sociologically and economically to Canadians and Americans.  
                                                   
8 Since the adoption of the American Constitution, freedom of speech has been identified as a fundamental value in 
American society. This might help explain any discrepancies. See specifically, Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech 
and its Relation to Self-Government (New York: Kennikate Press, 1972) at 27. 
9 Michael Oliveira, “Canadians Watch 30 Hours of TV but for Many Web Dominates Free Time”, The Toronto Star 
(April 26, 2013) online: The Toronto Star 
<https://www.thestar.com/life/technology/2013/04/26/canadians_watch_30_hours_of_tv_but_for_many_web_domi
nates_free_time.html>; Jacqueline Howard, “Americans Devote More Than 10 Hours a Day to Screen Time, and 
Growing”, CNN (July 29, 2016) online: CNN < http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/30/health/americans-screen-time-
nielsen/index.html>; Michael B. Sawen, “Cultural Imperialism: A Media Effects Approach” (1991) 8 Critical 
Studies in Media Communication 1. This does not include the amount of time that Canadians and Americans spend 
on the internet. 
10 Marshal McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extension of Man, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Taylor Francis Ltd., 2001) at 
9.  
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     This research also has considerable implications, not only for broadcasters but also for other 
parties. When broadcasters are left without rights protections their ability to do their job becomes 
more difficult, and they begin to operate in a precarious space. For example, the professional 
wrestler Terry Bollea, more commonly known as Hulk Hogan successfully sued the website 
Gawker for defamation after they posted his sex tape.11 Gawker was forced to file for 
bankruptcy.12 While the post that led Gawker’s downfall may have been salacious and morally 
dubious, that is beside the point. What is important is that unabated, the Gawker case has the 
potential to set a dangerous precedent for similar broadcasters in the future.  
     Conversely, how does broadcasting activity impact the rights of other groups? For example, 
what if it had been a more mainstream broadcaster such as Global Television in Canada or the 
National Broadcasting Corporation (“NBC”) in the United States that had disseminated Bollea’s 
tape?13 Or if that broadcaster had disseminated content that was even more offensive to the 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender or Questioning (“LGBTQ”) community?  
     In the following chapter, I will outline my methodological approach to this thesis. There, I 
will detail why judicial empowerment is an intuitive mechanism for assessing the effect that 
court decisions have on the scope of broadcasters’ rights. I will also outline how I will evaluate 
judicial empowerment. Specifically, I will explain the typology I developed to quantitatively 
explore the effect of jurisprudence on the rights of broadcasters. I will also outline my approach 
to the analysis that will supplement my quantitative findings.  
                                                   
11 Bollea v. Gawker, [2016] So. 3d 768. 
12 Tiffay Kary and Steven Church, “Gawker Founder in Bankruptcy After Losing Hulk Hogan Case”, Bloomberg 
Technology (1 August 2016) online: Bloomberg < https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-01/gawker-
media-founder-nick-denton-files-personal-bankruptcy>. 
13 The reason why this was not the case might have to do with the fact that Gawker was a gossip tabloid website, 
whereas larger broadcasters such as NBC or Global are not.  
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     In Chapter Three, I will discuss how the Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme Court of 
the United States have interpreted the scope of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(“the Charter”) and the American Bill of Rights. I will also examine how scholars have 
interpreted these decisions. In terms of the Charter, I will argue that the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of its scope is rather narrow. To that effect, I will discuss how there is an 
alternative framework that the Court has not yet applied and, in my view, it has erred in failing to 
do so. In terms of the Bill of Rights, I will argue that the scope of its application is considerably 
broader than the Charter. One area where this is especially noticeable is with the application of 
the Bill of Rights to the private sphere.  
     In Chapter Four, I will explore the leading jurisprudence on freedom of expression in Canada 
and the United States as well as the relevant academic theory. My focus there is twofold. First, I 
examine why Canada and the United States protect expression. I also look at the limits on 
expression in each country. My broad argument here is that Americans enjoy wider latitude in 
how they express themselves than do Canadians. In that sense, the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of freedom of expression is markedly broader and more principled than the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s.  
     In Chapter Five, I assess the judicial empowerment of broadcasters in Canada. There, I look 
at the cases I selected quantitatively by plotting them in my typology. I also seek to explain these 
results by looking at the content of the decisions themselves to reveal the trends that exist, but 
also any anomalies. In that chapter, I argue that the Canadian understanding of the rights of 
broadcasters is rather limited and the Charter should apply to broadcasters on the basis of a 
novel public importance theory.   
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     In Chapter Six, I discuss the judicial empowerment of broadcasters in the United States. 
These results show that the United States Supreme Court has been willing to empower 
broadcasters. It is important to note that in this data set, the Court has not addressed the rights of 
broadcasters since 1994. I argue that while this could mean that media rights are settled law in 
the United States, this fact also raises questions about the future of broadcasters’ rights.  
     Finally, in Chapter Seven, I conclude the argument by comparing the judicial empowerment 
of broadcasters in Canada and the United States. There, I discuss the types of cases where the 
Canadian and American courts have offered differing approaches. I then explore why the 
Canadian and American approaches in those types of cases are different. Based on this analysis, I 
forward two arguments which are central to this thesis. First, the Charter and the American Bill 
of Rights ought to apply to broadcasters uniformly. Second, under that framework, the same 
standards that apply to private citizens in terms of freedom of expression and other rights ought 
to apply to broadcasters.
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     In this chapter, I will outline my methodological approach to this thesis. This approach can be 
understood in terms three key components. First, this chapter will provide definitions for key 
terms in the research questions which are grounded in the literature. These terms are judicial 
empowerment, broadcasters, and freedom of expression. The second section of this chapter will 
explain how cases were selected for this thesis from Canadian and American courts. The final 
section of this chapter, building on the case selection methodology, will explain how the 
relationship between the jurisprudence and the judicial empowerment of broadcasters in Canada 
and the United States. There, this chapter will nominate a typology for quantitatively assessing 
judicial empowerment and explain the process by which this typology was conceived. In that 
section, I will also explain how I will supplement my quantitative findings. 
2.2 Definitions 
 
     In this section, I will argue that judicial empowerment is an intuitive construct for exploring 
the relationship between judicial decisions and the rights of a given group. This section will also 
nominate definitions for the terms broadcasters and freedom of expression, both of which are 
also central to understanding this thesis.  
2.2.1 Judicial Empowerment 
     Scholars have noted that one of the effects of codifying rights and encouraging judicial 
independence is imbuing courts with broad formal powers.1 This phenomenon has been 
                                                   
1 See generally, Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism, and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: 
Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) [New Democracies]; Tom 
Ginsburg, “The Global Spread of Constitutional Review” in Keith Whittington, Daniel Kelemen & Gregory 
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described as the judicialization of politics.2 According to Ran Hirschl, the judicialization of 
politics is also referred to as judicial empowerment.3 Judicial empowerment broadly refers to the 
expansion of judicial powers and authority by the legislative and executive branches of 
government in light of constitutional entrenchment of rights and judicial independence. While 
judicial empowerment undoubtedly affects rights, it is more applicable to the formal legal 
processes by which elites empower the judiciary.4  
     For this thesis, then, judicial empowerment as I refer to it, specifically means the judicial 
empowerment of rights claimants by the courts.5 Here, a more narrowly tailored definition of 
judicial empowerment is necessary and appropriate. Ran Hirschl and Tom Ginsburg define 
judicial empowerment in this sense, as “the enhancement of the role of the judiciary in the 
political system and the extension of the jurisdiction of courts and legal adjudication into new 
areas of public policy”.6 This definition places a greater emphasis on the judicial empowerment 
of rights claimants than of the constitutional revolutions through which elites empower 
judiciaries.  
     While literature exists on judicial empowerment in new and emerging democracies, the 
literature has also focused on the judicial empowerment of rights in Canada and the United 
States in a variety of policy contexts, including, but not limited to LGBTQ and abortion rights.7 
                                                   
Caldeira, eds, The Oxford Handbook on Law and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Ran Hirschl, 
Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004) [Juristocracy]; Charles R. Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter? The Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms” (1996) 90 American Political Science Review 4.  
2 Neal C. Tate & Torjborn Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Politics (New York: New York University 
Press, 1995). 
3 Juristocracy, supra note 1.  
4 Ran Hirschl describes this process as constitutional revolution. See generally, Ibid. 
5 For a broader discussion of the the theoretical explanations for constitutional revolutions, see generally, Ibid.  
6 Ran Hirschl, “The Struggle for Hegemony: Understanding Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization 
in Culturally Divided States” (2000) 36 Stanford Journal of International Law 73; New Democracies, supra note 1.  
7 Miriam Smith, “Social Movements and Judicial Empowerment: Courts, Public Policy, and Lesbian and Gay 
Organizing in Canada” (2005) 33 Politics and Society 2; Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, “Legitimacy and the 
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Moreover, broadcasting is a species of public policy. Finally, judicial empowerment lends itself 
well to this thesis because of how it functions as a causal mechanism. Judicial empowerment 
helps explain the relationship between court decisions and changes in the scope of rights 
protections. Accordingly, judicial empowerment as defined above will be used to evaluate the 
rights of broadcasters in this thesis.  
2.2.2 Broadcasters 
     In defining what a broadcaster is for this thesis, ss. 2(1)(2) of the 1991 Broadcasting Act (“the 
Act”) provide a starting point. The Act defines a broadcaster as “[one who transmits] 
programs…by radio waves or other means of telecommunication for reception by the public by 
means of broadcasting receiving apparatus”.8 Specifically, a network refers to “any operation 
where control over all or any part of the programs or program schedules of one or more 
broadcasting undertakings is delegated to another undertaking or person”9; a program refers to 
“sounds or visual images, or a combination of sounds and visual images, that are intended to 
inform, enlighten or entertain”10; and other means of telecommunication refers to “any wire, 
cable, radio, optical or other electromagnetic system, or any similar technical system”.11 In my 
view, this definition is too narrow. Rather, I seek to include a broader range of broadcasting 
activities.   
     The first way in which I expanded upon the Act’s definition of a broadcaster is to include 
print media. David Riesman, Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney define print media as 
                                                   
Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights” (1994) 43 
Duke Law Journal 4.   
8 Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c.11, s. 2(1) [Broadcasting Act]. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. at s. 2(2). 
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“transmit[ting] information via physical objects”.12 Examples here include books, comics, 
magazines, newspapers or pamphlets. However, I have limited discussions of print media to 
books, magazines, and newspapers. Because these print media are identified in both the Charter 
and the Bill of Rights through freedom of the press provisions whereas other types of print 
media, such as pamphlets are not.   
     The second way in which I will expand on the Act’s definition of broadcasters is to include 
new media. According to Robert Logan, new media is “digital media that are interactive, 
incorporate two-way communication, and involve some form of computing”.13 Ultimately, he 
distinguishes new media from old media by suggesting that new media is merely the repurposing 
of old media using new technologies.14 Simply put, new media refers to content disseminated 
through the internet, for example. Viewed in this way, the most concrete example of new media 
are blogs and microblogging platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.15 Because the Act was 
enacted before the proliferation of new media, any definition provided therein could not have 
anticipated the rise of new media.  
     New media, because of its novelty, also presents the courts with intriguing questions 
concerning the rights status and obligations of those who disseminate content using new media. 
Moreover, scholars have noted that new media is capable of exerting a great deal of pressure on 
political processes domestically as well as transnationally.16 In sum, the scope of broadcasting 
                                                   
12 David Riesman, Nathan Glazer & Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American 
Character (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) at 50. 
13 Robert K. Logan, Understanding New Media: Extending Marshall McLuhan (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 
2010) at 4. 
14 Ibid. at 7. 
15 See generally, Clay Shirkey, “The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political 
Change” (2011) 90 Foreign Affairs 1.   
16 Ibid.  
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activities I am concerned with in this thesis are those covered by the Act as well as print and new 
media.  
2.2.3 Freedom of Expression 
     Canada and the United States differ in the constitutional language used to describe the 
protection of expressive activity. For instance, s. 2(b) of the Charter refers to this right as 
freedom of expression, whereas the First Amendment to the U.S. constitution refers to the same 
right as freedom of speech.17 The most readily apparent distinction between the choice of 
verbiage is that expression encapsulates a broader range of activities than speech. Richard Moon 
notes that freedom of speech refers to core expressive activities, including but not limited to, 
political speech.18 Alternatively, freedom of expression includes the activities included in speech 
as well as fringe expressive activities which freedom of speech does not necessarily capture.19 
     Consider, for instance, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission. In that case, the Court held, rather generally, that campaign 
finance generally and vis-à-vis advertising was analogous to free speech.20 However, scholars 
have noted that while the Court used the language of free speech in Citizens United, corporations 
are not capable of speech as defined above.21 What the Court was likely referring to was the 
ability of corporations to express themselves, rather than speak.  
                                                   
17 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 2(b) [2(b)]; U.S. Const. amend. I [First Amendment]. Particularly, s. 2(b) of 
the Charter provides that “[Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:] freedom of thought, belief, opinion 
and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication. In contrast, the First Amendment 
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or of prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people to peacefully assemble, and 
to petition the government for a redress of grievances”. Ibid. 
18 Richard Moon, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2000) at 16.  
19 Ibid. 
20 [2010] 558 U.S. 310.  
21 Tamara R. Piety, “Citizens United and the Threat to the Regulatory State” (2010) 109 Michigan Law Review First 
Impressions at 17. 
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     A related line of inquiry concerns the distinction made in the Charter and the First 
Amendment between freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Melville Nimmer has 
argued that freedom of the press and freedom of expression are not redundant.22 Nimmer notes 
that for freedom of the press to be engaged, the material in question “must [be the result of] an 
act of copyright”.23 Nimmer further concludes that the copyright standard can also be applied to 
visual materials.24 The press also has legal protections and obligations which fall outside the 
scope of freedom of expression. This includes protecting the identity of their sources. I would, 
therefore, include freedom of the press in my definition of freedom of expression. 
2.3 Data Selection  
2.3.1 Canada  
     I selected Canadian cases from the Supreme Court of Canada as well as the provincial and 
territorial courts of appeal. Temporally, cases were selected following the advent of the Charter 
in 1982. In finding cases from these courts, five Boolean searches were conducted on the 
Canadian Legal Information Institute’s (“CanLII”) website. The search terms used were: “free 
expression” + “broadcaster” + “Charter”; “free expression” + “newspaper” + “Charter”; “free 
expression” + “blog” + “Charter”; “free expression” + “Twitter” + “Charter”; and “free 
expression” + “Facebook” + “Charter”. These five searches produced a combined 1,115 cases; 
76 were considered and 24 selected for examination here.25 Cases were selected based on the 
whether or not they met certain criteria, outlined below.   
                                                   
22 See generally, Melville B. Nimmer, “Introduction – Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to 
Freedom of Speech?” (1975) 26 Hasting Law Journal. 
23 Ibid. at 652. 
24 Ibid. Nimmer concedes that the copyright standard is not the only standard, but is merely illustrative of which 
materials would be protected under freedom of the press and which would fall under freedom of speech. Nimmer’s 
discussion is concerned exclusively with the United States. Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine that this discussion 
wold not be applicable in the Canadian context. Ibid. 
25 A complete table of cases considered and selected can be found in Appendices I and II.  
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     My first requirement for selecting cases from Canadian courts was that one of the parties to 
the dispute had to be a broadcaster as defined above. This is to say that in the cases selected, a 
broadcaster had to be making a rights claim, responding to a rights claim or intervening in a 
rights dispute.26 Cases excluded at this stage fell into one of the three following groups: urban 
advertising, indirect broadcasting, and printed, distributable material.  
     The first group of cases that was rejected at this stage were cases dealing with urban 
advertising. There were three cases which fell into this category. Vancouver (City) v. Zhang dealt 
with a Chinese group, the Falun Gong who protested human rights abuses in China through a 
variety of means outside of the Chinese consulate in Vancouver, including a billboard.27 
Similarly, Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students 
dealt with the ability of a student organization to advertise on the sides of buses in order to 
encourage students to vote in a provincial election.28 Finally, R. v. Stevens addressed defamatory 
and salacious posters which were displayed throughout the University of Manitoba campus.29 
The media used in these cases is not consistent with this thesis’ definition of a broadcaster.  
     The second group of cases which I excluded during this stage of analysis were cases which 
generally concerned interviews given to the media. Arguably the most notable of the cases 
rejected here is Hill v. Church of Scientology. Hill dealt with the legal repercussions of a press 
conference that a lawyer held on the courthouse steps following a trial.30 Similarly to Hill, R. v. 
Kopyto dealt with a lawyer who was found guilty of contempt for making disparaging remarks 
                                                   
26 Intervener status is included here, because there is evidence of the effect of third party interventions on Charter 
litigation. See e.g. John Koch, “Making Room: New Directions in Third Party Intervention” (1990) 48 University of 
Toronto Faculty Law Review 1.  
27 (2010) 325 D.L.R. (4th) 313. 
28 [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295. 
29 100 Man R (2d) 81. 
30 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130. 
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about the court to a media outlet following a trial.31 The final case excluded here was R. v. 
Ahenakew, wherein the respondent was accused and convicted of presenting anti-Semitic 
material at a conference as well as in subsequent interviews given to the media.32 The unifying 
feature in these cases is the fact that the broadcasters involved served as intermediaries to 
broadcasters rather than as broadcasters themselves.  
     The final group of cases excluded here concern small, printed, and distributable media. There 
are two cases of note here. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Bell (c.o.b Chop Shop 
Motorcycle Parts) addressed bumper stickers sold by a motorcycle store which displayed an 
image which was considered offensive by a number of ethnic minorities.33 Similarly, R. v. 
Harding was an Ontario Court of Appeals decision which concerned pamphlets and telephone 
messages which targeted and were inflammatory towards Muslims.34 This is not broadcasting as 
I have defined it. 
     The second exclusionary criteria concerned whether or not there was a live Charter dispute in 
the case at hand. Here, there were three specific reasons why cases were rejected. The first was 
cases that were governed by civil law.35 There was also a case, which otherwise met all the 
inclusion criteria set out in this thesis except for the fact that the rights claim being made was 
                                                   
31 (1987) 47 D.L.R. (4th) 213. 
32 (2008) 289 D.L.R. (4th) 59. 
33 (1994) 114 D.L.R. (4th) 370. 
34 (2001) 207 D.L.R. (4th) 686. 
35 See Awan v. Levant, 2016 ONCA 970 (CanLII); St. Lewis v. Rancourt, 2015 ONCA 513 (CanLII); Bou Malhab v. 
Difussion Métromédia inc., [2011] 1 SCR 214; Gilles E Néron Communication Marketing Inc. v. Chambres des 
Notaires du Québec, [2004] 3 SCR 95; Pressler v. Lethbridge and Westcom TV ltd. (2000) 86 BCLR (3d) 257; 
Pierre v. Pacific Press Ltd., (1994) 113 D.L.R. (4th) 511; WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] 2 SCR 420. Certain 
confidential source cases fell into this category as well because the Supreme Court has established that while s. 2(b) 
informs journalist-source privilege it does not flow from the Charter. See 1654776 Ontario Ltd. v. Stewart, 2013 
ONCA 184 (CanLII); Canwest Publishing Inc. v. Wilson, 2012 BCCA 181 (CanLII). Moreover, Pridgen v. 
University of Calgary. (2012) 350 D.L.R. (4th) 1; R. v. Daly. (2005) 256 D.L.R. (4th) 372; Adbusters Media 
Foundation v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (1997) 154 D.L.R. (4th) 404; and Adbusters Media Foundation v. 
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (2009) 92 BCLR (4th) were rejected because the courts did not address Charter 
arguments. 
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one concerning freedom of religion, rather than freedom of expression.36 Finally, one case was 
excluded at this stage because it was a reference case.37 In practice, reference decisions have 
been accorded the same precedential value as cases in which there was a concrete, organic legal 
dispute. However, the legal disputes in reference cases are not live.  
2.3.2 United States 
     In the United States, the Supreme Court is the eminent authority on the American bill of 
rights. Accordingly, American cases were selected from the United States Supreme Court. 
Scholars have routinely identified the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan as one of the most significant decisions in First Amendment jurisprudence.38 I 
conducted five searches on LexisNexis using these parameters and employing the following 
terms: “free speech” + “broadcaster” + “bill of rights”; “free speech” + “newspaper” + “bill of 
rights”; “free speech” + “blog” + “bill of rights”; “free speech” + “Twitter” + “bill of rights”; 
and “free speech” + “Facebook” + “bill of rights”.39 These searches produced a combined 260 
combined results with 99 cases being considered, and 29 being selected.40 
     The first set of cases which I excluded were omitted because there was no broadcaster as I 
have defined it. For instance, Underwager v. Channel 9 Australia was a case which dealt with an 
interview given to a broadcaster, similarly to Hill in the Canadian context.41 Other cases 
                                                   
36 Owens v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission). (2006) 267 D.L.R. (4th) 733. 
37 Reference re Election Act (BC), 2012 BCCA 394 (CanLII). 
38 See e.g. Samuel R. Pierce Jr, “The Anatomy of an Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan” (1965) 43 
North Carolina Law Review.   
39 Free speech was employed as a search term instead of free expression because the First Amendment employs the 
language of free speech as opposed to free expression. Moreover, analogous searches were conducted using the term 
“free expression” in lieu of “free speech” and there was virtually no change in the results produced. 
40 Complete tables of cases considered and selected have been reproduced in Appendices III and IV. Readers should 
note that the number of cases I found and considered includes circuit court of appeal decisions. The reason why I 
selected Supreme Court cases exclusively was that the number of cases would otherwise be disproportionate to the 
number of Canadian cases I selected. Including these cases would not have been feasible within the scope of this 
project for two reasons: First, the American Bill of Rights was enacted 191 years before the Canadian Charter. 
Second, the population of the United States is considerably greater than that of Canada.  
41 69 F.3d 361 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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excluded included but were not limited to those involving the posting of labour requirements, 
garbage collectors publishing editorials in a newspaper, erecting statues, school plays, wearing 
black armbands to school as a means of protesting the Vietnam war, and rap songs.42 
     The second type of cases excluded here dealt with commercial advertising. For instance, in 
Nike Inc. v. Kasky, Nike, a corporation launched an advertising campaign to refute concerns 
about their labour practices.43 Similarly, Association of National Advertisers v. Lundgren 
concerned the requirements for labelling products as environmentally friendly.44 The remaining 
cases excluded here addressed attorney advertising, campaign finance, liquor advertising, and 
public transit advertising.45  
     The second reason why I excluded cases was that there was no rights claim being made, or 
there was a rights claim but it did not concern freedom of expression or freedom of the press.  
Cases which fell into the first of these two categories were excluded from this study because the 
manner in which these cases were resolved was through the civil law.46   
     Similarly, I rejected cases because although they dealt with rights claims, they did not address 
freedom of expression. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., the United States Supreme Court 
struck down provisions associated with the Affordable Care Act requiring employers’ insurance 
programs to cover contraceptives for female employees.47 In Burwell, the claim centred around 
                                                   
42 National Ass'n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Board of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cty., v. Umbehr, 
[1996] 518 U.S. 668; Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1991); Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 
F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., [1969] 393 U.S. 503.  
43 [2003] 539 U.S. 654. 
44 44 F.3d 726 (Court of Appeals 1994). 
45 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz, [1977] 433 U.S. 350; Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, [1990] 494 U.S. 652; 
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, [1996] 517 U.S. 484; Lamar Outdoor Advertising v. Miss. St. Tax Com’n, 701 
F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1983); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, [1974] 418 U.S. 298; Bell v. Itawamba County School Bd., 799 
F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015). 
46 Virgil v. Time, Inc., [1976] 425 U.S. 998; McClellan v. Cablevision of Connecticut, Inc., 149 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 
1998); Sosa v. DirecTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2006); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, [1967] 388 U.S. 130. 
47 [2014] 573 U.S.  
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freedom of religion, rather than freedom of expression. Similarly, Adderley v. Florida and NLRB 
v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen both addressed freedom of association.48 
Adderley dealt with the right to protest outside prisons, whereas NLRB concerned the right to 
strike. 
     Finally, there was a third category of cases which were excluded because although there was 
a broadcaster who was involved in a rights dispute, the impugned activity in these cases was not 
directly connected with any broadcasting undertaking covered by this thesis. Here there are three 
types of cases. The first is cases in which a broadcaster is making a rights claim, although the 
claim is not connected with any broadcasting undertaking by the broadcaster. Young v. American 
Mini Theatres, Inc., and Basiardanes v. City of Galveston both concern zoning ordinances which 
prevent theatres from showing adult films.49 Similarly, Leathers v. Medlock dealt with a sales tax 
and Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. addressed the ability of a broadcaster to sell 
magazines through the use of news racks.50 These cases were excluded specifically because the 
infringement on the broadcasters ability to broadcast does not present a proximate threat to a 
specific broadcast undertaking. Finally, there was one case, Roaden v. Kentucky, in which the 
rights claim being made concerned legal rights than freedom of expression.51 
2.3.3 Differences in the Exclusionary Criteria 
     Finally, there are differences in the Canadian and American exclusions which are important to 
address. As I will discuss in Chapter Three, there are stark differences in the scope of the 
Canadian Charter and the American Bill of Rights. As a result, there are different types of cases 
in which the rights of broadcasters have been implicated in Canada and the United States. For 
                                                   
48 [1966] 385 U.S. 39; [1964] 377 U.S. 58. 
49 [1976] 427 U.S. 50; 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982). 
50 [1991] 499 U.S. 439; [1993] 507 U.S. 410. 
51 [1973] 413 U.S. 496. 
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example, the American Court has been willing to entertain that the Canadian Court has not. In 
light of these differences, it is not possible to apply the criteria from one country to the other.  
2.4 Evaluating the Effect of Jurisprudence on the Judicial Empowerment of Broadcasters 
2.4.1 A Typology for the Judicial Empowerment of Broadcasters  
 
     In this section, I will outline a quantitative means of evaluating the judicial empowerment of 
broadcasters and other rights claimants. Because of the empirical nature of my research 
questions, the most intuitive way of consolidating and evaluating case outcomes is through a 
typology. As I will discuss in greater detail below, there is one table for each country. Both 
tables are comprised of four axes: type of broadcaster, the broadcasters’ role in the case, the 
court’s decision, and the subject matter of the case.52 In the second part of this section, I will 
explain how I have how I will supplement my quantitative analysis by examining the substance 
of the decisions, themselves. 
2.4.2 Axis I: Type of Broadcaster 
     The first inquiry with which I was concerned in developing this typology was whether the 
broadcaster(s) involved in the case were public or private.53 In both the Canadian and American 
contexts, there are limits on the constitutional protections afforded to private actors. These will 
be discussed in the next chapter. However, in my view, exploring the effects of this distinction in 
both countries through the typology is important because it helps illustrate the extent of rights 
protection in each country. As I will discuss in chapters five through seven, there are 
discrepancies, both in the types of broadcasters that are represented in each country. 
                                                   
52 Complete tables for each country can be found in Appendices I and II 
53 Cases were coded according to whether or not the named appellant or respondent was a public or private 
broadcaster. 
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Additionally, public and private broadcasters are empowered to different extents. While this is 
mostly the case in Canadian jurisprudence, it is nevertheless important to note.    
2.4.3 Axis II: Broadcaster’s Role in the Case 
     The second axis of this typology deals with the role of the broadcaster in the case at hand. 
Here, there are four possibilities: the broadcaster is making a rights claim; the broadcaster is 
responding to a rights claim; the broadcaster is involved in a rights dispute where there are 
competing claims; and the broadcaster is serving as an intervener. These four categories cover 
the entire range of possible roles that a broadcaster might take on in a rights dispute. In 
particular, it broadens the focus of my research such that the emphasis is not on broadcasters 
alone, but is also on cases where broadcasters themselves come up against rights claims. In most 
of these cases, broadcasters are making rights claims or intervening in right disputes. However, 
there are also a few cases where broadcasters are responding to a rights claim or there are 
competing rights claims. As I will discuss in chapters five through seven, the broadcaster’s role 
in a case occasionally influences the court’s decision.   
2.4.4 Axis III: Court’s Decision 
     The third axis of my typology is concerned with the rights outcome in the cases at hand. Here, 
I sought to maximize the quantitative value that each decision had for the findings of this thesis 
without making this stage of inquiry too binary. It is important to assess the outcomes of cases 
where broadcasters are the rights claimants by coding whether or not the court’s decision was in 
favour of, or against the broadcaster. However, based on case outcomes, having a table for both 
case outcomes and rights outcomes would be redundant. In the table for each country, the rights 
claimants I have identified are primarily broadcasters. Where broadcasters are responding a 
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rights claim or there are competing claims, the other party or parties making those claims are 
identified in the footnotes below each table.  
2.4.5 Axis IV: Subject Matter  
     The fourth axis of my typology, subject matter, is perhaps where there is the most divergence 
between the two countries. This is simply because one cannot expect to find precisely the same 
types of cases in the two countries. However, in Chapter Seven, I have compared the same types 
of cases in each country. In the two tables utilized for Canadian jurisprudence, the cases fell into 
one of 12 specific categories: production orders, publication bans, confidential sources, open 
courts, open legislatures, broadcasting trial exhibits, trial fairness, election advertising, early 
dissemination of election results, and hate speech. These 12 categories of cases were grouped 
into three broader categories: press freedom, elections, and hate speech.54 In the United States, 
the cases that were selected covered 17 different subjects. For this thesis’ typology, these 17 
categories were narrowed to four broader categories: press freedom, elections, defamation/hate 
speech/obscenity, and broadcaster advertising.  
2.4.6 Content Analysis of Cases 
     While this typology provides an empirical perspective into the judicial empowerment of 
rights claimants, broadcasters or otherwise, I am also concerned with the substantive decisions in 
each of the cases selected. Accordingly, chapters five and six will explore the content of these 
decisions in conjunction with the empirical data and decisions in related, yet unselected cases to 
provide a fuller explanation of emergent trends. In particular, these chapters will explore, where 
appropriate, a courts’ reasons for judgment and persuasive dissenting opinions in particular 
                                                   
54 Press freedom includes production orders, publication bans, confidential sources, open courts, open legislatures, 
illegally disseminating election results, broadcasting trial exhibits, and trial fairness. Advertising includes election 
advertising, and advertising by broadcasters.  
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cases. These factors are especially important and merit close examination because there are cases 
within this set that have changed the law in a particular way. As an example, at the end of this 
thesis, I will use this qualitative analysis in large part to forward the argument that broadcasters 
should be granted rights protection and obligations in the same way that private citizens do.   
2.5 Conclusion 
     In this chapter, I have explained the methodological underpinnings of this thesis. In particular, 
I focused on the three aspects of my methodology: definitions, case selection, and measurement. 
The first of these sections, definitions, explored competing approaches to evaluating the effect of 
judicial decisions on the scope of rights. There, I argued that judicial empowerment is an 
intuitive concept for understanding this relationship. This section also presented definitions for 
broadcasters which is based on the definition provided by the 1991 Broadcasting Act and 
expanded to include print and new media. Finally, this section defined freedom of expression in 
light of the textual differences between the Charter and the bill of rights, arguing that expression 
is broader than speech and ought to be used accordingly.  
     The second section of this chapter explained the manner in which cases were selected for this 
thesis, including a brief explanation of why certain categories of cases were omitted. In the final 
part of this chapter, I explained how I would evaluate the effect of jurisprudence on the rights of 
broadcasters. Here, I outlined the typology that I developed as a quantitative mechanism for 
exploring judicial empowerment, not only of broadcasters but also of rights claimants in cases 
involving broadcasters. This section also outlined the qualitative approach to evaluating judicial 
empowerment as a complement to the typology.
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Chapter 3  
The Scope of Rights Protection in Canada and the United States 
 
3.1 Introduction 
     In this chapter, I will explore the application of the Charter and the American Bill of Rights. 
In particular, I will focus on how the courts have defined the scope of both documents through 
their decisions. In the first part of this chapter, I will discuss the Charter’s application generally, 
focusing on the Supreme Court of Canada’s current understanding of the Charter’s scope. There, 
I will argue that the jurisprudence on the application of the Charter is complex, inconsistent, and 
there is a different approach that the Supreme Court has not yet considered. This approach would 
allow Charter application to matters of public importance. The second part of this chapter will 
focus on the application of the American Bill of Rights. There I will focus on the application of 
the Bill of Rights to the federal government and the states, before outlining how it applies to 
private disputes. Finally, I will contrast the approaches taken by the Canadian and American 
courts in defining the scope of application for bills of rights in both countries. There, I will argue 
that the American Bill of Rights is far more conducive to rights-based litigation in the private 
sphere than the Charter.  
3.2 Application of the Charter 
3.2.1 The Charter’s Scope 
     The scope of the Charter’s application has been the subject of debate since it was enacted in 
1982. In regards to its application, s. 32(1) provides: 
32(1) This Charter applies 
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect to all matters within 
the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory 
and Northwest Territories; and  
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(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters 
within the authority of the legislature of each province.1 
 
     The Supreme Court has long attempted to define the scope of s. 32.2 However, the Court has 
not yet coherently defined what “government” means for the purposes of s. 32.3 Thus far, the 
legal tests crafted by the Court for determining whether or not an entity is government within the 
meaning of s. 32 have been inconsistent.4 This is problematic because it provides lower courts 
with minimal guidance in applying the Charter.      
     The Court addressed the application of the Charter’s scope for the first time in RWDSU v. 
Dolphin Delivery Ltd.5 In that case, the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the 
Charter applied to private entities. In particular, the dispute centred around whether or not the 
Charter applied to union members who were on strike and picketing against their employer, a 
private corporation.6 In Dolphin Delivery, the Court held that the Charter does not apply to cases 
involving private parties which is to say “litigation divorced completely from any connection 
with the government”.7 McIntyre J., writing for a unanimous Court stated: 
It is my view that s. 32 of the Charter specifies the actors to whom the Charter 
will apply. They are the legislative, executive and administrative branches of 
government. It will apply to those branches of government whether or not their 
action is invoked in public or private litigation.8  
 
      While the Dolphin Delivery decision is wholly consistent with the plain meaning of s. 32, 
scholars have opined the Court’s decision in that case. For instance, there is an argument that the 
Charter ought to apply to all private litigation because the judiciary is “government” for the 
                                                   
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule to the Canada 
Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 32(1).  
2 See e.g. RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 SCR 573 [Dolphin Delivery]. 
3 See e.g. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 624 [Eldridge]. 
4 See e.g. Ibid. 
5 Supra note 2. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. at 593. 
8 Ibid. at 598. 
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purposes of s. 32.9 Nevertheless, while the narrowness of the Dolphin Delivery decision rightly 
raises concerns, Patrick Monahan has argued against a universally broad interpretation of s. 32 
which would encompass all private action. Monahan specifically contends that “it 
would…significantly constrain the jurisdiction of the legislature, since [the resulting expansion 
of judicial powers] would take precedence over ordinary statutes”.10   
     Three years after its decision in Dolphin Delivery, the Court revisited the Charter’s scope in 
Slaight Communications.11 Slaight dealt with whether or not a statutorily created administrative 
body was subject to the Charter.12 The Court answered that question in the affirmative, holding 
that an entity did not have to be government in the strict sense adopted in Dolphin Delivery in 
order to attract constitutional review.13 The Court reasoned that “[an] adjudicator is a statutory 
creature: he is appointed pursuant to a legislative provision and derives all his powers from the 
statute”.14   
     Following Slaight, McKinney v. The University of Guelph attempted to provide a legal 
definition for “government”. In that case, professors from the University of Guelph argued that 
the University’s mandatory retirement policy was unconstitutional.15 The Court rejected this 
argument, holding that universities are not “inherently governmental”.16 Looking to the meaning 
of s. 32, the Court concluded that the Charter is a tool for checking the power of government 
                                                   
9 See e.g. Allan C. Hutchinson & Andrew Petter, “Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter” 
(1988) 38 University of Toronto Law Journal 278; David Beatty, “Constitutional Conceits: The Coercive Authority 
of the Courts” 37 University of Toronto Law Journal 2; Brian Slattery, “The Charter’s Relevance to Private 
Litigation: Does Dolphin Deliver?” (1987) 32 McGill Law Journal 2.  
10 Patrick J. Monahan, Constitutional Law, 3rd ed (Toronto: Irwin law, 2006) at 406 [Monahan]. 
11 Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. at 1077 (emphasis added). 
15 McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229 [McKinney]; Harrison v. University of British Columbia, 
[1990] 3 SCR 451 [Harrison]. 
16 Ibid. at para. 36. 
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over individuals.17 While universities are statutory bodies subject to government regulations and 
rely on government funding, the majority reasoned that “universities are autonomous”; they 
control their own affairs, and their internal operations are independent of the government.18 The 
majority did concede, however, that universities might perform some functions that would be 
subject to Charter review.19 Accordingly, the Court adopted the rule that determining whether or 
not the Charter applied was a question of the degree of governmental control over a private 
entity’s specific activity. 
     McKinney was decided alongside three cases with similar fact patterns. For instance, in 
Stoffman and Douglas College, the Court split along the same lines as it did in McKinney.20 The 
same majority held that the Charter applied to colleges while it did not apply to hospitals in 
Douglas College and Stoffman respectively.21 However, the Court distinguished Douglas 
College from McKinney by noting that “[i]n carrying out its functions, the college is performing 
acts of government, and I see no reason why this should not include its actions in dealing with                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
3.2.2 The “Control” Test 
      Following McKinney and Douglas College, Lavigne asked the Court to consider the 
Charter’s applicability to the Ontario Council of Regents (“the Council”) which was responsible 
for bargaining on behalf of college employees.22 The broader question in Lavigne was whether or 
not “a public body…performing a ‘private’ function…under the control of government” ought to 
be subject to the Charter.23 The Court concluded that the provincial government vis-à-vis the 
                                                   
17 Ibid. at para. 191. 
18 Ibid. at para. 372. 
19 Craig Jones, “Immunizing Universities from Charter Review: Are We ‘Contracting Out’ Censorship” (2003) 52 
University of New Brunswick Law Journal 261 at 272. 
20 Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 SCR 483 [Stoffman]; Douglas/Kwanten Faculty Assn. v. 
Douglas College, [1990] 3 SCR 483 [Douglas].  
21 Ibid. 
22 Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 SCR 211 [Lavigne]. 
23 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 37-19 [Hogg]. 
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Minister of Education fully controlled the Council’s activities.24 Further, the Court held that the 
Council was sufficiently controlled by the government and was, therefore, subject to the 
Charter.25 In Lavigne, the Court crafted a novel legal test for determining Charter applicability 
to private entities. This test focused on whether or not the entity in question was subject to 
government control. The Court justified this “control” test on the grounds that “the majority in 
the [previous] cases relied solely on the element of control in determining what fell within the 
apparatus of government”.26 
3.2.3 The “Government/Policy” Test  
     Whereas the Lavigne test inquired into government control, the Court took a slightly different 
approach in Eldridge. The Court’s analysis in Eldridge dealt with the application of the Charter 
to policy decisions.27 In that case, the Charter challenge dealt with a decision by British 
Columbia hospitals to refuse the provisions of sign interpreters to the deaf.28 There, the Court 
maintained the “control” test. Additionally, the Court held that the Charter should apply in cases 
where the entity in question performs a traditional government function or one which amounts to 
the implementation of government policy pursuant to statutory authority.29 The Court qualified 
this test by emphasizing that the specific activity in question must governmental.30 Accordingly, 
in Eldridge, the Court reasoned that by providing medically necessary services pursuant to a 
                                                   
24 Lavigne, supra note 23 at para. 221. 
25 Ibid.. 
26 Ibid. at para. 109. 
27 Eldridge, supra note 3. 
28 Ibid. at para. 35. 
29 Ibid. at para. 44. 
30 Ibid. at para. 90. However, certain other activities like purely internal hiring and firing employees are not 
considered government and would not be subject to the Charter. 
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provincial statute, hospitals perform a specific government objective and allowed the appeal on 
those grounds.31  
3.2.4 Revisiting McKinney  
“There is perhaps a faint argument that the Charter applies to the actions of all 
Canadian corporations, whether publicly or privately owned, and even if they 
engage only in commercial activity.”32 – Professor Peter Hogg 
 
     The above analysis indicates that the current law on the Charter’s scope is inconsistent, and 
more importantly provides lower courts with unclear guidance. For instance, the Court has held 
that the Charter applies to colleges but not universities.33 This is in spite of the fact that colleges 
and universities serve virtually the same function, post-secondary education. In making this 
distinction, the Court noted that colleges are “Crown agenc[ies] established by the government to 
implement government policy”.34 According to the Court, the government’s “direct and 
substantial” control over college governance extended to employment decisions including 
mandatory retirement policies.35 For those reasons, then, the Charter was found to apply to 
colleges. 
     Conversely, in McKinney, the Court accepted the lower court’s analysis that “universities 
[are] essentially private institutions”.36 This was based on the notion that while statutorily 
created and heavily subsidized by the government, universities nonetheless operated 
autonomously from the government.37 As a result, La Forest J. concluded that a university’s 
                                                   
31 Ibid. at para 46. Peter Hogg, pre-Eldridge rejected the “policy test”. Hogg was in favour of the governmental 
control test. However, even on this point, Hogg maintained that that the central question should be “whether or not 
the government has assumed control of the function,” not just the degree of state control over the institution. Peter 
W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 849-50 (emphasis added).  
32 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 671. 
33 McKinney, supra note 15; Douglas, supra note 20.  
34 Douglas, Ibid. at 584.	
35 Ibid. 
36 McKinney, supra note 15 at 257. 
37 Ibid. 
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actions, including mandatory retirement policies were autonomous from government influence, 
and the Charter did not apply to universities on those grounds.38  
     Beyond the fact that colleges and universities and colleges serve the same purpose, this 
decision is problematic. It has considerable rights implications. For example, students or faculty 
members that speak out critically against a university are unable to challenge that censure on 
rights grounds. As I will discuss in chapter five, there is evidence that in cases where students 
were critical of their university on Facebook, the court was forced to address that issue through 
administrative law, rather than under the Charter.  
     Similarly, the Court has also held that the Charter applies to hospitals through governmental 
policy vis-à-vis health care, whereas hospitals are not subject to the Charter where employment 
policy is concerned.39 These decisions are evidence that the Court has not provided a clear 
standard in defining the scope of s. 32. Moreover, when the Court has analyzed s. 32, the legal 
tests it has crafted have been applied inconsistently.   
     Indeed, revisiting McKinney highlights a complementary approach to those enumerated 
above. In a persuasive dissenting opinion, Wilson J. opined that the definition of “government” 
set out by the Court was far too narrow.40 Wilson proposed a different test for assessing whether 
or not an entity was “government” for the purposes of s. 32. This test set out three non-
exhaustive questions whereby an affirmative answer to one or more would be strongly indicative 
that the entity in question was government and ought to be subject to the Charter 
1. Does the legislative, executive or administrative branch of government 
exercise control over the entity? 
2. Does the entity perform a traditional or modern government function [/ 
policy]? 
                                                   
38 Ibid. at 273. 
39 Eldridge, supra note 3; Stoffman, supra note 20. 
40 McKinney, supra note 15 at para. 248. 
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3. Does the entity act pursuant to statutory authority specially granted to it by 
government for purposes that the government seeks ?41  
 
     Wilson developed this test specifically because she thought that the alternatives proposed by 
the majority were too rigid. In particular, she argued that the reason why the “[legal] tests 
designed to identify government inevitably fail is that they assume that government is static”.42 
Wilson further argued for the adoption of the public importance test because the other legal tests 
“[could not] identify some of the more unusual bodies that government creates or becomes 
intricately involved with in the process of pursuing particular government objectives”.43  
     Currently, the Wilson test has not been formally adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court. 
However, in light of the current law on the Charter’s scope, there are compelling reasons for the 
Court to adopt the public importance test. The current legal tests which inquire into whether or 
not an entity, its actions, or policy outcomes are subject to government control is an attempt by 
the Court to generalize what is government for the purposes of s. 32. In McKinney, Wilson was 
concerned that “the government/private action distinction may be difficult to make in some 
circumstances [although] the text of the Charter must be respected”.44 Wilson further noted that 
“the nature of the relationship between the entity and government must be examined in order to 
decide whether when it acts it truly is government…The Charter should not be circumvented by 
the simple expedient of creating an entity and simply having it perform that role”.45 By adopting 
the Wilson test, the Court would broaden the scope of the Charter in such a way that the Charter 
                                                   
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. at 370. 
43 Ibid. at 369. Wilson J. was joined by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in her dissenting opinions in both Stoffman and Douglas 
College. Both advocated adoption of the Wilson test in McKinney.    
44 Ibid. at 240. 
45 Ibid. 
	 30	
could actually serve its intended purpose: to check the power of the government-like institutions 
over the people.  
     In sum, adoption of the Wilson test by the Supreme Court need not represent a radical 
departure from established case law concerning the Charter’s scope. Indeed, the first two prongs 
of this test make the same inquiries as the “government control” and “governmental policy” 
tests.46 Rather, this test merely expands on the existing legal frameworks and would help resolve 
inconsistencies in the jurisprudence. For instance, under this test, post-secondary institutions 
would be subject to the Charter, as would hospitals which are constitutionally provided for under 
s. 92(7) of the Constitution Act, 1982.47 In this regard, Peter Hogg has noted that were it the 
government which implemented mandatory retirement provisions in its employment contracts, 
rather than universities or hospitals; those provisions would undoubtedly be subject to Charter 
review.48 Adopting the Wilson test would certainly go a long way towards clearing up this 
confusion.   
3.3 The Bill of Rights and the Federal Government  
     Unlike the Charter, the American Bill of Rights is a series of constitutional amendments 
rather than a single document. In order to provide a coherent taxonomy of rights in the United 
States, scholars have theorized that rights can be categorized either as liberty rights or as equality 
rights.49 Equality rights claims are typically made by “classes” of citizens whose rights, 
collectively, have been infringed.50 Comparatively, equal rights are analogous to the protections 
                                                   
46 Supra note 42. 
47 Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 92(7). 
48 Hogg, supra note 25 at 37-31. 
49 Thomas Lundmark, Power & Rights in US Constitutional Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 110 
[Lundmark]. 
50 Ibid. Lundmark also notes that the distinction between liberty and equality rights is fluid. For instance, “[a] person 
claiming a liberty right can style herself a group of one, who Is being “discriminated against” on the basis of some 
individual characteristic or behaviour”. Ibid. 
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afforded under s. 15 of the Charter. In the following part of this section, I will discuss the 
application of the Bill of Rights to the federal government. I then turn to rights application to 
state and local governments. In particular, my analysis focuses on the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, I conclude this section by looking at whether or not the Bill of 
Rights applies to private disputes. There, I explore the state action doctrine.  
     Unlike s. 32 of the Charter, the American Bill of Rights contains no provision explicitly 
detailing its scope.51 Rather, the dominant understanding of rights application in the U.S. has 
been developed through the common law.52 In a case concerning the rights application to cities, 
the Court held that “the Bill of Rights was a restriction of federal actions”.53 Chief Justice John 
Marshall, writing for the majority specifically noted that “[t]he constitution was ordained and 
established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not 
for the government of the individual states [or local governments]”.54 
3.4 Applicability of Rights to the States 
     As noted above, the Supreme Court stressed that initially, the Bill of Rights applied 
exclusively to the federal government. However, subsequent constitutional amendments have 
extended the scope of rights protection within the public realm, to state and local governments. 
The process by which rights protections are extended to the states is referred to as incorporation. 
Rights are incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment which provides as follows:  
…No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person 
                                                   
51 The only mention of applicability appears in the 10th amendment which provides: “The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, not prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people”. U.S. Const. Amend. X. 
52 Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, [1833] 32 U.S. 243 [Barron]. 
53 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, 2nd ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2002) at 
471 [Chemerinsky]. 
54 Barron, supra note 53 at 247. 
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of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.55 
 
In a 1908 decisions, a majority of the Court theorized that the Bill of Rights might apply to state 
and local governments through the due process and equal protections clauses of the 14th 
amendment.56  
3.4.1 Incorporation through Due Process   
     In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court addressed in earnest for the first time whether or not 
rights claims could be made against state or local governments.57 These cases concerned rights 
claims made by New Orleans butchers against a large-scale commercial slaughter house which 
had a monopoly on the local industry. In those cases, the Court actually rejected the notion that 
the first eight amendments applied to state and local governments, reasoning that the 
constitutional protections of United States citizens from incursions by the federal government 
ought not to be extended to actions by state or local governments.58 However, the Court later 
overturned the Slaughter-House decisions, holding that the Fifth Amendment could be 
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.59 
     In Gitlow v. New York, the Court held for the first time that the First Amendment right to free 
speech applied to the states through incorporation into the fourteenth amendment.60 In that case, 
Sanford J. concluded that “freedom of speech and of the press are among the fundamental 
                                                   
55 US Const. Amend. XIV § 1. 
56 Twining v. New Jersey, [1908] 211 U.S. 78.  
57 [1873] 83 U.S. 36 [Slaughter-House]. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Chicago, Burling & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, [1897] 166 U.S. 226. 
60 [1925] 268 U.S. 652.  
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personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
from impairment by the States”.61  
     Nonetheless, incorporation of the Bill of Rights is not without controversy and is the subject 
of scholarly debate.62 There are two dominant schools of thought. On one end of the spectrum, 
there is an argument against incorporation on the grounds that the framers of the constitution 
never intended for the Bill of Rights to apply to the states. The primary concern for originalists is 
that applying the Bill of Rights to the states effectively subverts the division of powers in the 
United States by encroaching upon the autonomy of states.63 Alternatively, selective 
incorporationists maintain that incorporation is necessary because there are certain rights which 
are of such a fundamental nature that they must apply to the states.64 In spite of the fact that the 
Supreme Court has been more willing to incorporate rights, this debate is important. This is 
because the incorporation challenges the very individualistic nature of the United States. 
However, the Court has been more willing to incorporate rights than not.  
3.5 The State Action Doctrine and Private Conduct 
     At first glance, it would seem as though the Bill of Rights does not apply to private disputes. 
Indeed, s. 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment makes specific reference to state action in regards to 
the scope of rights protection.65 The state action doctrine comports with the dominant principle 
                                                   
61 Ibid. at 666 (emphasis added). Two years later the Court actually struck down a state law on the grounds that the 
First Amendment applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fiske v. 
Kansas, [1927] 274 U.S. 380. 
62 Chemerinsky, supra note 54 at 480. 
63 Ibid. at 481. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Supra note 56. The State Action doctrine is one of the most complex aspects of American constitutional law and 
has been the subject of vibrant debate. See e.g. Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1998); Lilian BeVier & John Harrison, “The State Action Principle and its Critics” (2010) 96 
Virginia Law Review 8. Mark Tushnet has also written extensively on the nuances of the state action doctrine, 
largely from a comparative perspective. See e.g. Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and 
Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) [Tushnet].   
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underpinning American self-understanding: limited government and freedom from regulation.66 
In the American constitutional culture, private wrongs are thought to be sufficiently regulated by 
ordinary statutes and the common law irrespective of how egregious they are.67 
     Is it possible then, for rights to apply to private conduct through state action? Answering this 
question requires the Court to evaluate the relationship between private actors or private actors 
and the government on a case-by-case basis. It also suggests a willingness on the part of the 
Court to entertain these claims. There are at least seven legal tests for assessing state action.  
     The most prominent of these tests in the Public Function Test. This test inquires into whether 
or not the entity in question performs an exclusively traditional governmental function.68 For 
example, in Marsh v. Alabama, the Court was asked to answer the question of whether or not a 
private corporation which owned a town was beholden to the Bill of Rights.69 In Marsh, the 
Court held that the corporation, by performing functions traditionally ascribed to municipal 
governments, could not prevent the Jehovah’s Witnesses from distributing their pamphlets.70 The 
Court, however, narrowly tailored the scope of the public function test. For instance, in Jackson 
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., a rights claim was made against a private utility company on the 
grounds that traditionally, utilities had been the responsibility of government.71 The Supreme 
Court swiftly dismissed this argument, holding that private entities had provided utilities, and as 
a result, there was no state action.72  
                                                   
66 Lundmark, supra note 50 at 113. 
67 Chemerinsky, supra note 54 at 488. Exceptions here include, but are not limited to: San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee, [1987] 483 U.S. 522; Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 
[1995] 513 U.S. 374. 
68 Ibid. 
69 [1946] 326 U.S. 501. 
70 Ibid.  
71 [1974] 419 U.S. 345. 
72 Ibid. 
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     The second way in which private action can be considered state action for the purposes of 
constitutional review is if government is found to have exercised “coercive power” over the 
entity. This is referred to as the state compulsion test.73 In addressing the justiciability of rights 
claims in a dispute between nursing home residents and the nursing home where they resided; 
the Court maintained that “[the] choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State”.74 The 
state compulsion test applies when the state “coerces or encourages a private entity to engage in 
the challenged conduct”.75 By examining the degree of state influence, the state compulsion test 
appears to be broader in scope than the public function test.  
     The third standard for assessing the presence of state action is whether or not there is a nexus 
between the state and the private entity in question. Julie Brown has identified six criteria set out 
by the Supreme Court for evaluating whether or not there is a “nexus”:  
1) state regulation, no matter its extent; 2) public funding of a private group; 3) 
private use of public property; 4) minor presence of public officials on the board 
of a private entity; 5) the mere approval or acquiescence of the state in private 
activity; and 6) utilization of public services by private actors.76  
 
     A related, yet more loosely crafted test, is the symbiotic relationship test.77 This test requires a 
high degree of interdependence between the state and the entity in question for there to be a 
finding of state action. This test has been employed in the context of racially restrictive 
covenants for home ownership.78 However, the Court has not employed this test since 1961.79 
                                                   
73 Julie K. Brown, “Less is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine” (2008) 73 Missouri Law Review 2 at 565 
[Brown].  
74 Blum v. Yaretsky, [1982] 457 U.S. 991 at 1005. 
75 Paul C. McCaffrey, “Playing Fair: Why the United States Anti-Doping Agency’s Performance-Enhanced 
Adjudications Should be Treated as State Action” (2006) 22 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 1 at 
644. 
76 Brown, supra note 73 at 566. it is important to note that the presence of any of these criteria is not indicia of state 
action. Rather, a stronger indication of state action is if a combination of these factors are present in a given case. 
Ibid. 
77 Ibid. at 567. Erwin Chemerinsky has referred to this test as the entanglements exception. Chemerinsky, supra note 
54 at 505. 
78 Shelley v. Kraemer, [1948] 334 U.S. 1. 
79 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auhtority, [1961] 365 U.S. 715. 
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The joint participation test represents an evolution of the symbiotic relationship test.80 This test 
was first employed in a case which concerned a woman who was denied service at a restaurant 
and arrested for trespassing because “she was in the company of Negroes”.81 The Court found 
that police enforcement of the trespassing statute “cloaked [the establishment] with the authority 
of the state” such that there was state action.82 
     The sixth test for assessing state action concerns whether or not the entity in question is an 
“agency of the state”.83 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors was a case which dealt with racist 
admissions policies to a school in Philadelphia. According to the Court, in that case, the state 
agency applies when the agency in question represents the state.84 
     The final test conceived by the Court is the entwinement test. This test inquires into whether 
or not the state exerts sufficient influence on the entity, by examining the entity’s composition, 
for instance, its membership and board of directors for the significant presence of public 
officials.85 Under the entwinement test, then, the government has to be “entwined with the 
private group’s management or control”.86  
     In addition to the tests crafted by the Supreme Court, the Circuit Courts of Appeal have also 
attempted to define state action.87 It is no wonder that Professor Charles Black referred to the 
                                                   
80 Brown, supra note 73. 
81 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., [1970] 398 U.S. 144 at 147-148. 
82 Gregory D. Malaska, “American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan: “Meta-Analysis” as a 
Tool to Navigate Through the Supreme Court’s “State Action” Maze” (2001) 17 Journal of Contemporary Health 
Law and Policy 2 at 630. 
83 Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, [2001] 531 U.S. 288 (quoting 
Pennsylvannia v. Board of Directors, [1957] 353 U.S. 230) at 296 [Brentwood Academy]. 
84 Pennsylvannia v. Board of Directors, [1957] 353 U.S. 230. This is also an under-utilized test. 
85 See generally, Brentwood Academy, supra note 84. The dissenting justices in that case as well as legal 
commentators have opined that the majority did not clearly define what entwinement actually meant. See e.g. Josiah 
N. Drew, “The Sixth Circuit Dropped the Ball: An Analysis of Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Ass’n in Light of the Supreme Court’s Recent Trends in State Action Jurisprudence” (2001) 1313 BYU Law 
Review 3.   
86 Supra note 79. 
87 Brown, supra note 73 at 568-572. 
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state action doctrine as a “conceptual disaster”.88 The courts in the United States have yet to 
consolidate the myriad legal tests for state action, even though they recently have had the 
opportunity to do so.89 The prominent explanation here is that “it is analytically possible to 
conceptualize any private infringement of constitutional values as a result of government 
inaction”.90 In this regard, Mark Tushnet neatly describes state action as “[the] application of 
constitutional norms to…the background rules of law – property law, contract law, tort law”.91  
While this describes the principles which inform the current state action analysis, the Court 
ought to operationalize Tushnet’s conceptualization by developing a singular, coherent test.  
3.6 Scope of Rights in a Comparative Perspective 
     The above analysis reveals that current law on the application of the Charter and the 
American Bill of Rights is rather complicated. The Canadian Court, in particular, has been 
unable to define the precise scope of rights protection in any coherent manner. Nevertheless, 
there are two differences between the Canadian and American approaches which emerged from 
my analysis in the previous two sections which I will expand upon here. The first difference 
concerns the rights application to branches of government, and the second with the boundaries of 
rights protection in both countries.  
     As I noted, the Bill of Rights has been found to apply to private action.92 However, this is not 
the case with the Canadian Court’s understanding of the Charter’s scope.93 Here, the American 
experience is instructive. Applying the Charter to the judiciary would not automatically result in 
rights claims being made in virtually every legal dispute. Moreover, because the Charter does 
                                                   
88 Charles L. Black Jr, “The Supreme Court, 1966 – Foreward: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s 
Proposition 14” (1967) 81 Harvard Law Review 69 at 95. 
89 See Wickersham v. City of Columbia, 481 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, [2007] 128 U.S. 387. 
90 Chemerinsky, supra note 54 at 490. 
91 Tushnet, supra note 65 at 162-163. 
92 See e.g. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [1964] 376 U.S. 254.  
93 Supra notes 8, 10. 
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not confer rights in absolute terms, legislatures would still be able to retain a degree of 
autonomy.  
     The second way in which the application of the Charter and the American Bill of Rights 
differ is in terms of the scope of rights protection in a broader sense. The jurisprudence in both 
countries on the scope of rights in both countries has been inconsistent. However, the approach 
taken by the United States Supreme Court has been more principled and predictable. Whereas 
there is asymmetry in the jurisprudence on the Charter’s application to post-secondary 
institutions, the approach taken in the United States distinguishes between public and private, 
rather than the type of entity. This approach still allows for rights claims in private disputes 
through one of the tests outlined in the previous section.   
     Similarly, the willingness to entertain rights claims in private litigation also differs between 
Canada and the United States. The Supreme Court of Canada and the United States Supreme 
Court have not been keen to grant rights protection to private actors. Paradoxically, however, the 
United States Supreme Court has been more willing to extend rights protection to the private 
sphere than has the Supreme Court of Canada. Simply put, the current law on the Charter’s 
scope is arguably more “conceptually disastrous” than that on state action in the United States. 
The comparison between Canada and the United States in this regard presents another 
compelling reason why the Supreme Court of Canada ought to adopt the Wilson test in 
McKinney.  
3.7 Conclusion 
     In this chapter, I focused on the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
and the American Bill of Rights. The first part of my analysis dealt with the direct and indirect 
application of the Charter. There, I argued that the inconsistency of the jurisprudence on the 
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Charter’s scope is problematic. Accordingly, I proposed a legal test derived from Wilson J’s 
dissent in McKinney which I believe would resolve most inconsistencies. The second part of this 
chapter addressed the application of the Bill of Rights. My primary concern there was evaluating 
the state action doctrine and how it has been interpreted in such a way that it allows for rights 
claims in private disputes. Finally, I contrasted the approaches taken by the Canadian and 
American courts to argue that while both are not without their problems, the interpretation of the 
state action doctrine is more consistent and principled than the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
approach to interpreting the scope of s. 32.
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Chapter 4 
Themes of Free Expression in the Literature 
 
4.1 Introduction 
     In this chapter, I will discuss the Canadian and American approaches to freedom of 
expression. In the first part of this chapter, I will discuss why freedom of expression is not only 
protected in Canada and the United States but also why it is considered a fundamental right. 
There, I will discuss the three prominent justifications for protecting expression: its link to 
democracy, its utility in discovering truth, and its centrality to autonomy and self-realization. In 
the second part of this chapter, I will explore types of expression which are not protected in 
Canada and the United States, or enjoy limited protection. These are hate speech, obscenity, 
defamation, and commercial expression. In the final section of this chapter, I will compare the 
Canadian and American approaches. There, I will argue that the American Court has furnished a 
more liberal interpretation of expression than the Canadian Court has.  
4.2 Rationale for Protecting Expression and the Press 
     It is established fact that freedom of expression is central to Canadian and American 
democratic self-understanding. In this section, I am therefore unconcerned with debates about if 
these freedoms ought to be protected. Rather, my focus here is why they are protected and the 
processes which brought about entrenchment of these rights.   
     The literature on freedom of expression in Canada and the United States identifies three 
prominent reasons why freedom of expression and freedom of the press are not only protected 
but also considered “fundamental”.1 These explanations are democracy/self-governance, the 
                                                   
1 This is an allusion to s. 2 of the Charter which is entitled fundamental freedoms; it is also a reference to the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which contains clauses addressing speech and the press. Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, s. 2, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11, s. 2(b); U.S. Const. amend. I. 
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discovery of truth and knowledge, the protection and promotion of autonomy, self-realization, 
and tolerance.2 Each of these explanations will be discussed in turn.  
4.2.1 Democracy and Self-Governance 
     As I noted above, the ability of people to legally express themselves is a central feature of 
Canadian and American democracies. This is an idea which originated in the United States.3 
Following the enactment of the Sedition Act, James Madison argued that the First Amendment 
was necessary because it would counteract the deleterious effects of the Sedition Act or similar 
attempts at censure. The Sedition Act prohibited political speech critical of the federal 
government by making such speech punishable by fines or imprisonment.4 Madison warned that 
the Sedition Act “produce[s] universal alarm; because it is levelled against the right of freely 
examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people 
thereon, which has even been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right”.5  
     Drawing on Madison’s assertion that the First Amendment was crafted and intended to 
exclusively protect political speech, Alexander Meiklejohn has argued that free expression is 
fundamental to American democracy in the sense that public decisions must be informed by 
“universal suffrage”.6 Specifically, Meiklejohn posited that “[t]he principle of freedom of speech 
springs from the necessities of the program of self-government”.7 These accounts of freedom of 
                                                   
2 Richard Moon, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2000) at 9-21 [Moon]; Thomas Lundmark, Power & Rights in US Constitutional Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) at 128-29. The explanations fleshed out by both Moon and Lundmark are “frequently 
overlapping” rather than mutually exclusive. Moon at 9; Lundmark at 128-129.  
3 Moon, Ibid. at 14. See also Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (New York: 
Kennikat Press, 1972) [Meiklejohn]; Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: The 
Free Press, 1993) [Sunstein]. 
4 Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 stat. 596 (1798).  
5 James Madison, “Report of January 7, 1800” in David Mattern et al., eds 17 Papers of James Madison 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1991) at 141.  
6 Meiklejohn, supra note 3 at 27. 
7 Ibid. at 26. 
	 42	
expression in the United States were undoubtedly compelling in the context of the enactment of 
the First Amendment. Currently, however, they are unsatisfying. Specifically, there are a variety 
of new ways in which people choose to express themselves which, based on a Madisonian 
interpretation, would not be protected. In that sense, it is a rather archaic conceptualization of 
free speech which does not comport with contemporary values.   
     On the latter point, Cass Sunstein suggests that limiting the scope of free speech protection to 
political speech is inconsistent with the values of the United States.8 Specifically, Sunstein 
maintains that “free speech values are likely to be plural and diverse” and that the “problem with 
unitary or monistic theories is that…[t]hey fail to perceive the multiple interests served by 
constitutional guarantees”.9 This is not in any way to suggest that James Madison and the other 
framers of the Bill of Rights should have endorsed universal protection of speech at the outset. 
Rather, it is to suggest that Meiklejohn’s interpretation of the First Amendment was too narrow. 
     In Canada, the discourse around protecting freedom of expression began at least 45 years 
before the adoption of the Charter. Alberta’s Social Credit government in the 1930s enacted a 
suite of legislation which included provisions through which the provincial government exerted 
direct control over what newspapers published and the sources they used.10 In turn, the Supreme 
Court was asked to provide an opinion on the constitutionality of the Social Credit provisions 
vis-à-vis the reference procedure. In regards to the provision limiting the press, Duff C.J. 
reasoned that while Canada had no concrete bill of rights at the time, there was an implied bill of 
rights based on the constitution of the United Kingdom.11 The courts could, therefore, strike 
                                                   
8 Sunstein, supra note 3 at 124.  
9 Ibid. at 125.  
10 Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] SCR 100 [Alberta Press] at 142. 
11 Ibid. at 146.  
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down legislation that was seen to violate traditional human rights on that basis.12 In regards to 
freedom of expression, Duff further noted that “free public discussion is…the breath of life for 
parliamentary institutions”.13 
     Ultimately, the Duff Doctrine laid the groundwork for more robust rights frameworks such as 
the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights and the Charter.14 Nevertheless, the Duff Doctrine was 
successfully employed to strike down legislation which prohibited the dissemination of literature 
by Jehovah’s Witnesses and alleged communists as ultra vires on freedom of expression 
grounds.15 At the core of the Duff Doctrine’s application in these cases is the relationship 
between political speech and freedom of expression which is integral to Canadian democracy.  
4.2.2 Discovery of Truth and Self Knowledge  
      The second explanation for why Canada and the United States have codified protections for 
expression is that allowing a diversity of viewpoints helps flesh out the truth. John Stuart Mill 
argued that even if ideas are proven to be wrong, some aspect[s] of them may, in fact, be 
truthful.16 Furthermore, Mill posited that even if the state were capable of infallibly identifying 
false ideas, there would still be a negative effect on the search for truth.17  
     In Canada and the United States, the discovery of truth certainly influenced decisions to 
protect speech. As I discussed above, the adoption of the First Amendment was largely 
concerned with the threat of suppressed speech on American democracy. Scholars have noted 
                                                   
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. at 133. In this sense, the Alberta Press case built on a 1929 decision by the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (“JCPC”) wherein the JCPC held, rather generally, that the Constitution ought to be interpreted in a broad 
and progressive manner. See Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1929] UKPC 86.  
14 Ian Greene, The Charter of Rights (Toronto: Lorimer, 1989) at 20. Ian Greene has noted that the Duff Doctrine 
did not gain meaningful traction with the Supreme Court, otherwise “there might have been less public demand for a 
charter of rights and freedoms”. Ibid. 
15 Saumur v. Québec (City of), [1953] 2 SCR 299; Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] SCR 285. 
16 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Harmondsworth: Penguin, [1859] 1982) [On Liberty] at 108. 
17 Ibid. at 76. This is referred to as the “marketplace of ideas”. Although, Mill qualified his argument by advocating 
for censored expression if such expression caused harm. Ibid. at 97, 68. 
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that “[i]t is the enlightenment function which constitutes the foundation upon which the First 
Amendment edifice largely rests”.18 In this regard, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes posited that 
“the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market [of ideas], and that the truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be 
carried out”.19 More recently, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the enlightenment 
function of the First Amendment to mean that “[f]ree trade in ideas means free trade in the 
opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts”.20  
     Critics of this position maintain that the promotion of truth served by freedom of expression is 
problematic because it compels the “listener” to hear a message.21 My brief response to this 
criticism in the context of this thesis is that the entire purpose of the broadcasting industry and 
broadcasters more generally is to provide a diverse set of perspectives by disseminating content 
that is intended to “inform, enlighten, and entertain”.22 Therefore, the question is not so much 
about the ability of broadcasters to disseminate a message, but rather for the public to hear that 
message. Nevertheless, this should not confer upon broadcasters an absolute right to broadcast 
their message.23  
     Mill’s argument concerning the discovery truth holds true in the Canadian context as well. In 
spite of the fact that it seems like an obvious proposition, the literature on freedom of expression 
                                                   
18 Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech: A Treatise on the Theory of the First Amendment, Student 
ed. (New York: Matthew Bender, 1984) at 1-7 [Nimmer]. 
19 Abrams v. United States, [1919] 250 U.S. 616 at 630. 
20 Thomas v. Collins, [1945] 323 U.S. 516 at 537. The Supreme Court has clarified this interpretation, noting that 
“[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse 
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public...” Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, [1969] 
394 U.S. 131 at 139-140.  
21 Nimmer, supra note 18 at 1-20. Whether or not these criticisms are valid or correct is beyond the scope of this 
section. My purpose here is simply to explain the relationship between the truth-seeking function of free expression 
and the First Amendment. Rather, whether or not an audience ought to be constitutionally compelled to hear a 
message is an intriguing argument that I will explore in greater detail in chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
22 Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c.11, s. 2(1). 
23 The specific exceptions to constitutionally protected speech will be elaborated on in sections in the following two 
sections of this chapter. 
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in Canada neglects to discuss the discovery of self-truth as a driver for including freedom of 
expression in the Charter. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on freedom of 
expression does make specific reference to this ideal. For instance, in R. v. Keegstra, Dickson 
C.J., writing for a majority of the Court argued that “the state should not be the sole arbiter of 
truth”.24  
     Similarly, in a case dealing with restrictions on advertising to children by a toy company, 
Dickson, again writing for the majority outlined three specific principles which form the core of 
free expression in Canada. The presence of at least one of which would indicate that the 
expressive medium or content in question ought to be protected. These principles were: 
 “(1) seeking and attaining the truth…(2) participation in social and political 
decision-making…(3) the diversity in forms of individuals self-fulfillment and 
human flourishing ought to be cultivated, in an essentially tolerant, indeed 
welcoming environment…for the sake of those to whom it is conveyed”.25 
 
Based on Dickson’s writings in these cases then, it is abundantly clear that one of the reasons the 
Charter protects freedom of expression is that it serves to encourage the marketplace of ideas.  
4.2.3 Autonomy, Self-Realization and Tolerance 
     The final explanation for why freedom of expression is constitutionally protected is that “it 
protects individual autonomy”.26 According to this line of reasoning, not protecting expression or 
even censoring is an affront to autonomy and the potential for self-realization because censorship 
presupposes that people cannot properly or appropriately interpret messages that are conveyed to 
                                                   
24 [1990] 3 SCR 697 at 762 [Keegstra]. 
25 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Attorney General), [1990] 1 SCR 927 at 976-77 [Irwin Toy]. This decision reaffirmed 
the Court’s earlier ruling in Ford v. Québec, [1988] 2 SCR 712. Interestingly, in Irwin Toy, the Court found that the 
impugned legislation did violate s. 2(b) of the Charter. However, it was saved under s.1 because Irwin Toy failed to 
show that the deleterious effects on speech went beyond minimal impairment. 
26 Moon, supra note 2 at 19. 
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them.27 The corollary to this argument, presented by Ronald Dworkin, is that the state shows 
disregard for the speaker when they choose not to protect expression.28  
     Unlike the previous two justifications for protecting expression, here there is no clear nexus 
between the present justification of protecting freedom of expression and debates concerning the 
entrenchment of that right in either Canada or the United States. Nevertheless, in the American 
context, Justice Thurgood Marshall alluded to this connection by noting that “[t]he First 
Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit – a spirit 
that demands self-expression”.29  
     Alternatively, Robert Bork has criticized this position by arguing that “[autonomy and self-
realization do] not distinguish speech from any other human activity”.30 Bork further notes that 
“[o]ne cannot, on neutral grounds, choose to protect speech on this basis more than one protects 
any other claimed freedom”.31 Bork is certainly right to point out that there is no hierarchy of 
rights. For example, there is a long-standing debate concerning whether or not pornography 
warrants constitutional protection. This is because pornography poses the potential for harm.32 In 
this sense, the argument that expression may harm the listener, rather than promote autonomy 
and self-realization, is compelling. However, as I will discuss in the following sections of this 
                                                   
27 Thomas Scanlon, “A Theory of Freedom of Expression” in Ronald Dworkin, ed, The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977) at 162.  
28 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) at 386. Other 
versions of this theory focus on the relationship between freedom of expression, self-realization, and tolerance. My 
aim here is to provide an overview of this theory. For a more in depth discussion see e.g. Lorraine E. Weinrib, 
“Does Money Talk? Commercial Expression in the Canadian Constitutional Context” in David Schneiderman, ed, 
Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Toronto: Carswell, 1991); C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom 
of Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); For a discussion of the connection between freedom of 
expression and tolerance, see Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in 
America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
29 Procunier v. Martinez, [1974] 416 U.S. 396 at 427. Commentators have argued that autonomy and self-realization 
should be the dominant value of the First Amendment. Martin H. Redish, “The Value of Free Speech” (1982) 130 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 291.  
30 Robert Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems” (1971) 47 Indiana Law Journal 1 at 25. 
31 Ibid. 
32 See e.g. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).  
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chapter, it is precisely because of the harmful effects of certain types of expression that the there 
are limits on expression.    
     In Canada, there is limited discussion of autonomy and self-realization as being values of free 
expression in the jurisprudence. Scholars have nonetheless theorized that these values are 
accounted for in s. 2(b) of the Charter. For instance, Richard Moon suggests that freedom of 
expression be linguistically recast as a positive liberty, rather than simply “a right not to be 
interfered with”.33 In that sense, Moon is explicitly advocating for a novel account of freedom of 
expression focusing on “the importance of communication and social interaction to individual 
development”.34 More saliently, autonomy and self-realization are among the principles 
identified by the Supreme Court of Canada in Iwrin Toy, one of the Court’s leading decisions on 
freedom of expression.35  
4.3 The Scope of Freedom of Expression  
     To this point, I have demonstrated the importance of protecting expression. The Canadian and 
American Courts have outlined areas where the scope of freedom of expression is limited or does 
not apply altogether. In the remainder of this section, I will focus on these exceptions. More 
specifically, I will focus on those types of expression which are consistent with the types of 
expression claims that are made in the cases I have selected. These areas are: hate speech, 
obscenity, defamation, commercial speech.36  
 
                                                   
33 Richard Moon, “The Scope of Freedom of Expression” (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 2 at 345. 
34 Ibid. For Moon, Rawls and Dworkin’s silence on this point is problematic.  
35 Irwin Toy, supra note 25. 
36 Readers will note that I have not included a discussion of internet speech here. This discussion is more relevant to 
my discussion of broadcasters in chapters five through seven than it is here. Additionally, the other types of limited 
or restricted speech discussed below are all issues which are central to evaluating the type and scope of rights 
protections afforded to broadcasters as well as their rights obligations. Moreover, internet speech, by definition is 
broadcasting.  
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4.3.1 Hate Speech in Canada 
     In Canada, hate speech is regulated by the Criminal Code of Canada (“Criminal Code”), at 
the federal level, and Human Rights provisions at the provincial and territorial levels.37 Keegstra 
gave the Supreme Court its first opportunity to address whether or not the Criminal Code 
provision prohibiting “inciting harm towards a particular group” offended s. 2(b) of the 
Charter.38 In that case, James Keegstra, a high school teacher, was accused of “unlawfully 
promoting hatred against an identifiable group by communicating anti-Semitic statements to his 
students”.39 He “expected his students to reproduce his teachings in class and on exams. If they 
failed to do so, their marks suffered”.40 The Court found that s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code 
violated s. 2(b) of the Charter because “hate propaganda can[not] be seen as threats of violence 
or analogous to such threats, so as to deny protection under s. 2(b)”.41 
      The analysis in Keegstra subsequently turned to whether or not s. 319 could be saved under 
s. 1 of the Charter. Dickson concluded that the impugned provision was a reasonable limit, 
noting in particular that hate propaganda cause “very real harm” “which is sufficiently 
substantial to warrant [pressing and substantial] concern”.42 Dickson further concluded that 
Parliament’s aim of limiting the harm associated with hate speech and that “s. 319(2) create[d] a 
                                                   
37 Criminal Code, R.S.C 1985, c C-46, ss. 318-320 [Criminal Code]. S. 318 of the Criminal Code prohibits 
advocating genocide, s. 319 prohibits inciting harm towards a particular group, and s. 320 provides for the 
confiscation of materials which promote hateful propaganda. Interestingly, hate speech was also prohibited by s. 13 
of the Canadian Human Rights Act which was repealed because it was seen as too restrictive and tantamount to 
censoring expression. Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 13(1) [rep. 2013]; Bill C-304, An Act to 
Amend the Canadian Human Rights Acting (Protecting Freedom), 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2013; Provincially, for 
example, s. 14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code explicitly prohibits publication of any kind which 
“exposes or tends to expose to hatred any person or class of persons on a prohibited ground”. Saskatchewan Human 
Rights Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-241, s. 14(1)(b).       
38 Criminal Code, Ibid. at s. 319; Keegstra, supra note 24. 
39 Ibid. at 713. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. at 733. Dickson C.J. was very careful to uphold the interpretation of freedom of expression it developed in 
Irwin Toy. In particular, the Court noted that “Irwin Toy can be seen as…reaffirming and strengthening the large and 
liberal interpretation given the freedom in s. 2(b) by the Court in Ford”. Ibid. at 728.  
42 Keegstra, supra note 24 at 746-47. 
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narrowly confined offence” and that the impairment on freedom of expression was minimal.43 
Accordingly, s. 319(2) was upheld under s. 1. 
     The second landmark decision in which the Supreme Court addressed hate speech was R. v. 
Zundel. In that case, Ernst Zundel, a Holocaust denier was charged with “spreading false news” 
under s. 181 of the Criminal Code for publishing and distributing a pamphlet alleging that the 
Holocaust never happened.44 The Court’s discussion of freedom of expression in that case 
closely followed its decision in Keegstra. McLachlin J. concluded that “a law which forbids 
expression of a minority or “false” view on pain of criminal prosecution or imprisonment, on its 
face, offends the purpose of the guarantee of free expression”.45 McLachlin noted in particular 
that material which is unpopular or controversial “is most in need of protection under the 
guarantee of free speech”.46 
     Where Zundel differs from Keegstra, however, is in terms of the Court’s s. 1 analysis. In 
Zundel, McLachlin posited that “[when it enacted s. 181] Parliament has identified no social 
problem, much less one of pressing concern”.47 In this sense, McLachlin distinguished Zundel 
from Keegstra because the legislative intent of the impugned provisions in the latter case was 
abundantly clear and narrowly tailored. S. 181 was struck down on those grounds.48  
 
                                                   
43 Ibid. at 771, 786-88. 
44 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 [Zundel]; Peter Hogg has noted that Zundel was charged under the false news provision 
rather than the hate propaganda provision of the Criminal Code because an offence under s. 319(2) “require[d] the 
consent of the Attorney General [of Ontario]…[who] refused his consent, presumably because he was unsure 
whether denying the Holocaust constituted an offence under s. 319(2)”. Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 
student ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 43-30, note 169. 
45 Zundel, Ibid. at 753.  
46 Ibid. This is referred to as “content neutrality”.  
47 Ibid. at 764. 
48 More recently, the Court has addressed hate speech in Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, 
[2013] 1 S.C.R. 467 [Whatcott]. In that case, the Court held that while the s. 14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan Human 
Rights Code violated s. 2(b) of the Charter, it was nonetheless saved by s. 1. 
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4.3.2 Hate Speech in the United States 
     The United States Supreme Court has been relatively silent on hate speech as a distinct 
concept. For instance, in 1942, Murphy J. noted that “there are certain well-defined classes of 
speech…the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous and the insulting or ‘fighting words’ – 
those which by their very utterances inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace”.49 Murphy did not, however, enumerate a distinct category for hate speech.   
     Ten years after the Court’s first discussion of hate speech in Chaplinsky, the Court was once 
again asked to address “hate speech”. On that issue, the Court held that “[a state could] punish 
the same utterance directed at a defined group”.50 Accordingly, the Court upheld the impugned 
legislation.51 However, since that decision, scholars have questioned whether or not Beauharnais 
is still good law.52 This is because the impugned speech in Beauharnais was political in nature 
and would likely be protected on that basis.53 
     More recently, the Court addressed the issue of hate speech in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.54 In 
that case, the accused burned a cross on the front lawn of an African American family’s home.55 
The accused was subsequently charged under a municipal provision prohibiting such action.56 
Scalia J., writing for a unanimous Court, struck down the municipal provision on the basis that 
the municipal ordinance “is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted 
                                                   
49 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, [1942] 315 U.S. 568 at 572. 
50 Beauharnais v. Illinois, [1952] 343 U.S. 250 at 258. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, 2nd ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2002) at 
978 [Chemerinsky]. Additionally, various circuit courts of appeal have echoed this sentiment. See e.g. American 
Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).	
53 Chemerinsky, Ibid. 
54 [1992] 505 U.S. 377 [R.A.V]. 
55 Ibid. at 380. 
56 Ibid. 
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speech on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses”.57 The Beauharnais decision strongly 
suggests that the Supreme Court has been sympathetic to First Amendment claims, even those 
which are hateful towards an identifiable group. 
4.3.3 Obscenity in Canada 
     As is the case with hate speech, obscenity is problematic in two ways. First, by its very 
nature, it is “degrading, dehumanizing, and inimical to other Charter values, especially the 
equality of women”.58 It also presents courts with the task of crafting extremely specific 
parameters that distinguish material that has artistic value from obscene material which depicts 
or advocates violence or otherwise results in harm.  
     The Supreme Court of Canada was first presented with the issue of obscenity in R. v. Butler.59 
In that case, Donald Butler was charged with “selling obscene material…possessing obscene 
material for the purposes of distribution…possessing obscene material for the purposes of 
sale…[and] exposing obscene material to public view”.60 In Butler, a majority of the Court 
rejected the argument that pornography could not be protected expression because it is “purely 
physical and does not convey or attempt to convey meaning”.61 Sopinka J. writing for the 
majority noted that “[t]he subject matter of the materials in this case is clearly “physical”, but 
                                                   
57 Ibid. at 381. Similarly, the Supreme Court held in 2011 that the homophobic content of placards carried by 
members of the Westboro Baptist Church at the memorial service of an openly homosexual soldier was protected 
speech because “[First Amendment] protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was 
outrageous”. Snyder v. Phelps, [2011] 562 U.S. 443 at 1219. Justice Alito authored a scathing dissent in which he 
wrote “[o]ur profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault 
that occurred in this case”. Ibid. at 1222 (emphasis added).      
58 Robert J. Sharpe & Kent Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 5th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2013) at 174 
[Sharpe & Roach]. 
59 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 [Butler]. 
60 Ibid. at 461. 
61 Ibid. at 486-87. 
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this does not mean that the materials convey or attempt to convey meaning such that they are 
without expressive content”.62  
     Sopinka then explored when sexually explicit material should be considered obscene. Sopinka 
reasoned that this distinction should be made on the basis of whether or not the material in 
question offended community standards. He noted specifically that this meant “what the 
community would tolerate others being exposed to on the basis of the degree of harm that may 
flow from such exposure”.63 Based on the community standards test, Sopinka outlined three 
classifications of pornographic material:  
1. Sex coupled with violence will always constitute the undue exploitation of 
sex.  
2. Explicit sex which is dehumanizing or degrading may be undue if the risk of 
harm is substantial.  
3. Explicit sex that is not violent and neither degrading nor dehumanizing is 
generally tolerated…unless it employs children in its production.64  
 
Accordingly, Sopinka “found that it was possible to interpret an offence originally intended to 
protect a certain view of sexual morality as having evolved to the point where it now protects 
against sexual violence and the denial of equality of women”.65 
     Ultimately, the Court held that because of the creative decisions central to the creation of 
pornography, restricting pornography violated s. 2(b) of the Charter.66 However, as was the case 
with its hate speech jurisprudence, the Sopinka held that the prohibitions on obscenity could be 
                                                   
62 Ibid. at 487. In this sense, the decision in Butler reverses, to a certain extent the scope of protected expression 
detailed in Irwin Toy.  
63 Ibid. at 485.  
64 Ibid. Note that this harm test was clarified in R. v. Labaye. There, the Court set out a two-part test for assessing 
harm. First, the nature of the harm had to (1) interfere with individual autonomy or liberty, (2) “predispose others to 
antisocial behaviour”, and (3) result in physical or psychological harm. Second, “the harm or potential harm” had to 
interfere with the “proper functioning of society”. [2005] 3 SCR 728 at para. 62.  
65 Sharpe and Roach, supra note 58 at 175. While the classifications Sopinka derives are coherent and well defined, 
the community standards test problematic because it is far too subjective. Sopinka did not clearly define what the 
requirement is for offending the community. For example, an individual might be tolerant of pornography which is 
violent and degrading and be willing to subject their neighbour to such material. Conversely, someone else might 
take great exception to any kind of pornography.  
66 Butler, supra note 59 at 489-90. 
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saved under s. 1. There, he rejected the moral basis of the obscenity laws, while maintaining that 
Parliament could “legislate on the basis of some fundamental conception of morality”.67  
     The second landmark decision in which the Court addressed obscenity was Little Sisters.68 
That case dealt with gay and lesbian materials which were being shipped to a Vancouver store 
and were confiscated by customs officials.69 In that case, Binnie J. writing for the majority found 
that the confiscation of the imported materials constituted a justifiable violation of s. 2(b).70 
Binnie further concluded that requiring customs officials to take measures to protect Charter 
rights “would be unnecessarily rigid”.71 Butler and Little Sisters makes clear that the Court’s 
understanding of obscenity is consistent with its treatment of hate speech to the extent that 
obscene material has the potential to cause harm. While the Court did uphold the impugned 
provisions in these cases, it nonetheless clearly signalled to the government that morality based 
restrictions on obscenity would not pass s. 2(b) scrutiny, although they would likely be saved 
under s. 1.   
4.3.4 Obscenity in the United States 
     In the United States, the first decision addressing obscenity was Roth v. United States.72 In 
that case, Samuel Roth had been charged under a federal statute with mailing “obscene, lewd, 
lascivious or filthy” material in the form of a pornographic magazine.73 Brennan J. writing for 
the majority noted that “obscenity [is] utterly without redeeming social importance”.74 Brennan 
                                                   
67 Ibid. at 493. For a more recent decision on obscenity with a similar result see R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45.   
68 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 SCR 1120 [Little Sisters]. 
69 Ibid. at para. 5. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. at para. 137. 
72 [1957] 354 U.S. 476 [Roth]. 
73 Ibid. at 480. 
74 Ibid. at 484.  
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concluded based on this analysis that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally 
protected speech or press”.75 This decision was subsequently upheld on a number of occasions.76  
     In 1973, the Court clarified the definition of obscenity which it provided in Roth.77  To 
determine whether or not material should be considered obscene, the Court developed a three-
part test. The first part of that test inquires into whether or not the material in question “appeals 
to prurient interests” based on community standards.78  The second part of the Miller test asks 
“whether the work depicts or describes sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically 
defined by applicable state law”.79 The final part of this test inquires into “whether the work, 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value”.80  
     Nonetheless, critics of the Supreme Court’s exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment 
protection argue that “the government should not be able to decide what is moral and suppress 
speech that does not advance that conception”.81 Further, scholars have noted that “other forms 
of speech produce physical reactions. [For example, a] movie or a book is not deprived First 
Amendment protection because it provokes tears”.82 In fact, the Supreme Court has struck down 
a prohibition on a play simply because it “portrays acts of sexual immorality [as] desirable, 
acceptable or proper patterns of behavior”.83 The Court further noted that “[what the 
government] has done, [is] to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture 
advocates an idea – that adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behaviour”.84  
                                                   
75 Ibid. at 485. 
76 See specifically, Alexander v. United States, [1993] 509 U.S. 544; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, [1973] 413 
U.S. 49. 
77 Miller v. United States, [1973] 413 U.S. 15 [Miller] at 23. 
78 Ibid. at 25.  
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Chemerinsky, supra note 52 at 983. 
82 Ibid. at 984. 
83 Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, [1959] 360 U.S. 684 at 699. 
84 Ibid. at 688. 
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     The important point to note here is the emphasis on morality which is wholly subjective as 
opposed to a more concrete standard such as harm. Morality is therefore a far broader restriction 
on expression. Presumably, a morality based assessment would exclude speech which offends 
community standards but might still be considered art, for instance. An alternative approach 
might be for the Court to distinguish between obscenity and pornography on the grounds that the 
latter form of expression has greater potential to cause harm.85 As I will argue in greater detail 
below, this analysis suggests that there is no readily available, satisfactory approach to obscenity 
within the American constitutional framework. 
4.3.5 Defamation in Canada 
     Defamation in both Canada and the United States is primarily addressed through the law of 
torts.86 The Supreme Court has, however, been asked for opinions on two occasions as to 
whether or not the Charter can apply in purely private defamation disputes. In the first of these 
cases, Hill v. Church of Scientology, the Church of Scientology made allegations against a 
Crown attorney, Casey Hill, which resulted in contempt of court proceedings.87 The claims made 
by Scientology proved false, and Hill brought a libel suit in which he was successful.88 On 
appeal to the Supreme Court, the Church of Scientology argued that the statements that were 
made about Casey Hill ought to be protected under s. 2(b) of the Charter.89 Cory J. writing for 
the majority swiftly rejected this argument. Cory concluded that Hill’s status as a Crown attorney 
                                                   
85 See e.g. Catharine McKinnon, Only Words (Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1993); Catharine 
MacKinnon, “Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech” (1985) 20 Harvard Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law 
Review 1.  
86 Defamation refers to libel and slander.  
87 [1995] 2 SCR 1130 at para. 1 [Hill]. 
88 Ibid. at para. 2. 
89 Ibid. at para. 65. According to this novel argument, Hill was “government” within the meaning of s. 32 because he 
worked for the Crown. Ibid. 
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provided an insufficient basis for the Charter to apply.90 Furthermore, Cory noted that libel was 
beyond the scope of s. 2(b).91  
     In 2009, the Court was once again confronted with the question of whether defamation was 
protected under the Charter.92 In Grant, the appellant, Peter Grant brought suit against the 
Toronto Star based on an article the newspaper ran in which it was alleged that Grant’s 
connections to provincial politics enabled him to expand the golf course on his property.93 
McLachlin C.J. writing for the majority decried the Court’s decision in Hill as being too limiting 
on the “value of free expression”.94 As a result, McLachlin ordered a new trial based on errors in 
the application of the law.95 
4.3.6 Defamation in the United States 
     As I discussed briefly in chapter two, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan represents a landmark 
decision in American jurisprudence.96 In that case, L.B. Sullivan, a police commissioner in 
Montgomery Alabama, sued and subsequently won a judgment against the New York Times as a 
result of an advertisement that was published which was critical of that police departments’ 
treatment of civil rights protesters.97 The New York Times challenged the jury verdict on the 
grounds that it violated its First Amendment Rights. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that 
                                                   
90 Ibid. at para. 65. 
91 Ibid. at para. 120. 
92 Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] 3 SCR 640 [Grant]. 
93 Ibid. at para. 16. 
94 Ibid. at paras. 57, 62. It is important to note that while McLachlin did attach greater weight to the Charter value of 
free expression in defamation cases, she did not go so far as to allow Charter claims to be made in these cases. it is 
important to note here that McLachlin’s analysis does not lead her to the conclusion that Charter claims ought to be 
available to defendants in defamation cases. Rather, she merely provided these defendants with the defence of 
“responsible communication on matters of public interest” which is informed by Charter values. Ibid. at para. 97. 
95 Ibid. at paras. 140-41. 
96 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [1964] 376 U.S. 254 [Sullivan]. 
97 Ibid. at 257. 
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the advertisement at issue was protected speech under the First Amendment because it was 
critical of a public official, rather than a private citizen.98  
     However, the Court has identified two exceptions to the public official standard developed in 
Sullivan. In Gertz and Milkovich, the Court has set out a requirement that defamatory statements 
made about public officials which is merely an opinion are the only types of statements which 
are protected by the New York Times standard.99 Instead, the Court in Milkovich held that “a 
statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability 
under…defamation law”.100 The second exception crafted to New York Times centres around 
whether or not there is actual malice, and more specifically whether or not that malice is 
provable.101 Here, the individual(s) making the defamatory statements have to have done so 
“[with] a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity”.102 Additionally, the falsity of the 
statements must be “deliberate or reckless” and whoever made them must “in fact [have] 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication”.103  
 
 
                                                   
98 Ibid. at 265. Following Sullivan, the Court has attempted to clarify what a public official is for the purposes of the 
First Amendment. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, public officials were defined thus: “those among the hierarchy of 
government employees who have, or appear to the public to have substantial responsibility for the control of 
government affairs”. Additionally, their positions must be “[of such] apparent importance that the public has an 
independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it”. [1966] 383 U.S. 75 at 85-86. 
This definition, however leaves some ambiguity as to what a public official is.  
99 Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., [1974] 418 U.S. 323; Milkovich v. Lorraine Journal Co., [1990] 427 U.S. 1. 
100 Milkovich, Ibid. at 19-20. 
101 Garrison v. Louisiana, [1964] 379 U.S. 64. 
102 Ibid. at 74. 
103 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., [1991] 501 U.S. 496 at 499; St. Amant v. Thompson, [1968] 390 U.S. 727 
at 731.Interestingly, the Supreme Court has suggested that the term public figure be employed instead of public 
official for the purposes of the Sullivan requirement. See specifically, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts; Associated 
Press v. Walker, [1967] 388 U.S. 130. Additionally, the Court has attempted to expand the meaning of Sullivan to 
capture matters of public interest, although this position has not been formally adopted. See Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., [1971] 403 U.S. 29. Commentators have argued, however, that the Court has not yet clarified a 
coherent requirement in order for an individual to be classified as a public figure. Chemerinsky, supra note 52 at 
1018.  
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4.3.7 Commercial Expression in Canada 
     As I discussed earlier in this chapter, in Irwin Toy the Supreme Court was given its first 
opportunity to address whether or not commercial speech ought to be afforded s. 2(b) protection. 
That case specifically dealt with a toy company seeking Charter protection of “television 
advertis[ements] directed at persons under thirteen years of age”.104 The Court found that the 
impugned provisions violated s. 2(b) since those provisions “prohibit particular content of 
expression in the name of protecting children”.105  
     However, the impugned consumer protection laws were upheld as being a reasonable limit 
under s. 1.106 The Court’s finding in Irwin Toy has been criticized for the deference it appears to 
provide legislators in regards to deciding what constitutes minimal impairment for the purposes 
of s. 1 analyses.107 On this point, Robert Sharpe and Kent Roach have argued that the only 
justification for protecting commercial speech is that it contributes to the marketplace of ideas, 
rather than contributing to democratic discourse or promoting individual autonomy and self-
realization.108 
     The Court has also dealt with commercial advertising in the context of tobacco advertising.109 
In that case, the Attorney General for Canada declined the opportunity to mount a defence of the 
impugned provisions against the 2(b) challenge.110 In light of this, McLachlin J. writing for the 
majority focused her analysis on whether the legislative scheme could be saved under s. 1. In 
rejecting the notion that a total ban was the least drastic means of regulating tobacco advertising, 
                                                   
104 Irwin Toy, supra note 25 at 938. 
105 Ibid. at 979. 
106 Ibid. at 1000. Interestingly, the Court patently rejected Irwin Toy’s argument that they were harmed by the 
consumer protection provisions. Readers will note that in the companion case to Irwin Toy, Ford, the Court struck 
down the Québec law because it failed to meet the reasonable limit aspect of the s. 1 analysis. Ford, supra note 25. 
107 Sharpe & Roach, supra note 58 at 161. 
108 Ibid. at 162. 
109 RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R 199 [RJR-MacDonald]. 
110 Ibid. at para. 58. 
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McLachlin noted that “the government present[ed] no evidence justifying its choice of a total 
ban”.111 This was in spite of the fact that the government had commissioned a study for the 
express purpose of proposing less intrusive means of regulating tobacco advertising.112  
     However, RJR-MacDonald does not represent a significant departure from Irwin Toy. There 
is clear evidence of this in the subsequent tobacco advertising challenge, Canada (Attorney 
General) v. JTI-MacDonald Corp.113 In that case, the amended tobacco advertising restrictions 
were upheld because they represented “a genuine attempt by Parliament to craft controls on 
advertising and promotion that would meet its objectives as well as the concerns expressed by 
the majority of this Court in RJR”.114 There, the public health argument prevailed over the 
commercial expression.115 These cases indicate that the Court has been cautious in terms of 
allowing 2(b) challenges to succeed in commercial expression cases.116 
4.3.8 Commercial Expression in the United States 
     On several occasions, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that commercial 
expression is protected by the First Amendment.117 Subsequent jurisprudence on commercial 
expression provided the unsatisfying clarification that “[commercial] expression [is] solely 
related to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience”.118 That definition has 
subsequently been interpreted as containing three core features: (1) there is some type of 
                                                   
111 Ibid. at para. 167. 
112 Ibid. at para. 166. 
113 [2007] 2 S.C.R 610. 
114 Ibid. at para. 7. 
115 Ibid. at paras. 68, 94, 115; Hogg, supra note 44 at 43-25. 
116 One exception to this trend might be Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario where the Court 
struck down prohibitions on advertising by dentists. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232.  
117 See e.g. Bigelow v. Virginia, [1975] 421 U.S. 809; Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, [1976] 425 U.S. 748.This, however, excludes promotion of illegal activity, and false 
advertisements. Virginia Board of Pharmacy at 771-72. 
118 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, [1980] 447 U.S. 557 at 561 [Central 
Hudson]. 
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advertisement, (2) the advertisement makes specific reference to a product, and (3) the 
expression is economically motivated.119 Moreover, in deciding whether or not governments can 
restrict commercial speech, the Court in Central Hudson set out a four-part test:  
1. The activity must be lawful and not misleading.  
2. The government objective in regulating speech must be substantial.  
3. Whether the regulation directly advances the stated government interests.  
4. The regulation is not more extensive than is necessary to meet its objective.120  
 
      Later decisions, however, have held that this least restrictive test is too onerous on 
governments because it “impose[s an] unnecessarily heavy burden on the state”.121 Although 
Scalia J. did qualify this by stating that “[governments must use] a means narrowly tailored to 
the desired objective”.122 Subsequent decisions have affirmed the latter analysis.123 While the 
Court’s approach to commercial advertising is still restrictive, it is comparatively less restrictive 
than that employed Canada. 
4.4 Freedom of Expression in a Comparative Context 
     In general terms, the First Amendment has been interpreted in a more liberal manner than s. 
2(b) of the Charter has. Whereas Charter rights always have the potential to be limited, this is 
not the case in the United States. However, the United States Supreme Court has established 
three “levels of scrutiny” for weighing rights against government interest.124 Freedom of speech 
cases are most commonly adjudicated under the two more stringent requirements, intermediate 
                                                   
119 Chemerinsky, supra note 52 at 1048 citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., [1983] 463 U.S. 60.  
120 Central Hudson, supra note 136 at 566. This test appears to be very similar to the Oakes test crafted by the 
Supreme Court of Canada for determining what constitutes a reasonable limit on rights.  
121 See Board of Trustees for the Sate University of New York v. Fox, [1989] 492 U.S. 469 at 477.  
122 Ibid. at 480. 
123 Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States, [1999] 572 U.S. 173. Exceptions to the First 
Amendment protection afforded commercial advertising include, but are not limited to: advertising for illegal 
activity, false advertising, and advertising in relation to alcohol products. See Chemerinsky, supra note 52 at 1053-
1068 for a broader discussion of these exceptions.  
124 Chemerinsky, supra note 52 at 517-20. The other level of scrutiny is rational basis which requires that the law is 
“rationally related to a legitimate government purpose” in order to be upheld. Ibid. at 517.  
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and strict scrutiny.125 Intermediate scrutiny is employed in cases where the speech in question is 
content neutral.126 Under intermediate scrutiny, impugned legislation will be upheld if “it is 
substantially related to an important government objective”.127 Strict scrutiny is applied in cases 
where the restriction on speech is content-based.128 Under a strict scrutiny analysis the onus is on 
the government to prove that its legislative objective is “compelling…[and] necessary”, a heavy 
burden.129  
     Strict scrutiny is effectively the same as the Supreme Court of Canada’s “pressing and 
substantial” component of the Oakes test. However, there is an important distinction to draw 
here. In terms of strict scrutiny, American constitutional scholars have pointed out that strict 
scrutiny is “strict in theory and fatal in fact”.130 Conversely, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
adopted a looser interpretation as to what constitutes a pressing and substantial objective. If 
legislation in Canada is struck down, it is typically at other stages of the reasonable limits 
analysis.131 The Supreme Court of Canada has been rather generous to governments in accepting 
pressing and substantial reasons for taking legislative actions.132  
     Additionally, “freedom of expression fits awkwardly within the two-step adjudicative model 
[of] the Charter”.133 This analysis helps explain why freedom of expression claims are so 
commonly saved under s. 1. Of the leading freedom of expression jurisprudence in Canada, there 
                                                   
125 Ibid. at 519-20. 
126 See e.g. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, [2000] 529 U.S. 803.  
127 Supra note 123. 
128 Ibid.  
129 Ibid.  
130 Gerald Gunther, “Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection” (1972) 86 Harvard Law Review 1 at 8. 
131 Dwight Newman, “The Limitations of Rights: A Comparative Evolution and Ideology of the Oakes and Sparrow 
Tests” (1999) 62 Saskatchewan Law Review at 553. 
132 Richard Moon, “Justified Limits on Free Expression: The Collapse of the General Approach to the Limits on 
Charter Rights” (2002) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 40.  
133 Ibid. at 365. 
	 62	
were three cases where the impugned legislation was struck down, and it was only done so 
because the impugned legislation was far too broad, even by the loosened pressing and 
substantial standard: Zundel, Rocket, and RJR-MacDonald.134 Against this backdrop, I will 
provide a brief comparison of the Canadian and American approaches to the four types of limited 
or excluded expression discussed above: hate speech, obscenity, defamation, and commercial 
speech.  
     In terms of hate speech and obscenity, the Supreme Court of Canada has taken a very 
conservative approach by routinely upholding hate speech laws.135 The Court has taken a similar 
tack in regards to obscenity.136 In both types of cases, the Court has opted for a harms-based 
approach. Comparatively, the United States Supreme Court has granted these types of expression 
broader protection.137 Here, the difference is largely due to the architecture of rights documents 
in both countries. In Canada, for example, the impugned legislative provisions generally fail to 
withstand s. 2(b) analysis, but are frequently upheld on the subsequent s. 1 analysis.  
     However, where freedom of expression claims tend to fail is that the onus is on the rights 
claimant to prove the government action is an unreasonable limit on freedom of rights which, in 
these cases, has proven to be a heavy burden.138 Comparatively, in the United States, the onus is 
largely on the government to prove the importance of the law.139 Additionally, rights are 
conferred absolutely. This helps explain why the rights claim succeeded in R.A.V. while it did 
not in Keegstra, for example.  
                                                   
134 Zundel, supra note 44; Rocket, supra note 116; RJR-Macdonald, supra note 100. 
135 See Keegstra, supra note 24; Whatcott, supra note 48.   
136 Butler, supra note 59; Little Sisters, supra note 68.  
137 Supra notes 48, 61.  
138 See e.g. Supra note 61. 
139 Supra note 54. 
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     Moreover, in Miller, the United States Supreme Court suggested that speech which has 
artistic value is protected.140 However, this is inconsistent with the morality-based approach 
taken by the Court in hate speech and obscenity cases. For example, the subjectivity of morality 
means that what might be artistic for one person might be obscene to another. As such, the 
potential exists that artistic material which may be obscene could be left unprotected by the First 
Amendment even though this would not be the case by any other standard. Therefore, I argue 
that the Court needs to draw a clearer distinction between obscenity and pornography, for 
instance, and transition to a standard of review based on harm rather than one based on morality.  
     In terms of defamation, the Canadian approach has long been that this was strictly a matter of 
tort law. This likely has to do with the Court’s understanding of the Charter’s scope. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, the Supreme Court of Canada has taken a very restrictive 
approach in this regard. Because of the Court’s unwillingness to expand the Charter’s scope to 
include, for instance, matters of public interest, it follows that there are considerable barriers that 
rights claimants in defamation cases must overcome in order for Charter claims to be 
adjudicated. They either have to prove that they are government, they are performing a modern 
or traditional government function, or they are implementing a government policy.141 In the 
United States, however, rights claimants in defamation cases simply must prove that the other 
party is a public figure, a more reasonable standard. It is for this reason, in part, that in chapter 
three, I argued that the Supreme Court of Canada ought to adopt the Wilson test from McKinney 
which would allow Charter disputes in cases involving matters of significant public interest.142 
For example, under this framework, the Charter claims made in Grant, and perhaps Hill would 
                                                   
140 Supra note 77. 
141 Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 SCR 211; Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General), [1997] 3 SCR 624. 
142 McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229[McKinney] at 248. 
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have been allowed to proceed and likely have been successful. I am not, however, advocating for 
universal application of the Charter. Rather, Charter application should be limited to matters of 
considerable public interest.  
4.5 Conclusion 
     In this chapter I examined the current legal status of freedom of expression in Canada and the 
United States as well as the relevant academic literature. First, I discussed why Canadian and 
Americans protect speech, identifying three prominent explanations in the literature: democracy 
and the connection to self-government, its contribution to the discovery of truth, and finally the 
importance to autonomy and self-realization. My analysis then turned to types of expression 
which lack or enjoy minimal protection in both countries, focusing in particular on: hate speech, 
obscenity, defamation, and commercial speech. Comparing the Canadian and American 
approaches, I concluded that there are aspects of both approaches which are problematic. In 
particular, I argued that the Canadian approaches to defamation and commercial speech are too 
restrictive, while the American approaches to obscenity and hate speech are too arbitrary. 
Against the backdrop provided by this and the previous chapters, I will turn my analysis to the 
rights of broadcasters in Canada.  
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Chapter 5  
The Judicial Empowerment of Broadcasters in Canada 
 
5.1 Introduction 
     In this chapter, I will explore the judicial empowerment of broadcasters in Canada and the 
implications thereof. In the first part of this chapter, I will explore judicial empowerment 
quantitatively. There I will argue that Canadian courts have been reluctant to expand the scope of 
rights protection afforded to broadcasters. In the second part of this chapter, I will explore these 
results qualitatively, looking at the reasons for judgment, persuasive dissenting opinions, and 
decisions which changed the law. There, I will argue that these results confirm the empirical 
findings but also present powerful evidence that the scope of rights protection afforded to 
broadcasters ought to be broadened considerably. In the final part of this chapter, I will argue 
that recognition and adoption of the Wilson test in McKinney would further the judicial 
empowerment of broadcasters.  
5.2 The Judicial Empowerment of Broadcasters in Canada: The Empirical Context  
 
     In this section, I will explore the judicial empowerment of broadcasters in the cases I have 
selected, quantitatively. These results are displayed in Table 1 below. My analysis of these 
results will focus on two specific perspectives. First I will discuss the judicial empowerment of 
public, as opposed to private, broadcasters. Second, I will explore these results thematically in 






Table 1: Rights Outcomes in Canadian Jurisprudence 
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Public & 
Private Total   20 
Subtotals 7 0 8 3 26 0 10 15  
Table 1 Classifies rights claimant(s) involved in Canadian cases based on whether or not the court ruled in favour 
of the rights claimant(s). Canadian cases fell into one of three broad categories which correspond to the number 
under the subject matter heading: (1) Press Freedom, (2) Elections and (3) Hate Speech.3  Rights claimants refers to 
broadcasters unless otherwise noted in the footnotes below.      
 
5.2.1 The Underrepresentation of Public Broadcasters in Rights Disputes 
 
     The CBC, the only public broadcaster to make a rights claim in these cases was only 
successful on two of the 18 occasions that it made such claims. This translates to a success rate 
of 11.1%. Similarly, private broadcasters made rights claims on 51 occasions, succeeding in 13 
of these. The success rate of private broadcasters is approximately 25.5%, approximately 5% 
                                                   
1 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2010] 1 S.C.R 721 [Toronto Star]. In that case, the CBC came up 
against the collective s. 11 claims of seven individuals; R. v. White, [2008] ABCA 294 [White]. In that case the CBC 
came up against the s. 11(d) claim of one individual.  
2 Toronto Star, Ibid. In this context, there were six private broadcasters who came up against s. 11 claims; A.B. v. 
Bragg Communications Inc., [2012] 2 S.C.R 567 [Bragg]. In that case, the Court found that the appellant’s right to 
privacy was entrenched in the Charter under ss. 7 & 8 and superseded the private broadcasters s. 2(b) right; White, 
Ibid. There, four private broadcasters made rights claims; Flahiff v. Cour du Québéc, [1998] QCCA [Flahiff], where 
the appellants s. 11(d) right to a fair trial was found to supersede the private broadcasters right to publication of a 
search warrant and supporting affidavit. It is important to note that broadcasters in this category where counted in 
the “Against Rights Claimant” total. 
3 Cases that fell into the enumerated categories above dealt with the following subject matter: (1) Production Orders, 
Publication Bans, Confidential Sources, Open Courts, Open Legislatures, Broadcasting Trial Exhibits, and Trial 
Fairness; (2) Election Advertising, Early Dissemination of Election Results; (3) Hate Speech. 
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lower than public broadcasters. However, in most of these cases, the CBC and private 
broadcaster(s) were equally involved.4 Nonetheless, in four of the five cases where the CBC was 
the sole broadcaster, they were successful once.5 I will explore why this is the case in the 
following section. There is also the question of why the CBC is the only public broadcaster 
involved in rights disputes. The CBC is not the only public broadcaster in Canada. This list 
includes, but is not limited to  TVOntario (“TVO”) and Télé-Québec which provide educational 
programming in Ontario and Québec respectively; and Télévision Française de l’Ontario 
(“TFO”) which provides French language programming in Ontario.6  
     The CBC is a crown corporation, created by the Broadcasting Act and is, to a large extent, 
publicly funded.7 The Act confirmed CBC’s position as a national broadcaster, strengthened 
restrictions on foreign ownership, required that Canadian programming is created by mainly 
Canadian talent, and confirmed the idea, through objectives, that the broadcasting system should 
strengthen Canada’s cultural, social and economic structures.8 Furthermore, the Act explicitly 
delegated implementation of its “broadcasting policy for Canada” to the Canadian Radio-
television and Communication Commission (“CRTC”), a new regulatory agency.9 The CRTC, in 
                                                   
4 Readers will note that the number of occasions on which the CBC made a rights claim is also considerably lower 
than those on which private broadcasters made rights claims. This means that the CBC’s success rate does not 
necessarily provide an accurate representation of the judicial empowerment of public broadcasters.  
5 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480. 
6 In addition to the public broadcasters I have enumerated above, there are a number of publicly funded radio 
stations including those which are student-run, university or college stations.  
7 Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c.11, s. 47 [Broadcasting Act]. 
8 CRTC Origins, online: CRTC 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20131220212044/http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/backgrnd/brochures/b19903.htm > 
[Origins]. 
9 John Aird, Report of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1932). 
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turn, regulates broadcasters with a view to this policy.10 The CBC, through the CRTC, reports to 
Parliament through the Minister of Canadian Heritage.11  
     TVO is a public broadcaster created by the Ontario Educational Communications Authority 
Act (“OECAA”) and licensed as such under the Broadcasting Act.12 TVO’s mandate is to 
“initiate, acquire, produce, distribute, exhibit or otherwise deal in programs and materials in the 
educational broadcasting and communications fields”.13 TVO reports to the Ontario government 
through the Minister of Education and is a Crown Corporation.14 In this sense, TVO is governed 
in much the same fashion as the CBC. Similarly, until 2008 TFO was governed under the 
OECAA as a subsidiary of TVO.15 At that point, the provincial government enacted legislation 
analogous to the OECAA for the express purpose of governing TFO.16 In Québec, the provincial 
public broadcaster, Télé-Québec operates under a similar governance structure to TVO and TFO 
in Ontario.17     
     As I described above, the prominent public broadcasters in Canada operate under virtually 
identical governance structures. Thus, governance structures alone do not explain why public 
broadcasters (apart from the CBC) have not been involved in rights disputes. Additionally, 
because these are all, to varying degrees, publicly funded entities, it is unlikely that the lack of 
Charter claims made by public broadcasters is a funding issue. This means that the likely 
                                                   
10 Origins, supra note 8. 
11 Ibid. In spite of this, it is interesting to note that three-decade-old case law has held that the CBC is private and not 
subject to the Charter. See e.g. Elliott v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. (1995) 125 D.L.R. (4th) 534 (Ont. 
C.A.). See also, Trieger v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., (1988) 54 D.L.R. (4th) 143 (Ont. C.A.).  
12 Broadcasting Act, supra note 7; Ontario Educational Communications Authority Act, R.S.O. 1990 , c. O.12 
[OECAA].  
13 OECAA, Ibid. at s. 3(a). 
14 Ibid. at s. 10. 
15 Ibid. (as amended 2008). 
16 Ontario French-language Educational Communications Authority Act, S.O. 2008, c. 10. 
17 Loi Sur La Société de Télédiffusion du Québec, S.Q. 1996, c S-12.01.  
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explanation for why other public broadcasters have not been involved in rights disputes is quite 
simply because they have not had to.  
     Operating under the assumption that public broadcasters have not made rights claims because 
they have not had to, there are two implications. First, this means that the s. 2(b) rights of one or 
more of these broadcasters have not been infringed upon. Part of this might be a function of the 
fact that the broadcasters I enumerated above were created largely for the purpose of producing 
and disseminating educational content. Therefore, there is little reason for them to seek to 
overturn publication bans, for instance. Second, it likely means that those broadcasters have not 
infringed on the rights of others.  
5.2.2 Thematic Discrepancies in the Judicial Empowerment of Broadcasters 
 
     Of the three “types” of cases that comprise my data set, a disproportionate amount of these 
cases were cases where the broadcasters made rights claims in the context of trial proceedings, as 
well as the ability of broadcasters to cover courtroom proceedings and provincial legislatures. I 
will expand on this trend in greater detail in the following section. However, broadcasters in 
these cases did not enjoy much success, regardless of whether they were public or private. For 
example, broadcasters making claims in these cases were successful in eight out of 46 occasions 
or 17.40% of the time. In terms of rights challenges that broadcasters made to election 
legislation, they enjoyed a notably higher success rate. In those cases, broadcasters were 
successful on seven of 22 occasions or 31.8%. Notably, however, the seven broadcasters that 
were successful were private rather than public. Finally, there was only one case dealing with 
hate speech, R. v. Andrews, where the decision went against the rights claimant. In the following 
section, I will elaborate on these results and provide explanations for these trends using the 
actual decisions themselves as well as drawing on cases that were not included in this data set.  
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5.3 The Judicial Empowerment of Broadcasters in Canada: The Qualitative Context 
 
     In the previous section of this chapter, I was concerned with furnishing an empirical 
assessment of the judicial empowerment of broadcasters in Canada. In this section, my attention 
turns to why the courts have interpreted the rights of broadcasters in the manner that they have. 
To do this, I will explore the cases I have selected thematically. I will also discuss cases which I 
did not select that helps explain those trends and cases which fall into categories not at all 
represented in my typology: broadcaster advertising, and new media. 
5.3.1 Judicial Empowerment in “Press Freedom” Cases 
     The largest set of cases which appear in my data set are those in which broadcasters challenge 
provisions or decisions which prohibit them from covering trials, courtrooms or legislatures. In 
these cases, irrespective of whether or not there is a concrete competing claim, the tension in 
these disputes is largely between the broadcaster(s) who are claiming a s. 2(b) right, and criminal 
defendants, Crown Attorneys, or provincial legislatures who assert that allowing broadcasters to 
have greater access would compromise privacy or procedural rights. In the subsections that 
follow, I will explore three types of cases: those dealing with publication bans and open courts; 
those dealing with search warrants and production orders; and finally, those concerned with open 
legislatures.  
5.3.1.A Publication Bans, Open Courts, and Open Legislatures 
     There are two distinct eras in cases dealing with publication bans and open courts: those cases 
which were decided before Dagenais and those cases which came after Dagenais.18 In the earlier 
cases, the courts acknowledged that prohibiting broadcasters from covering court proceedings 
violated their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. For example, in Re 
                                                   
18 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, [1994] 3 S.C.R 835 [Dagenais]. 
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Global Communications Ltd., the Ontario Court of Appeals conceded that mandatory publication 
bans infringed upon “freedom of the press and other media of communication”.19 However, the 
court in that case held that the mandatory ban was a justifiable limit on s. 2(b). The majority 
reasoned that striking down the impugned provisions would have had an effect on trial fairness 
in that trial fairness “[would be] quite capable of being shattered by the kind of publicity that can 
attend…hearing[s] and, once shattered, it may…be quite impossible to put together again”.20  
     Similarly, in Toronto Sun the appellant broadcaster challenged a statutorily created ban which 
was altered at the discretion of the trial judge.21 As was the case in Global Communications, the 
Alberta Court of Appeals in Toronto Sun upheld the publication ban.22 The court did note, 
however, that the scope of the trial judge’s order went too far and allowed the appeal on those 
grounds rather than striking down the impugned provisions.23  
     Three years after Toronto Sun, the Canadian Newspapers company mounted a challenge to a 
provision of the Criminal Code which mandated publication bans in sexual assault trials.24 In this 
case, the s. 2(b) claim was swiftly rejected because mandatory bans were necessary because they 
encouraged victims of sexual assault to come forward.25 The purpose of the impugned provisions 
was, and ought to have been, seen to be of considerable importance to the administration of 
justice. Because of the importance and scope of this object, the Court rejected case-by-case or 
contextual approaches to deciding these types of cases to protect the identity of sexual assault 
victims.26  
                                                   
19 Re Global Communications Ltd. and Attorney-General for Canada. (1984) 5 D.L.R. (4th) 634 (Ont. C.A.) at 18. 
20 Ibid. at 23. 
21 Toronto Sun Publishing Corp. v. Alberta (Attorney General). 39 Alta. L.R. (2d) 97 (Alta. C.A.) [Toronto Sun].  
22 Ibid. at para. 22.  
23 Ibid. at para. 23.  
24 Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122 [Canadian Newspapers]. 
25 Ibid. at para. 15.  
26 Ibid. at para. 19. The reasoning in this line of cases was subsequently upheld in R. v. Squires. (1992) 11 O.R. (3d) 
385 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. D.M., [1993] NSCA.  
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     Where the Court did depart from this trend of protecting the administration of justice was in 
Edmonton Journal.27 In that case, the Charter challenge was to provincial legislative provisions 
which required publication bans in divorce proceedings.28 Cory J. writing for a narrow majority 
reasoned that such bans could not be saved under s. 1 of the Charter because “there is no 
requisite proportionality between the overly restrictive provisions of s. 30(1) and the important 
right to report freely upon trial proceedings”.29 Based on this logic, Cory J. distinguished 
Edmonton Journal from Canadian Newspapers by noting that the mandatory publication ban, in 
that case, applied specifically to sexual assault cases and as such was considerably narrower in 
scope than the impugned Alberta ban.30 Moreover, Cory maintained that upholding the 
publication ban would “[prohibit] the publication of…documents that might have a wide public 
interest and would prevent the public from knowing about a great many issues in which 
discussion should be fostered”.31  
     In a spirited dissent, however, La Forest J. viewed s. 30(1) as protecting “the most private 
aspects of [peoples] lives”.32 La Forest largely followed the Ontario Court of Appeals decision in 
Global Communications and Canadian Newspapers. Ultimately, Justice La Forest concluded that 
s. 30(1) was not crafted as the broad sweeping prohibition that the majority interpreted it to be.33 
I argue that the dissenters went too far. Justice La Forest was effectively advocating for equal 
rights to privacy for divorce litigants and sexual assault victims. This logic is tenuous insofar as 
one cannot equate divorce proceedings with sexual assaults. Upholding statutory publication 
bans in virtually any context severely limits the ability of broadcasters to perform their jobs, but 
                                                   
27 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1386 [Edmonton Journal]. 
28 Ibid. at 1334. 
29 Ibid. at 1346. 
30 Ibid. at 1347. 
31 Ibid. at 1348. 
32 Ibid. at 1370. 
33 Ibid. at 1374. 
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it also would severely limit a fundamental freedom. While limits on the rights of broadcasters 
might be appropriate in certain situations, they should not be restricted altogether as La Forest 
seems to suggest. 
     While Dagenais, which I will discuss below did change the law on publication bans and open 
courts, there have nevertheless been subsequent decisions which have addressed statutory bans.34 
In those cases, the courts have routinely upheld the publication bans. One of the broader trends 
which emerged, however, is that the ability of broadcasters to film courtrooms “can [no longer] 
be [seen] as an absolute freedom without restrictions or control”.35 Similarly, in R. v. White, the 
Alberta court of appeals held that deferring publication of bail hearing proceedings was a 
reasonable limit on the rights of broadcasters.36 Finally, the Supreme Court upheld, though 
altered a publication ban in a case in which a teenage girl was the victim of cyberbullying 
through a fake Facebook account.37 I do not take issue with any of these decisions for two 
reasons. First, the courts acknowledged that the Charter applied and engaged in the analysis that 
followed. Second, it is not my position in this thesis that Charter protections, particularly 
freedom of expression should be conferred absolutely; instead, my argument is simply that the 
Charter ought to apply to broadcasters and the Charter standards which apply to all Canadians in 
terms of freedom of expression ought to apply to broadcasters as well.  
     Nevertheless, as I noted above, the law on publication bans changed beginning with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Dagenais. That case addressed discretionary publication bans.38 
Dagenais represented a bifurcation in the approaches that courts take when addressing 
                                                   
34 Société Radio-Canada c. Québec (Procureur Générale). 62 C.R. (6th) 99 [Radio-Canada]; White, supra note 1; 
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 1 S.C.R. 19; Bragg, supra note 2.   
35 Radio-Canada, Ibid. at para. 21.  
36 White, supra note 1.  
37 Bragg, supra note 2. 
38 Dagenais, supra note 18. 
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discretionary publication bans. Lamer C.J. writing for the majority affirmed the notion that the 
previous jurisprudence on publication bans “emphasized the right to a fair trial over the right to 
freedom of expression”.39 Consequently, the Court established a new common law rule for 
deciding whether or not to issue a publication ban. The Court crafted this test with a view to 
incorporating the substance of the Oakes test as a means of importing “Charter values” into the 
common law.40 The two-part test provides:   
1.) Such a ban is necessary when such an order is necessary in order to prevent a 
real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably 
available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and   
2.) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to 
the free expression of those affected by the ban.41 
 
     This test represents a significant hurdle for obtaining a publication ban. It also provides for 
different approaches to cases dealing with discretionary bans as opposed to those dealing with 
statutorily created publication which are dealt with under the Charter. However, it is 
symptomatic of a larger problem which is that while it imbues the common law with Charter 
values, it also creates an asymmetry between broadcasters and private citizens. This asymmetry 
is evidenced in the current understanding of the Charter’s scope and in judicial understandings 
of freedom of expression and other rights as they pertain to broadcasters. Based in part on this 
analysis, I will argue that the Charter ought to apply to broadcasters based on public importance 
in the final part of this chapter.  
                                                   
39 Ibid. at 877. 
40 Ibid. at 878. 
41 Ibid.  
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     The Dagenais test was reformulated a decade later in R. v. Mentuck, a case dealing with the 
trial of an individual who was arrested as a result of a “Mr. Big” police sting operation.42  In that 
case, a unanimous Court restated the Dagenais test as follows:  
1.) Such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper 
administration of justice because reasonably available alternatives will not 
prevent the risk; and  
2.) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on 
the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effect on the 
right to freedom of expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public 
trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.43 
 
While the Dagenais/Mentuck test does make explicit reference to freedom of expression, in my 
view it does not change the fact that in cases dealing with discretionary publication bans, 
broadcasters are still unable to make explicit Charter claims. Specifically, the Supreme Court 
has stated that the Dagenais/Mentuck test applies “where the rights of the media are engaged”.44 
However, there is no reference to Charter protections or responsibilities for broadcasters. In this 
sense, then, the Dagenais/Mentuck test might be an acknowledgement that the Charter does not 
apply to private broadcasters or even the CBC in certain instances. Nonetheless, this test has 
been affirmed by the Supreme Court and various provincial courts of appeal on numerous 
occasions and is established law.45  
     A related area where the Court has decided the rights of broadcasters in a similar fashion has 
been the ability to film provincial legislatures. In Donahoe, a narrow majority of the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeals held that the Charter applies to actions taken by legislative assemblies at both 
                                                   
42 [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 [Mentuck]. For an in-depth discussion of the Mr. Big technique, see e.g. Timothy E. Moore & 
Kouri Keenan, “What is Voluntary? On the Reliability of Admissions Arising from Mr. Big Undercover Operations” 
(2013) 5 Investigative Interviewing: Research & Practice 1.  
43 Mentuck, Ibid. at para. 32. 
44 Toronto Star Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 at para. 7 [Toronto Star]; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 1 S.C.R. 19 at para. 13.  
45 See specifically, Toronto Star, Ibid.; Vancouver Sun (Re), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332; CTV Television Inc. v. R. et al. 
(2006) 208 Man. R. (2d) 244. 
	 76	
the provincial and federal levels and that a prohibition on filming the provincial legislature could 
not be justified on the basis that it was designed to preserve decorum.46 The dissenting justices 
argued that “the guarantee of free expression does not provide a right to access to all government 
property for the purpose of exercising that right”.47  
     However, on appeal, the Supreme Court took a different view. The Court overturned the 
decision because the Charter did not apply to legislative assemblies.48 Specifically, the Court 
theorized that Parliamentary privilege which extended to legislative assemblies was analogous to 
judicial independence and that the Charter should not apply on those grounds.49 Cory J., 
however, reached a different conclusion. Looking to the meaning s. 32(1), Cory reasoned that the 
“constitutional power of privilege is not entrenched in the Constitution of Canada and the 
Charter must apply to exercise of that parliamentary privilege”.50  The tension here centres 
around whether or not the Court’s holding in Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, where the 
Court held that the Charter did apply to a federal Cabinet decision to allow the United States to 
test cruise missiles.51 The broad argument, in that case, was that allowing the Americans to test 
cruise missiles would lead to nuclear conflict.52  
     Equating the Operation Dismantle precedent with filming provincial legislatures is 
problematic. Fundamentally, these are two very different issues, and the arguments made in 
Operation Dismantle were rather farfetched. In addition to his conclusion in New Brunswick 
Broadcasting Co. that the Charter should apply, Cory J. posited that if the objective was merely 
to limit the number of cameras in the provincial legislature, that objective could be justified 
                                                   
46 Donahoe v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. (1991) 102 N.S.R. (2d) 271 [Donahoe]. 
47 Ibid. at 51. 
48 New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319.  
49 Ibid. at 354 [New Brunswick Broadcasting Co.].  
50 Ibid. at 405.	
51 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.  
52 Ibid.	
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under s. 1, whereas a total ban could not.53 In my view, the Court erred in this case by incorrectly 
interpreting the Charter as it relates to the rights of broadcasters.  
5.3.2.B Search Warrants and Production Orders  
     A related area where broadcasters have enjoyed relatively little success is in regards to search 
warrants and production orders. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard is the landmark 
decision in that area. In Lessard, the CBC launched a Charter challenge in response to search 
warrants that had been issued for their offices.54 In finding that the search was constitutionally 
valid, a majority of the Supreme Court found the argument that the warrant had a chilling effect 
on freedom of the press unpersuasive.55 This was a moot point, however, because the search 
warrant was upheld under s. 8 of the Charter which prohibits unreasonable search and seizures.56 
This analysis rested in large part on the fact that the material which was covered by the warrant 
had previously been disseminated.57  
     In her dissent, McLachlin J. rejected that notion, noting in particular that “[f]reedom of the 
press under the Charter must be interpreted in a generous and liberal fashion”.58 In outlining her 
reasons for why this particular search could not be saved under s. 1, McLachlin outline three 
specific conditions under which a warrant could be issued: “when there are no alternative 
sources; the importance of the search outweighs the deleterious effects; [and] there is a minimal 
impairment on freedom of the press”.59 McLachlin’s analysis rejects the majority’s view that 
whether a search warrant violates a broadcasters s. 2(b) rights is a direct result of whether or not 
                                                   
53 New Brunswick Broadcasting Co., supra note 49 at 413-414. 
54 [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421 [Lessard]. Note that in this case, the CBC challenged the search warrant under ss. 2(b) and 8 
of the Charter.  
55 Ibid. at 432. 
56 Ibid. at 447; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule 
to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 8. 
57 Lessard, Ibid. at 446-47. 
58 Ibid. at 450.	
59 Ibid. at 455.  
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it violates their s. 8 rights. Instead, I would argue that these are two separate issues. A search 
warrant might be upheld on a s. 8 analysis, but the court should nevertheless explore, as 
McLachlin did, whether or not it also violates s. 2(b). Furthermore, with search warrants, the 
distinct possibility exists that they could unveil sources and methods which would likely mean 
that the confidential sources that broadcasters rely on would not come forward, thus imposing a 
chilling effect on the fourth estate.60      
     Similarly, in 1997, the Nova Scotia court of appeal unanimously held that journalists could be 
subpoenaed.61 The court dismissed both the freedom of the press claim and the freedom of 
expression claim, noting that both of the CBC’s claims were “baseless”.62 These statements, 
however, constitute a gross oversimplification of the issues. While the court was correct in 
noting that a subpoena is less intrusive than a search warrant, they glossed over the fact that it is 
nonetheless intrusive.63 Regardless of degree, intrusion strikes at the core of both freedoms of the 
press and expression. This line of reasoning has permeated subsequent decisions.  
     For example, in National Post, one of the most important decisions in this area, the Supreme 
Court conceded that “protection of confidential sources should be treated as if it were an 
enumerated Charter right”.64 However, the Court rejected the Charter claim reasoning that:  
“to throw a constitutional immunity around such a heterogeneous and ill-defined 
group of writers and speakers and whichever ‘sources’ and on whatever terms 
they may choose to offer it…would blow a giant hole in law enforcement and 
other constitutionally recognized values such as privacy”.65  
 
                                                   
60 This is a point that I will argue in greater detail at the end of this section. Note also that the Court reached a 
similar conclusion in the companion case, Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), 
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 459.  
61 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. Batiot. (1997) 144 D.L.R. (4th) 444.  
62 Ibid. at 8. 
63 Ibid.  
64 R. v. National Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477 at para. 38 [National Post].  
65 Ibid. at 40. 
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This argument broadens the concerns I raised in regards to the Batiot decision. The assertion that 
there ought to be limits on who broadcasters seek out as “sources” is certainly valid. However, 
the broader contention that this would be detrimental to law enforcement efforts is problematic.  
     As an example, the Canadian Association of Journalists (“CAJ”) outlines specific guidelines 
for using confidential sources. The guidelines make it explicitly clear that “[w]e only promise 
anonymity when the material is of high public interest and it cannot be obtained any other 
way”.66 The guidelines further note that there are instances where journalists are not, nor should 
not be willing to go to jail to protect a source and the source should be made aware of this at the 
outset of the relationship. Finally, the guidelines make clear that “the deal [between the journalist 
and the source] is off if the source lies or misleads us”.67 Presumably, these are practices which 
most journalists adhere to.  
     While these are only guidelines and do not necessarily reflect the actual practices of every 
journalist, they directly contradict some of the assertions made by the Court in National Post. 
For example, the guidelines refute the notion that journalists do not select and vet sources 
carefully.68 Moreover, there are occasions where journalists are willing to cooperate in police 
investigations at the expense of confidentiality.69 The problem, however, arises in cases where 
the story at issue is of considerable importance such as one which pits freedoms of the press and 
expression against national security. Finally, the Court in National Post raised a concern that 
allowing more robust protections for the journalist-source relationship would mean that those 
protections would extend beyond the traditional media and into the realm of new media. While 
                                                   
66 Canadian Association of Journalists Ethics Guidelines, online: Canadian Association of Journalists 
<http://caj.ca/content.php?page=ethics-guidelines>. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. For instance, as I will discuss in greater detail below there is a case currently working its way through the 
courts in which a journalist engaged an accused terrorist for a story. R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2017] ONCA 
231 [Vice]. 
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this may well be the case, traditional broadcasters, as well as citizen journalists who use new 
media, should be afforded the same protections. Using a novel platform to disseminate a 
message should not preclude one from rights protections and obligations.    
     In Vice, the case discussed above, the Ontario Court of Appeal held, rather generally, that the 
Charter claim being made by Vice Media journalist Ben Makuch was not justiciable.70 Even 
though this case deals in large part with national security concerns, the scope of rights afforded 
to broadcasters are such that Makuch faces imprisonment pending the outcome of a potential 
appeal to the Supreme Court. This case, in particular, reinforces my argument in this chapter that 
the Charter should apply to broadcasters. Were this the case, the courts would have to engage in 
a sincere analysis of whether the production order at issue constituted a “reasonable limit” on 
Makuch’s rights as a journalist. Part of this inquiry would likely focus on whether or not the 
communications between Makuch and the presumed terrorist contained information about an 
imminent threat to national security. An imminent threat ought to be the threshold for infringing 
on the rights of a broadcaster because anything shorter would give the courts wider latitude to 
encroach upon these rights.71  
     Currently, the only legal framework crafted to protect journalists in this area is the Wigmore 
criteria. That test sets out four requirements for what relationships are deserving of privilege:  
1.) The communications must originate in confidence that they will not be 
disclosed.  
2.) The element of the confidentiality must be essential to the full satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties.  
3.) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be 
sedulously fostered.  
                                                   
70 Ibid.  
71 What constitutes an “imminent threat” is rather subjective. Courts would have to establish specific parameters to 
define a threat as imminent.  
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4.) The injury that would inure to the relation by disclosure of the 
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct 
disposal of litigation.72   
 
These requirements are grounded in the common law, and the Court in National Post went so far 
as to assert that confidential sources did not enjoy Charter protection.73  
     What these decisions make clear is that the courts have been reluctant to acknowledge the 
rights of broadcasters as it relates to the journalist-source relationship. As I noted above in 
regards to publication bans, these decisions have a significant chilling effect on the constitutional 
protections afforded to broadcasters under s. 2(b) of the Charter. Recently, however, the Senate 
of Canada has proposed legislation, Bill S-231 which would give journalists the right to not 
divulge either sources or the content of communications with those sources.74 Additionally, S-
231 would amend the Criminal Code in such a way that securing a search warrant for a 
broadcaster’s office or work product would be considerably more difficult.75  
     This legislation was proposed in part out of concern for incidents’ in Québec where 
journalists were being investigated by Québec provincial police, the Sûreté du Québec.76 
However, in the Parliamentary debate on  Bill S-231, there was explicit reference on more than 
one occasion to the situation concerning Mr. Makuch.77 Adopting this legislation would be an 
important step towards broadening protections afforded to broadcasters, however, it does not 
confer upon broadcasters the level of protection afforded by the robust Charter protections. This 
                                                   
72 R. v. Gruenke, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 363 at 310. 
73 National Post, supra note 64 at para. 64. 
74 Bill S-231, An Act to amend the Canada Evidence Act and the Criminal Code (Protection of Journalistic 
Sources), 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2017 (as passed by the Senate 11 April 2017). 
75 Ibid.  
76 Allan Woods, “Police Spying Inquiry Hears of Another Targeted Quebec Journalist”, The Toronto Star (April 10, 
2017) online: The Toronto Star < https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/04/10/police-spying-revelations-led-
to-urgent-reforms-in-quebec-inquiry-hears.html>. 
77 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 9th June 2017 (Brigitte Sansoucy) online: Open Parliament 
<https://openparliament.ca/debates/2017/6/9/brigitte-sansoucy-3/>.; Canada, House of Commons Debates, 11 May 
2017 (Matthew Dubé) online: Open Parliament <https://openparliament.ca/debates/2017/5/11/matthew-dube-9/>.  
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is especially true in terms of keeping the identity of sources confidential, which is central to the 
journalistic process. 
5.3.3 Election Advertising and Publication Bans on Polls and Results 
     In regards to cases dealing with elections, there are two contexts within which the courts have 
addressed the rights of broadcasters. These are cases dealing with campaign advertising either by 
political parties or third parties, and cases addressing the dissemination of opinion polls and 
election results.78 I will address these two types of cases in turn.  
     Rather generally, in terms of rights claims, the jurisprudence dealing with election advertising 
has tended to go against broadcasters. In the first of these cases, Reform Party of Canada v. 
Canada (Attorney General), a majority of the Alberta court of appeal upheld limits on campaign 
advertising and airtime quotas which favoured established parties.79 In deciding that case, the 
court reasoned that while the impugned provisions were discriminatory towards fringe parties, 
the objective of the law was to provide those parties that had a reasonable chance at forming 
government greater access to the airwaves.80 The argument that the airtime formula ought to 
favour parties which are objectively capable of contending to form government is a reasonable 
one. However, the dissent, in this case, focused on the fact that fringe parties nevertheless play 
an important role in raising issues in elections for contending parties and the public to consider.81 
While fringe parties might play an important role in framing the issues, this does not necessarily 
mean that they should be given the same amount of access to the airwaves as contending parties. 
I share the majority’s view here that this is an issue which arbitrators can help mitigate.  
                                                   
78 Note that because the actions for which they seek rights protection, the political parties and third parties involved 
are broadcasters as I defined them in chapter 1.			
79 [1995] 123 D.L.R. (4th) 366.  
80 Ibid. at paras. 61-62. Part of this decision was based on the fact that the legislative scheme did provide for an 
arbiter to resolve disputes between emerging and established parties. Ibid.  
81 Ibid. at para. 155.  
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     Similarly, in Harper, the Supreme Court noted that in cases dealing with election advertising 
and campaign finance, courts ought to take a deferential approach to Parliament and upheld the 
limits on those grounds.82 The minority argued, unpersuasively in my view, that the concern over 
disproportionate election spending was merely theoretical and there was no evidence that it 
actually had an effect on the outcome of elections.83 
     One case in which broadcasters were successful, however, was in regards to a prohibition on 
election advertising between the dropping of the writ and 29 days before the election.84 In that 
case, the provisions failed the Oakes requirement that the government action be pressing and 
substantial on the grounds that “[t]here can be no need to suppress input [on elections] merely 
because it might have an impact on elections”.85 This is certainly a valid conclusion, the 
impugned prohibition was far too broad.  
     The second type of cases where election laws conflict with the rights of broadcasters are cases 
in which the courts addressed the dissemination of poll results and the early dissemination of 
election results. As with Somerville, Thomson Newspapers dealt with legislation which banned 
the publication of poll results in a three-day period leading up to an election.86 Bastarache J. 
writing for the majority found that the exact purpose of the prohibition was unclear and was 
unconvinced by the Attorney General’s argument that it was pressing and substantial because 
                                                   
82 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 at para. 88. 
83 Ibid. at para. 34. It is important to note that at the time of this decision, the United States Supreme Court had 
already dealt with the issue, holding that provisions within the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) 
addressing campaign finance and election advertising were necessary inasmuch as those provisions close loopholes 
which would otherwise have been exploited by large corporations. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 
[2003] 540 U.S. 93 at 118. I will discuss this case in greater detail in the following chapter.  
84 Canada (Attorney General) v. Somerville. (1996) 136 D.L.R. (4th) 239. 
85 Ibid. at paras. 77, 68. 
86 Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877.  
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publishing such polls would supersede other values that Canadians’ take into account when 
voting.87  
     In Bryan, however, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a broadcaster who had 
disseminated election results from the Maritimes before polling closed in other parts of the 
country.88 Abella J. mounted a persuasive argument that “the right of the media…to publish 
election results…is an essential part of the democratic process, clear and convincing evidence is 
required to justify limiting the availability of this information”.89 Additionally, the majority’s 
conclusion that disseminating results early would privilege Canadians in the Western Provinces 
is tenuous at best.90 In Bryan, there was no clear link established between disseminating results 
from Atlantic Canada and changes in voter behaviour in the Western provinces and territories.91 
As a result, the majority’s concerns are largely speculative.  
5.3.4 Hate Speech 
     The only case in my data set addressing hate speech was R. v. Andrews, the companion case 
to Keegstra.92 In that case, the Court upheld the conviction and in doing so, echoed its reasons 
from Keegstra which I discussed at length in the previous chapter. One case which I rejected 
because the Charter was not addressed, was Lund v. Boissoin. There, the broadcaster published a 
homophobic editorial.93 The  Boissoin case certainly raises some questions. For example, in that 
case, there was no competing s. 15 claim from the LGBTQ community in response to the 
freedom of expression claim. If there were a case in which a freedom of expression claim was in 
competition with an equality claim by the LGBTQ community, how would a court decide that 
                                                   
87 Ibid. at paras. 101-102.	
88 R. v. Bryan, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527.  
89 Ibid. at para. 110. 
90 Ibid. at para. 27. 
91 Ibid. at 117-18. 
92 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 870. 
93 (2012) 365 D.L.R. (4th) 459.  
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issue in the future? On several occasions, the Supreme Court has listed sexual orientation as an 
analogous ground under s. 15.94 Based on this, I argue that were such a conflict to arise, the 
equality right would likely supersede the right to freedom of expression.  
5.3.5 Broadcaster Advertising 
     Adbusters Media Foundation is a radical media organization whose primary goal is to raise 
awareness about the negative effects of North American consumerism.95 In 2003, Adbusters 
requested that Global and the CBC broadcast ten videos which were critical of consumer 
advertising.96 Those requests were rejected, and Adbusters brought suit alleging this violated 
their freedom of expression.97 The British Columbia Supreme Court dismissed this application, 
holding that the issue was not justiciable, largely because the Charter did not apply.98 On appeal, 
the B.C. court of appeals found that whether or not the Charter applied was something on which 
“reasonable persons might differ” and that the trial court was incorrect in dismissing the case 
outright, ordering a new trial.99 However, as of July 2017, Adbusters has not yet pursued a new 
trial. The importance of the ability of Adbusters to not only express themselves but also to have 




                                                   
94 See Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493; M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3; 
Little Sisters Book and Arts Emporium, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120.  
95 See especially, Kalle Lasn, Culture Jam: How to Reverse America’s Suicidal Consumer Binge – And Why We 
Must (Toronto: Harper Paperbacks, 2000) [Lasn]. Note also that Adbusters is credited with initiating the recent 
“Occupy” movement.  
96 Adbusters Media Foundation v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2008 BCSC 71, (2008) Carswell BC 286 
(Adbusters I). 
97 Ibid.  
98 Ibid.  
99 Adbusters Media Foundation v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. (2009) 92 B.C.L.R. (4th) at para. 15 
[Adbusters II]. 
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5.3.6 New Media  
     As yet, Canadian courts have not yet acknowledged the Charter in cases dealing with new 
media, although there have been broadcasters that have made Charter claims.100 Courts have 
held that these cases are best addressed through civil or administrative law.101 Nevertheless, this 
is an important area to explore because new media is at the nexus of the other issues discussed 
not only in this chapter but this entire thesis more broadly.  
     However, as broadcasting evolves, broadcasters still encounter issues similar to those 
encountered by traditional media. Consider for example, a citizen journalist who “tweets” their 
thoughts in a well-researched, well-articulated manner and uses confidential sources in 
accordance with the guidelines set out by the CJA rather than writing a traditional article. Should 
that citizen journalist be distinguished from a conventional broadcaster? I would argue that the 
two are indistinguishable. Instead, I argue that broadcasters who decide to disseminate messages 
that are intended to “inform, enlighten, and entertain” should not be viewed any differently than 
newspapers or television stations. One problem with this approach, however, is that in the 
internet age, it is much more difficult to discern who constitutes such a broadcaster from those 
who do not follow the same practices. Currently, the Court has refused to apply the Charter in 
cases dealing with new media. However, I argue that adding a layer to any analysis by requiring 
a court to determine whether the person or entity in question is a broadcaster is a more preferable 
approach. The reasons set out in the following section provide a compelling explanation for why 
presuming that the Charter does not apply in new media cases is too arbitrary and myopic.    
 
                                                   
100 Pridgen v. University of Calgary. (2012) 350 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [Pridgen]; St. Lewis v. Rancourt, [2015] CarswellOnt 
10241; Taylor-Baptiste v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union. (2015) 126 O.R. (3d) 481 [Taylor-Baptiste]; 
Awan v. Levant, [2016] ONCA 970 [Levant]. 
101 See e.g. Pridgen, Taylor-Baptiste, and Levant, Ibid.  
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5.4 The Public Importance of Broadcasting 
     As I have argued throughout this chapter, one of the most compelling reasons why the 
Supreme Court of Canada ought to adopt the Wilson test from McKinney is that broadcasting is 
of considerable public importance. In this regard, the Broadcasting Act explicitly states that the 
Canadian broadcasting system is “a public service essential to the maintenance and enhancement 
of national identity and cultural sovereignty”.102 Moreover, the government has acknowledged 
the importance of broadcasting by subjecting it to a unique regulator, the CRTC.  
     Furthermore, broadcasting serves an important public function not only because it is 
recognized as such by the government, but also because of its power to shape the lives of 
Canadians. Recent statistics show that Canadian adults watch an average of 30 hours per week of 
television.103 Because of the amount of time that Canadians devote to television consumption, it 
is difficult to argue that broadcasting does not play an important role in Canada. In fact, Marshal 
McLuhan theorized that the “medium (television) is the message” because it is the “medium that 
shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action”.104 McLuhan argued 
that television had a profound impact on society. His theory held that all technology is a form of 
media, and that all media is an extension of human faculties in the same way that a car is an 
extension of a human foot.105 The more pervasive a medium is, the more it symbolizes an 
extension of all human culture. McLuhan argued that as far as media is concerned, television is 
                                                   
102 Broadcasting Act, supra note 7 at s. 3(1)(b).  
103 Michael Oliveira, “Canadians Watch 30 Hours of TV but for Many Web Dominates Free Time”, The Toronto 
Star (April 26, 2013) online: The Toronto Star 
<https://www.thestar.com/life/technology/2013/04/26/canadians_watch_30_hours_of_tv_but_for_many_web_domi
nates_free_time.html>. It is important to note as well that much of this media consumption is shifting to the internet-
based broadcasting services. These statistics do not include the time that Canadians spend using new media such as 
Twitter.  
104 Marshal McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extension of Man, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Taylor Francist Ltd., 2001) at 
9.  
105 Ibid.  
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about as pervasive as it gets.106 In interpreting this theory, scholarship posits that since television 
programming is decided by so few, it is invariably represented by homogeneous values.107 Thus, 
what Canadians get to see on television and on the internet should of great public interest both 
sociologically and economically. For these reasons, then, on the basis of its undeniable public 
importance, the Charter ought to apply to broadcasters through the Wilson test in McKinney. 
5.5 Criticisms of the Public Importance Argument 
     Critics of my argument that the Charter ought to apply to broadcasters on the basis of public 
importance would argue that the purpose of the Charter is to limit government action that 
encroaches on civil liberties and that regulating private conduct is the responsibility of 
government rather than the courts.108 It follows that the ability of legislatures to regulate private 
conduct “makes it unnecessary…to extend the Charter’s reach to matters outside the fluid 
boundaries set by governmental action”.109  
     Throughout this thesis, I have argued that the Charter should apply to matters of considerable 
public importance. As I have shown, there is a strong argument for such a definition to include 
broadcasting. The concern that expanding the Charter’s scope in this way would complicate the 
law is overstated. I have noted elsewhere in this thesis that the effect would be an added layer to 
rights litigation. In that sense, it would make Charter litigation more consistent with the 
American approach where rights disputes emerge organically from private disputes. An 
additional issue with this approach might be with the text of s. 1. Professor Hogg has noted that 
                                                   
106 Ibid. It stands to reason that this undoubtedly applies to new media as well. 
107 Mark Federman, “What is the Meaning of the Medium is the Message?” online: The University of Toronto 
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private disputes cannot result in limits that are “prescribed by law” which would result in 
contradictions within Charter interpretation.110 In my view, this does not present a considerable 
barrier. It would simply require the Court to re-interpret that aspect of s. 1. Additionally, 
expanding the Charter’s scope to include matters of great public importance need not represent a 
radical departure from the Court’s current understanding. Indeed, the Court’s decisions 
concerning the scope of s. 32 indicate that the Court has been reticent to interpret s. 32 in a broad 
and liberal manner.111  
     Substantively, there might also be an argument that I am arguing for the Supreme Court of 
Canada to adopt a less restrictive approach to its reasonable limits analysis in cases involving 
broadcasters. This is not the case. Part of my broad argument in this thesis is that freedom of 
expression and freedom of press cases involving broadcasters ought to be adjudicated in the 
same manner as freedom of expression claims involving private citizens or other actors. This 
argument should not be construed to suggest that the Supreme Court of Canada needs to change 
its approach to freedom of expression or reasonable limits.  
5.6 Conclusion 
     In this chapter, I explored the judicial empowerment of broadcasters both empirically and 
qualitatively. These results indicate that Canadian courts have not afforded broadcasters robust 
rights protections. In my view, this is problematic. I argued in this chapter that the scope of the 
Charter’s application ought to be construed in such a way that it applies to broadcasters. 
Interpreting s. 32(1) of the Charter in this way would make it more difficult for government 
                                                   
110 Hogg, Ibid. There is precedent for this. As an example, the Court found a municipal transit authority’s policy 
regulating advertising on the sides of buses to be “prescribed by law”. Greater Vancouver Transit Authority v. 
Canadian Federation of Students, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295.  
111 See e.g. RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573; McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 
229. 
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actors to violate the rights of broadcasters. The importance of conferring broader rights 
protection to broadcasters is evidenced in particular in the realm of new media where these rights 
are rendered even more tenuous than the rights of traditional broadcasters, specifically because 
of the current body of jurisprudence dealing with the rights of broadcasters.   
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Chapter 6  
The Judicial Empowerment of Broadcasters in the United States 
 
6.1 Introduction 
     In this chapter, I will examine the judicial empowerment of broadcasters in the United States. 
In the first part of this chapter, I will explore the judicial empowerment of broadcasters 
quantitatively. There, I will argue that in almost half the cases involving broadcasters, the Court 
has empowered those actors. In the second part of this chapter, I will look at the content of the 
decisions to explain why the Court has been as willing as it has to empower broadcasters. In the 
final part of this chapter, I will argue that norms and values have emerged in the United States 
concerning the importance of freedoms of speech and freedom of the press. Similarly, in these 
cases, there is evidence to suggest that the Court is bound by past precedent.   
6.2 The Judicial Empowerment of Broadcasters in the United States: The Quantitative 
Context  
 
     In this section, I will present a quantitative perspective of the judicial empowerment of 
broadcasters in the United States. These results are displayed in Table 2. There are two broad 
trends which emerge from this analysis that I will discuss in greater detail. First is the 
considerable overrepresentation of private broadcasters within this set of cases. The second trend 








Table 2 Rights Outcomes in American Jurisprudence 
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3 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 6 
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1 1 0 0 1 10 0 11 1 14 
 
Public & 
Private Total   21 
Column 
Subtotals 1 0 0 1 32 1 1 7  
Table 2 Classifies rights claimant(s) involved in American cases based on whether or not the court ruled in favour 
of the rights claimant(s). American cases fell into one of five broad categories which correspond to the number 
under the subject matter heading: (1) Press Freedom, (2) Elections, (3) Defamation/Hate Speech/Obscenity, (4) 
Broadcaster Advertising.2 Unless otherwise indicated in the footnotes below, rights claimants refers to broadcasters 
in this table 
.  
6.2.1 The Underrepresentation of Public Broadcasters  
     In this data set, private broadcasters were successful on 19 of 41 occasions or 46.34% of the 
time. What these results indicate is that the American Court has been rather willing to entertain 
and allow the rights claims made by private broadcasters. There are two explanations for this 
trend. First, rights in the United States are conferred without limits, and rather generally, without 
                                                   
1	Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, [1976] 427 U.S. 539 [Nebraska Press]. In that case, freedom of the press 
was in competition with the right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court decided in favour of the broadcaster. It is 
important to note that broadcasters in this category where counted in the “Against Rights Claimant” total. 
2 The four categories outlined above include cases dealing with the following topics: (1) Editorials, the Fairness 
Doctrine, Publishing Classified Documents, Subpoenas, Access to Prisons, Equal Access, Publication Bans, Search 
Warrants, Student Newspapers; (2) Election Advertising and Campaign Finance; (3) Defamation, Hate Speech, 
Obscenity; (4) Broadcaster Advertising.  
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qualifications. Second, as I will discuss in the following section, the Court has set out 
considerable barriers to justify violating freedoms of expression and the press. Conversely, there 
was only one case where public broadcasters were involved.3 While there have also been cases at 
the federal circuit appellate level involving public broadcasters, these cases are the exception 
rather than the rule.4 As I will discuss below, this issue goes beyond whether or not public 
broadcasters enjoy First Amendment protections and obligations, but whether or not these 
broadcasters are and will continue to be viable and sustainable actors.  
     The current system of public broadcasting in the United States was established in 1967 with 
the adoption of the Public Broadcasting Act.5 That legislation created a central body responsible 
for governing public broadcasting in the United States, known as the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting (“CPB”).6 The legislative objective in creating the CPB was to “facilitate the full 
development of public telecommunications in which programs of high quality, diversity, 
creativity, excellence, and innovation…will be made available to the public”.7 The Act provided 
for the creation of a national television broadcaster, the Public Broadcasting Service (“PBS”) as 
well a national radio broadcaster, the National Public Radio (“NPR”) and various State-level 
public broadcasters.8  
                                                   
3 in that case, the Supreme Court struck down FCC prohibitions on editorializing as being overbroad. Federal 
Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters, [1984] 468 U.S. 364 [League of Voters]. 
4 This applies within this data set. See e.g. Muir v. Alabama Educational Television Commission, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th 
Cir. 1982) [Muir]. Given the absence of public broadcasters, there are no readily identifiable quantifiable trends in 
terms of public broadcasters. 
5 Public Broadcasting Act, 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1967) [Public Broadcasting Act]. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. at (g)(1)(A). 
8 Ibid. at (6)(A); (4); (2)(A). It is important to note that PBS and NPR are umbrella organizations which create 
content for their local subsidiaries.   
	 94	
     In addition to the CPB, public broadcasters in the United States are also subject to regulation 
by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), a statutorily created federal regulator.9 
The FCC’s mandate is to “regulat[e]…communication…by wire or radio so as to make 
available…a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communications 
service”.10 The FCC grants licenses to both public and private broadcasters with a view to this 
policy.11 Therefore, public broadcasters in the United States report to the President and Congress 
through the CPB and the FCC.12   
     The Public Broadcasting Act also allocates federal funding for the CPB which is intended to 
support American public broadcasters to an extent.13 Recently, the level of funding allocated to 
public broadcasting in the United States has been approximately $400 million although this 
figure has remained fairly stagnant.14 This means that public funds make up approximately 15% 
of public broadcasters’ operating budgets.15 Adding to the precarity of public broadcasting in the 
United States is the fact that past administrations have routinely threatened and attempted to 
defund the CPB.16 Further complicating the matter is the fact that the Public Broadcasting Act 
explicitly prohibits public broadcasters to raise revenues through commercial advertising.17 
                                                   
9 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934) [Communications Act]. The Communications Act was amended in 
1996 with the adoption of the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. (1996) (as amended). The dominant purpose of 
the Telecommunications Act was to account for the advent of the internet and loosen restrictions on who could own a 
broadcasting station.   
10 The Public and Broadcasting, online: FCC <https://www.fcc.gov/media/radio/public-and-
broadcasting#PROGRAMMING>. [Public and Broadcasting] 
11 Ibid.  
12 Public Broadcasting Act, supra note 5 at i; Communications Act, supra note 9 at 4(k). 
13 Public Broadcasting Act, Ibid. at k(1). 
14 Robert K. Avery, “The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967: Looking Ahead by Looking Back” (2007) 24 Critical 
Studies in Media Communication 4 at 362 [Avery]. Note that this does reflect the funding that is provided to public 
broadcasters at the state level.  
15 Ibid. at 361. 
16 See generally, James Ledbetter, Made Possible By…The Death of Public Broadcasting in the United States (New 
York: Verso, 1997). For example, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, New Gingrich asserted that “[he] 
would not recognize any proposal that will appropriate money for the CPB”. Ibid. at 3. Similarly, Presidents Richard 
Nixon and George W. Bush sought to take action which would cripple the CPB. Avery, supra note 14 at 360. 
17 Public Broadcasting Act, supra note 5 at s. 399(b). 
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Consequently, public broadcasters in the United States rely on donations in order fund their 
operating budget.18 
     As such, public broadcasters in the United States do not have the resources to pursue rights 
claims. However, there is another explanation for why public broadcasters are significantly 
underrepresented in this data set. The FCC has rather strict guidelines for the types of 
programming that broadcasters can disseminate. For example, FCC regulations explicitly 
prohibit “objectionable programming” which includes, but is not limited to “[p]rogramming 
inciting lawless action” and “[o]bscene, [i]ndecent, or [p]rofane [p]rogramming”.19 When 
viewed in light of their sources of funding, these restrictions have arguably dissuaded public 
broadcasters from producing and disseminating content that is salacious or inflammatory and 
from which a rights claim might emerge.  
6.2.2 Thematic Trends in the Judicial Empowerment of Broadcasters 
   The broadest category of cases in the United States are those in which I have referred to as 
“press freedom” cases.20 In these case, broadcasters succeeded in 14 of 29 occasions, or 48.2%. 
This figure is significant. It confirms my earlier assertion that the data supports a finding that the 
Supreme Court of the United States has empowered broadcasters through its jurisprudence. This 
trend is amplified in cases dealing with defamation, hate speech, and obscenity. In those cases, 
broadcasters were successful on five of seven occasions, or 71.4%. The Court’s treatment of 
defamation, hate speech, and obscenity indicates that it has interpreted the First Amendment 
rather liberally. In the cases I have selected, the number of cases in which the Supreme Court 
addressed rights claims in the context of election law or broadcaster advertising is not significant 
                                                   
18 Supra note 15.  
19 Public and Broadcasting, supra note 10. 
20 For a complete list of the cases in this category, see note 2 above. 
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enough to draw out truly meaningful trends. In the following section, I will draw on the 
substance of these cases to explain these trends.  
6.3 Judicial Empowerment of Broadcasters in the United States: The Qualitative Context 
 
     In the previous section, I provided a quantitative perspective of the judicial empowerment in 
the United States. In particular, I noted two trends: that there was a dearth of public broadcasters 
involved in rights disputes; and that in the cases I selected, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has been willing to expand the scope of the First Amendment as it relates to broadcasters. 
This raises the question of why are broadcasters as successful as they are in rights cases in the 
United States? To answer this question, I will evaluate the substantive reasons for judgment in 
these cases. 
6.3.1.A Freedom of the Press Cases   
     Within the American cases I selected for this thesis, there were nine cases which I have 
termed “freedom of the press” cases.21 The earliest of these cases, Mills v. Alabama, dealt with 
the issue of political editorials.22 In that case, the editor of the Birmingham Post-Herald wrote an 
editorial “strongly urg[ing] the people to adopt the mayor-council form of government”.23 The 
editor was charged under the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act (“ACPA”) which, in part, 
prohibited “the editor of a daily newspaper [from] writ[ing] and publish[ing] an editorial on 
election day urging people to vote a certain way”.24 In a rather strong opinion, a majority of the 
Supreme Court held that the ACPA was far too restrictive.25 Black J. writing for the majority 
                                                   
21 Here, freedom of the press refers to a narrow conception of that concept rather the broader characterization of 
freedom of the press presented by the First Amendment and the myriad, related legal issues which arise from that 
constitutional provision. Rather, my conception of freedom of the press cases in this subsection refers to five 
specific types of cases dealing with the following issues: editorials, the fairness doctrine, publishing classified 
documents, equal access, and student newspapers.   
22 Mills v. Alabama, [1966] 384 U.S. 214 [Mills]. 
23 Ibid. at 215.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid. at 220.  
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reasoned that as far as the ACPA was concerned “it [would be] difficult to conceive of a more 
obvious and flagrant abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press”.26 
Black argued, rather persuasively, that on those grounds “no test of reasonableness can save a 
state law from invalidation as a violation of the First Amendment” where the law in question 
prevents newspapers from encouraging voters to adopt a particular position.27 
     The Court’s decision in Mills is entirely uncontroversial. In terms of First Amendment 
violations, the type of prohibition on newspaper activity at issue in Mills is about as egregious as 
it gets. In subsequent cases dealing with editorials and editorializing on public access television, 
the Supreme Court has empowered broadcasters, although for different reasons. In Pickering v. 
Board of Education, an Illinois high school teacher was dismissed for directly contributing to 
articles which were critical of how the local school board handled its fundraising efforts for new 
schools.28 Marshall J. noted that “[t]he question of whether a school system requires additional 
funds is a matter of legitimate public concern on which the judgment of the school 
administration…cannot…be taken to be exclusive”.29 The Court concluded that the school 
board’s interest in limiting the ability of its teachers to comment on public issues did not 
outweigh the teachers right to criticize the school board on matters of public concern.30  
     Similarly, a majority of the Supreme Court has held that restricting the ability of public 
broadcasters to present editorial opinions; the Court noted in particular that it “far exceed[ed] 
what was necessary to protect against the risk of governmental interference or to prevent the 
public from assuming that editorial opinions by public broadcasting stations represent the official 
                                                   
26 Ibid. at 219. 
27 Supra note 25. 
28 [1968] 391 U.S. 563 [Pickering]. 
29 Ibid. at 572. 
30 Ibid. at 573. 
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view of the government”.31 In that case, Brennan J. posited that government restrictions on 
broadcasting “have been upheld only when we were satisfied that the restriction is narrowly 
tailored to further a substantial government interest”.32 That standard is a recurring theme in 
these cases and helps explain why the Court has empowered broadcasters to the extent that it has. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue broadcasters should not be allowed to comment on public 
issues.33   
     However, a related area where broadcasters have not benefited from the Court’s decisions is 
in terms of cases dealing with equal access to air and radio waves. In 1967, the Court was asked 
to consider whether the “Fairness Doctrine”, an FCC rule that broadcasters present each side of a 
given issue, violated the First Amendment.34 In upholding the Fairness Doctrine, a majority of 
the Court noted that the First Amendment burden on the government was not overly onerous.35 
This was because “[t]he right to free speech of a broadcaster…does not embrace a right to snuff 
out the free speech of others”.36 In the context of broadcast television, the Court re-affirmed its 
decision that equal access requirements were constitutional in Turner.37 Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that in between Red Lion and Turner, the Court issued a decision wherein it 
rejected the equal access argument on First Amendment grounds.38 In that case, the Democratic 
National Committee sought paid access to the airwaves to broadcast an advertisement concerning 
                                                   
31 League of Voters, supra note 3 at 395. 
32 Ibid. at 381. (emphasis added) 
33 This is an argument that the dissenters in League of Women Voters attempted to make. Specifically, they 
contended that “Congress has rationally determined that the bulk of taxpayers…would prefer not to see the 
management of local educational stations promulgate its own private views on the air at taxpayer expense”. Ibid. at 
405. 
34 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, [1969] 395 U.S. 367 [Red Lion]. 
35 Ibid. at 401. 
36 Ibid. at 387 
37 Turner Broadcasting Systems Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, [1997] 520 U.S. 180 [Turner]. 
38 Columbia Broadcasting Systems Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, [1973] 412 U.S. 94 [CBS].  
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the Vietnam War. In terms of newspapers, the Supreme Court has held that compelling 
newspapers to give political candidates equal access violated the First Amendment.39     
     There are two important points here. First, requiring broadcasters to present a range of 
perspectives on a given issue of public importance invariably contributes to the marketplace of 
ideas. Thus, while doing so may restrict the rights of broadcasters in the narrow sense that it 
limits the scope of their editorial judgment, it also expands the ability of other actors. This 
includes other broadcasters to disseminate perspectives and views which contribute to, and have 
the potential to enhance public discourse and understanding on a given topic.  
     Second, it is important to note that in this era, the amount of airtime on television and the 
radio was limited. This was a fact that largely informed the Court’s equal access decisions.40 
However, recent technological developments have mitigated the importance of equal access. For 
example, the advent of satellite television, radio, and the internet have significantly loosened the 
time and space restrictions on broadcasters.41  
     Similarly, the Supreme Court has also decided cases dealing with the publication of classified 
documents and student newspapers.42 In New York Times Co. v. United States, the New York 
Times published the contents of a classified United States Department of Defense study 
revealing the true scope of its bombing activities in Vietnam, commonly referred to as the 
“Pentagon Papers”. Then President Richard Nixon sought to prohibit the publication of the 
Pentagon Papers as well as other classified documents on the basis of executive privilege.43 In a 
scathing opinion, Black and Douglas JJ. opined that “every moment’s continuance of the 
                                                   
39 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, [1974] 418 U.S. 241. 
40 Red Lion, supra note 34 at 383; CBS, supra note 38 at 102; Turner, supra note 37 at 188.  
41 Readers should note that in the cases within this data set, the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of equal 
access since its 1994 decision in Turner. 
42 New York Times Co. v. United States, [1971] 403 U.S. 713 [New York Times Co.]; Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier, [1988] 484 U.S. 260 [Kuhlmeier]. 
43 New York Times, Ibid. 
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injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing 
violation of the First Amendment”.44 While there is an argument to made for prohibiting the 
publication of classified government documents, allowing the President of the United States to 
do so on the basis of executive privilege would result in a considerable chilling effect on the 
rights of broadcasters.  
6.3.1.B Subpoenas, Access to Prisons, Publication Bans, and Search Warrants 
     The second set of cases dealing with freedom of the press address subpoenas, access to 
prisons, publication bans, and search warrants. Each of these types of cases will be discussed in 
turn. In this data set, Branzburg v. Hayes is the only case dealing with subpoenas.45 In 
Branzburg, the Court found that requiring a journalist to answer to a grand jury subpoena and 
identify confidential sources was justifiable under the First Amendment.46 White J. posited that 
the chilling effect on journalists as an argument for exempting journalists from answering 
subpoenas was unpersuasive.47 There was, however, no substantial analysis in the majority 
opinion to support that particular conclusion. Douglas J. pointed this out in his dissent, noting 
that “[u]nless [a journalist] has a privilege to withhold the identity of his source, he will be the 
victim of government intrigue or aggression”.48 As I discussed in the previous chapter, 
compelling journalists to reveal their sources, through whatever means, is likely to result in a 
considerable chilling effect.  
     On two occasions, broadcasters sought access to prisons for the purposes of interviewing 
inmates and were denied, resulting in First Amendment claims.49 In the first of these decisions, 
                                                   
44 Ibid. at 715. 
45 [1972] 408 U.S. 665 [Branzburg]. 
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid. at 691. 
48 Ibid. at 722. 
49 Pell v. Procunier, [1974] 417 U.S. 817 [Pell]; Houchins v. KQED Inc., [1978] 438 U.S. 1 [Houchins]. 
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Pell, the Court held that in-person interviews were not the only means by which broadcasters 
could conduct interviews.50 However, this was a major point of tension in the Court’s decision. 
For example, Powell J. maintained that the ban “impermissibly restrains the ability of the press 
to perform its constitutionally established function of informing people of the conduct of their 
government”.51 Indeed, while it may be appropriate to limit media access to prisons in specific 
contexts for reasons including, for instance, safety concerns, a total ban, as Powell rightly noted, 
is rather difficult to justify. Four years later, this decision was upheld in Houchins.52 In that case, 
the Court expanded on its decision in Pell, identifying access to prisons as a policy issue rather 
than a rights issue.53 While that may be correct in a narrow, technical sense, this line of reasoning 
is tenuous. Primarily because policy issues can, and frequently do become rights issues. Pell and 
Houchins four decades later continue to stand.54  
     In terms of publication bans and open courts, the Court has routinely empowered broadcasters 
to cover criminal trials as well as judicial inquiry and review board proceedings.55 A broad theme 
in these cases is the Court’s repeated assertion in Nebraska Press Association that “it is far from 
clear that prior restraint [on publication] would have protected [trial fairness]”.56 Similarly, in 
Landmark Communications, Burger C.J. noted that “the publication Virginia seeks to 
punish…lies near the core of the First Amendment”.57 Moreover, in Richmond Newspapers, 
                                                   
50 Pell, Ibid. at 824.  
51 Ibid. at 835.  
52 Houchins, supra note 48. 
53 Ibid. at 9. 
54 Adrian Shirk, “Why Don’t You Ever See Inmates on TV?”, the Atlantic (July 14, 2014) online: The Atlantic 
<https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/why-dont-you-ever-see-tv-interviews-with-
inmates/374447/>.  
55 Nebraska Press, supra note 1; Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, [1978] 435 U.S. 829 [Landmark 
Communications]; Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, [1980] 448 U.S. 555 [Richmond Newspapers]; El Vocero 
v. Puerto Rico, [1993] 508 U.S. 147 [El Vocero]. 
56 Nebraska Press, Ibid. at 567. 
57 Landmark Communications, supra note 55 at 838.  
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arguably the landmark decision in regards to open courts, Chief Justice Burger was apoplectic 
about the prospect of journalists being prevented from attending and reporting on criminal trials. 
Burger maintained that such a prohibition would “eviscerate” freedom of the press and freedom 
of expression.58  
     The final case in this area deals with search warrants.59 The Stanford Daily Newspaper was 
alleged to have evidence of criminal conduct which occurred during a protest and it had 
published in a special edition. As a result, local police obtained a search warrant for the 
newspaper’s premises.60 In upholding the warrant, White J. reasoned that “it is untenable to 
conclude that property may not be searched unless its occupant is reasonably suspected of a 
crime and is subject to arrest”.61 White refuted the notion that search warrants had a chilling 
effect by citing the rarity with which search warrants had been issued against broadcasters 
premises.62 However, as I discussed in the previous chapter, that proposition is problematic. 
Search warrants have the very real potential to reveal sources and methods which can cripple a 
journalist or broadcasters’ ability to do their job. This is a fact that was not lost on the dissenters 
in Zurcher.63 As such, the Court did not properly consider the effect on freedom of the press or 
expression.   
6.3.2 Election Advertising and Campaign Finance 
     In McConnell v. Federal Elections Commission, the Court was asked to consider whether 
campaign finance legislation, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) violated the First 
Amendment insofar as it prohibited the use of “soft money” to fund, amongst other things, 
                                                   
58 Richmond Newspapers, supra note 55 at 580. 
59 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, [1978] 436 U.S. 547 [Zurcher]. 
60 Ibid. at 550-52. 
61 Ibid. at 559. 
62 Ibid. at 566. 
63 Ibid. at 572. 
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campaign advertisements.64 In deciding this case, the Court was alerted to the potential dangers 
that soft money would have on elections, including the connection between soft money and 
corruption.65 Accordingly, a majority of the Court was unpersuaded by the contention that the 
BCRA was vague and overbroad.66 The Court upheld the BCRA because it had a marginal effect 
on freedom of speech.67 The dissenters in this cases, however, highlighted two areas of concern: 
there were less restrictive means available to Congress in reforming campaign laws, and that the 
majority applied the incorrect standard of review in regards to the First Amendment question. On 
the latter point, Thomas J. referred to the majority opinion as “an assault on the free exchange of 
ideas”.68 
     In 2010, the Court was given the opportunity to revisit the BCRA, where the McConnell 
dissenters prevailed.69 In that case, the Court bypassed its decision in McConnell by equating 
corporations with human beings.70 The majority reasoned that a corporations’ ability to spend its 
resources as it chooses is a means of expressing itself.71 Given that corporations are legal 
persons, and that money is analogous to speech, the inference is that in the context of elections, 
corporations are allowed to express themselves through expenditures. This line of reasoning is 
questionable. While it has inevitably allowed corporations and political parties alike as 
broadcasters to make considerable investments in campaign advertising, this phenomenon is 
troubling. While I do not take issue with the expansion of corporations’ ability to broadcast 
                                                   
64 [2003] 540 U.S. 93. Soft money refers to indirect donations or those that are intended to fund state and local, 
rather than federal election campaigns. Ibid. at 123.  
65 Ibid. at 153. 
66 Ibid. at 224. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid. at 265. 
69 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, [2010] 558 U.S. 310. 
70 Ibid. at 955.  
71 Ibid. At 904.	
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advertisements per se, the fact that those same corporations can use their considerable resources 
to influence elections is concerning. However, that point is beyond the scope of my focus here.  
6.3.3 Defamation 
     The Court has also addressed the rights of broadcasters in the context of defamation, hate 
speech, and obscenity cases. I will explore these three types of cases in turn. Unlike the Canadian 
courts, the Supreme Court of the United States has, on several occasions, entertained claims 
made by broadcasters emerging from civil defamation cases. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is 
arguably the landmark decision in that area.72 In that case, a police commissioner, L.B. Sullivan 
from Alabama successfully sued the New York Times for libel. Sullivan took exception to 
advertisements published by the Times in support of the Civil Rights movement which were 
critical of police conduct. Although the advertisements did not personally name Sullivan, he felt 
that they did impugn his character.73 On appeal, the New York Times argued that the jury award 
and the lawsuit more generally violated the First Amendment’s freedom of the press clause.  
     In it’s decision, a majority of the Supreme Court held that “the Constitution delimits a State’s 
power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their 
official conduct”.74 In reaching that conclusion, Brennan J. established the rule that public 
officials could not sue broadcasters for defamation unless the defamatory statements were made 
with “actual malice”, or “with knowledge that it was false” or that it was made “with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not”.75 The actual malice and known falsity standards are 
laudable because of the considerable barriers that they present for public officials to overcome in 
                                                   
72 [1964] 376 U.S. 265 [Sullivan]. See also Samuel R. Pierce Jr, “The Anatomy of an Historic Decision: New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan” (1965) 43 North Carolina Law Review.   
73 Sullivan, Ibid. at 255-58. 
74 Ibid. at 284.	
75 Ibid. at 279-80. 
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order to be able to sue broadcasters for libel. However, the Court did not clearly define the limits 
of who ought to be considered a public official for the purposes of Constitutional analysis. It is 
that definition that the Court grappled with in its subsequent defamation cases.  
     Indeed, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, the Court had to decide whether the Sullivan standard applied 
to a public recreation area manager who sued a New Hampshire newspaper for defamation.76 In 
that case, Brennan, again writing for the majority, maintained that there was insufficient 
evidence to decide that issue, referring the case back to the trial level for that point to be argued 
in greater detail.77 However, in its decision, the Court noted that in libel cases involving public 
officials, Sullivan was indeed the relevant authority.78 Implicit in that analysis is the tacit 
suggestion that the recreation area manager was likely a public official and could not recover 
damages on those grounds. Indeed, this is a point that Black and Douglas JJ. explicitly argued in 
their dissent.79 However, as in Sullivan, the Court neglected to define “how far down into the 
ranks of government employees the ‘public official’ designation [should] extend”.80 
      Time Inc. v. Hill addressed whether a New York court’s interpretation of a State civil rights 
statute in a defamation case was consistent with Sullivan.81 The Court conceded that requiring 
journalists to make sure that the facts of every story they wrote were correct would “saddle 
[them] with an impossible burden”.82 In spite of this concession, the Court nevertheless rejected 
the rights claim on the grounds that the narrow interpretation of the statute by the lower courts 
was appropriate.83 In Time Inc., the Court’s narrow interpretation of Sullivan is problematic 
                                                   
76 [1966] 383 U.S. 75. 
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid. at 86.	
79 Ibid. at 89. 
80 Ibid. at 85. 
81 Time Inc. v. Hill, [1967] 385 U.S. 374.   
82 Ibid. at 389. 
83 Ibid. at 398. 
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insofar as the very purpose of the Sullivan decision was to imbue freedom of the press with a 
broad, liberal interpretation.  
     In 1971, the Court once again was presented with the opportunity to address the scope of 
Sullivan’s public official requirement.84 In Rosenbloom, a plurality of the Court held that the 
Sullivan standard applied to purely private disputes as well.85 Brennan J. noted in particular that 
“if a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely 
because a private individual is involved”.86 In deciding what expression was constitutionally 
protected as opposed to that which was defamatory and subject to jury awards, Brennan simply 
reaffirmed the Court’s knowing falsity requirement”.87 In Rosenbloom, however, there were five 
different opinions written with none receiving more than three votes. While I agree with the 
prevailing justices in that case in regards to the scope of broadcasters’ rights, the considerable 
lack of consensus in that case subverts Justice Brennan’s overall conclusion.  
     In the final defamation cases in this data set, the Court attempted to reign in its decision in 
Rosenbloom. For example, in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., a case that dealt with a broadcaster that 
spread conspiracy theories, the Court refuted the Rosenbloom plurality’s expansion of Sullivan.88 
Specifically, Powell J. maintained that “the States should retain substantial latitude in their 
efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private 
person”.89 Similarly, in Herbert v. Lando, White J. contended that “according an absolute 
privilege to the editorial process of a media defendant in a libel case… would substantially 
                                                   
84 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc., [1971] 403 U.S. 29. 
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid. at 43. Brennan also contended that “[d]rawing a distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ figures makes no 
sense in terms of the constitutional guarantees”. Ibid. at 45-46. 
87 Ibid. at 52. 
88 [1974] 418 U.S. 323. 
89 Ibid. at 346. 
	 107	
enhance the burden of proving actual malice, contrary to the expectations of New York Times”.90 
While these cases represented a reformulation, rather than a restatement of the law, what is 
particularly concerning is that in Lando, the Court was unwilling to extend the First Amendment 
privilege to the editorial process.91  
6.3.4 Hate Speech 
     In this set of cases, Brandenburg v. Ohio is the only case that deals with hate or inflammatory 
expression.92 In that case, a leader of the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) transmitted a broadcast of a 
rally by inviting a journalist to film the rally.93 The KKK member was charged and convicted 
under a State law which prohibited “advocate[ing]…sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of 
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform”.94 In striking down the 
Criminal Syndicalism law, the Supreme Court reasoned that in terms of hate or inflammatory 
expression, the threshold ought to be “advocacy [of the use of force] is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”.95 There are 
two issues here. First, the standard set by the Court in this case is rather high. In terms of hate 
speech, the rhetoric conveyed by the KKK is perhaps the clearest example of expression that is 
flagrantly and egregiously hateful. More technically, in this particular case the facts are difficult 
to reconcile with the outcome. It is inconceivable how the KKK’s activities do not meet the 
threshold of “imminent lawless action”. The entire raison d’être of that organization is to incite 
lawless action.  
 
                                                   
90 [1979] 441 U.S. 153. 
91 Ibid. at 171. 
92 [1969] 395 U.S. 444. 
93 Ibid. at 445. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. at 448. 
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6.3.4 Obscenity 
     As was the case with hate speech, the Court has addressed obscenity in the context of 
broadcasting on only one occasion. In Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 
the Court was faced with the question of whether obscene expression in a student newspaper 
merited First Amendment protection.96 In a unanimous decision, the Court flatly rejected the 
argument that constitutionally, universities could censor student newspapers. The Court noted in 
particular that “the mere dissemination of ideas…on a state university campus may not be shut 
off in the name of ‘conventions of decency’”.97 This is in spite of the fact that the content at issue 
in that case included a reprinted cartoon of “policemen raping the Statue of Liberty”.98 Even still, 
the Court was correct here. The newspaper’s content that the university took exception to, while 
highly controversial, is nonetheless political speech, which is central to the First Amendment. 
While the editors of the newspaper could have shown greater restraint in how they chose to 
convey their message, that is nonetheless an editorial decision in which the government vis-à-vis 
a state university should have no influence.   
6.3.5 Broadcaster Advertising 
     The remaining cases in this set deal with the ability of newspapers to print objectionable or 
salacious advertisements.99 At issue in Pittsburgh Press was the newspapers decision to use sex-
designated employment columns.100 In that case, the Court held that “[d]iscrimination in 
employment [advertisements] is not only commercial activity, it is [also] illegal commercial 
activity”.101 This decision, however, is a by-product of its era. Presently, it is inconceivable and it 
                                                   
96 [1973] 410 U.S. 667. 
97 Ibid. at 670. 
98 Ibid. at 668. 
99 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Committee on Human Relations, [1973] 413 U.S. 376 [Pittsburgh Press]; 
Bigelow v. Virginia, [1975] 421 U.S. 809 [Bigelow]. 
100 Pittsburgh Press, Ibid. at 378. 
101 Ibid. at 388. 
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would be unconscionable if a newspaper made such a controversial distinction in its “help-
wanted” section. Nevertheless, in Bigelow, the Court held that advertising abortions was 
constitutionally protected expression.102 While taboo in the 1970s, abortions are a routinely 
performed medical procedure. Thus, a prohibition on advertising abortion services is problematic 
and stifles the expression of the service provider, who by advertising their services is a 
broadcaster.  
6.3.5 New Media 
     The American courts have not addressed rights claims arising from new media posts in any 
meaningful way. One explanation for this could be that in terms of the rights of broadcasters, the 
Court’s decisions discussed above are matters of settled law. This likely means that until such a 
case arises, the Court’s current First Amendment framework will govern new media as well. 
Even if such a case were to find a way to the federal appellate courts in the United States, it is 
difficult to conceive of a scenario where an impugned post would not be afforded First 
Amendment protection.103 
6.4 Public Importance, Stare Decisis, and Consistency in First Amendment Jurisprudence 
     My analysis in this chapter reveals that the Court has been rather willing to empower 
broadcasters that make rights claims. Part of my broad argument in this thesis is that broadcasters 
ought to enjoy rights protections and be subject to rights obligations. The rationale for this, as I 
argued in the previous chapter, is that broadcasting is of considerable public importance.104 
Indeed, as I discussed in regards to specific cases above, this is a principle that the Supreme 
                                                   
102 Bigelow, supra note 99 at 825. 
103 The exceptions here would be a post issuing a call to action for violence, a post that is or an obscene post which 
is degrading or inhumane, for example.     
104 For a discussion of this point and its emergence in the United States, see Owen M. Fiss, “Free Speech and Social 
Structure” (1986) 71 Iowa Law Review. 
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Court has recognized and offered as a rationale for empowering broadcasters on many occasions. 
As a result, in those cases, the rights standards that were applied to broadcasters were analogous 
to those applied to private citizens. What explains this phenomenon? 
     In my view, there are two likely explanations. The broader explanation is that norms and 
values have emerged in the United States concerning the importance of freedom of speech to the 
United States’ democratic self-understanding. As I discussed at length in chapter 3, this explains 
why freedoms of speech and the press were included in the Bill of Rights. However, that is only 
a partial explanation. Scholars have noted that cultural norms concerning the importance of 
freedom of expression emerged at the beginning of the 20th century and resonated to the extent 
that the importance of freedom of speech in American society is significant enough that it has 
buttressed the First Amendment protections.105 Sociologically, this argument provides a 
persuasive explanation for the weight attached to free speech in the United States.  
     The second explanation has to do with the nature of appellate review in the United States. 
One of themes in the cases I examined, particularly in terms of issues such as publication bans 
and open courts, is that the Supreme Court has been steadfast in acknowledging the rights of 
broadcasters and empowering those actors. This indicates that in regards to publication bans and 
open courts, the Court has been bound by precedent. 
     There is, however, a debate in the literature concerning the extent to which justices on the 
United States Supreme Court feel bound by precedent. James Fowler and Sangick Jeon examined 
every majority decision handed down by the Supreme Court. Their analysis reveals that the norm 
of stare decisis greatly influences the Court’s decisions.106 Indeed, Fowler and Jeon found that 
                                                   
105 See specifically G. Edward White, “The First Amendment Comes of Ages: The Emergence of Free Speech in 
Twentieth-Century America” (1996) 95 Michigan Law Review 2.   
106 James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon, “The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent” (2008) Social Networks 30.  
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even when the Court overturns precedent, the members of the Court take great care to ground 
those decisions in precedent and those decisions tend to be more authoritative than the decisions 
they overturned.107  
     Conversely, other scholars argue that stare decisis does not play a significant role in the 
Court’s decision-making process. Jeffrey Seagal and Harold Spaeth looked at the substance of 
the Court’s decisions in a simple random sampling of landmark decisions.108 What they found 
was that Supreme Court justices were not as bound by precedent as earlier scholarship on the 
topic would suggest.109 However, reaching the conclusion that they did on the basis of a random 
sample is suspect. They do not marshal any evidence to quell the notion that the results would 
have differed in a different set of cases. Accordingly, Fowler and Jeon’s analysis, as well as the 
cases I have selected, lend strong support to the notion that Supreme Court justices are, to a large 
extend, bound by the norm of stare decisis.  
     However, there are two important, related caveats to note here. First, aside from its decisions 
on campaign finance and election advertising, the Supreme Court has not addressed the rights of 
broadcasters since 1994. Critics will note that this does not include circuit court of appeals 
decisions. However, the courts at that level only addressed the rights of broadcasters on two 
occasions since 2000. The more salient of the two cases dealt with blog posts, although the rights 
claim was made by a Canadian business against an American blogger, and the 5th Circuit Court 
                                                   
107 Ibid. at 25. It is important to note that between 1946 and 1992 only 115 precedents have been overruled, and this 
period includes the rather “activist” Warren Court. Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration 
of Precedent on The Supreme Court, 1946-1992 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 23.  
108 Jeffrey Seagal & Harold J. Spaeth, “The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court 
Justices” (1996) 40 American Journal of Political Science 4.  
109 Ibid. at 984. 
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of Appeals rejected the claim on those grounds, rather than addressing the rights issue.110 The 
other case dealt with eavesdropping.111  
     The second caveat is how the Supreme Court would address the rights of broadcasters should 
it be given the opportunity. Presumably, such a case would most likely involve a television, 
radio, or new media broadcaster. What is important here is that the time and space restrictions 
that dictated many of the Court’s earlier decisions would not necessarily apply here. I would 
hypothesize that, barring any of the restricted types of expression I noted above, the Court would 
likely find in favour of the broadcaster.  
6.5 Conclusion 
     In this chapter, I explored the judicial empowerment of broadcasters in the United States. I 
quantitatively explored the cases I selected by plotting them in my typology. That analysis 
revealed that the Supreme Court has been willing, and routinely has, empowered broadcasters. I 
confirmed these results by looking to the reasons for judgment in these cases. Ultimately, I 
argued that this is a by-product of the values and norms concerning the First Amendment in the 
United States as well as the norm of stare decisis which weighs on Supreme Court Justices in 
deciding cases. 
                                                   
110 Trout Point Lodge v. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2013). 
111 American Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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Chapter 7  
Judicial Empowerment in Canada and the United States Compared 
 
7.1 Introduction 
     In this chapter, I will compare Canadian and American courts in terms of their willingness to 
empower broadcasters. In the first part of this chapter, I will explore the judicial empowerment 
of broadcasters quantitatively. In the second part of this chapter, I will look at the Canadian and 
American jurisprudence and identify types of cases where courts in both countries have taken 
different approaches. In the third part of this chapter, I will explore why Canadian and American 
courts differ on the points of law that they do. There, I will argue that structural differences in the 
Canadian and American constitutions has greatly altered the judicial empowerment of 
broadcasters. Finally, I will argue that based on this analysis, broadcasters in both countries 
should be afforded the same rights. I will further argue that according broadcasters’ full rights 
protections and obligations would allow the courts to apply the same legal standards to 
broadcasters that apply to private citizens, no more, no less.  
7.2 Quantitative Differences in Judicial Empowerment in Canada and the United States 
     Below, I have reproduced tables 1 and 2 for a side-by-side quantitative comparison of the 
judicial empowerment of broadcasters in Canada and the United States. In this section, I will 
argue that these results confirm my hypothesis that American broadcasters have enjoyed greater 






Table 1: Rights Outcomes in Canadian Jurisprudence 
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 7 
1 1 0 81 1 3 0 102 3 23 
 
Public & 
Private Total   20 
Subtotals 7 0 8 3 26 0 10 15  
Table 1 Classifies rights claimant(s) involved in Canadian cases based on whether or not the court ruled in favour 
of the rights claimant(s). Canadian cases fell into one of three broad categories which correspond to the number 
under the subject matter heading: (1) Press Freedom, (2) Elections and (3) Hate Speech.3  Rights claimants refers to 











                                                   
1 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2010] 1 S.C.R 721 [Toronto Star]. In that case, the CBC came up 
against the collective s. 11 claims of seven individuals; R. v. White, [2008] ABCA 294 [White]. In that case the CBC 
came up against the s. 11(d) claim of one individual.  
2 Toronto Star, Ibid. In this context, there were six private broadcasters who came up against s. 11 claims; A.B. v. 
Bragg Communications Inc., [2012] 2 S.C.R 567 [Bragg]. In that case, the Court found that the appellant’s right to 
privacy was entrenched in the Charter under ss. 7 & 8 and superseded the private broadcasters s. 2(b) right; White, 
Ibid. There, four private broadcasters made rights claims; Flahiff v. Cour du Québéc, [1998] QCCA [Flahiff], where 
the appellants s. 11(d) right to a fair trial was found to supersede the private broadcasters right to publication of a 
search warrant and supporting affidavit. It is important to note that broadcasters in this category where counted in 
the “Against Rights Claimant” total. 
3 Cases that fell into the enumerated categories above dealt with the following subject matter: (1) Production Orders, 
Publication Bans, Confidential Sources, Open Courts, Open Legislatures, Broadcasting Trial Exhibits, and Trial 
Fairness; (2) Election Advertising, Early Dissemination of Election Results; (3) Hate Speech. 
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Table 2: Rights Outcomes in American Jurisprudence 
                                                        Type of Broadcaster 
Public                                 Private 
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3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 11 1 0 5 17 
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r 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
3 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 6 
2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 1 0 0 1 10 0 14 1 14 
 
Public & 
Private Total   21 
Column 
Subtotals 1 0 0 1 32 1 1 7  
Table 2 Classifies rights claimant(s) involved in American cases based on whether or not the court ruled in favour 
of the rights claimant(s). American cases fell into one of five broad categories which correspond to the number 
under the subject matter heading: (1) Press Freedom, (2) Elections, (3) Defamation/Hate Speech/Obscenity, (4) 
Broadcaster Advertising.5 Unless otherwise indicated in the footnotes below, rights claimants refers to broadcasters 
in this table 
 
     In these tables, the most important aspect is the public and private totals in the “for rights 
claimant” and “against rights claimant” sections. As I noted in Chapter 2, interveners play an 
important role in rights litigation in both countries.6 Likewise, cases where broadcasters are 
responding to a claim or where there are competing claims are equally as important as cases 
                                                   
4	Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, [1976] 427 U.S. 539 [Nebraska Press]. In that case, freedom of the press 
was in competition with the right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court decided in favour of the broadcaster. It is 
important to note that broadcasters in this category where counted in the “Against Rights Claimant” total. 
5 The four categories outlined above include cases dealing with the following topics: (1) Editorials, the Fairness 
Doctrine, Publishing Classified Documents, Subpoenas, Access to Prisons, Equal Access, Publication Bans, Search 
Warrants, Student Newspapers; (2) Election Advertising and Campaign Finance; (3) Defamation, Hate Speech, 
Obscenity; (4) Broadcaster Advertising.  
6 See e.g. John Koch, “Making Room: New Directions in Third Party Intervention” (1990) 48 University of Toronto 
Faculty Law Review 1.  
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where broadcasters are making a claim. This is because the emphasis in these tables is on rights 
outcomes, rather than on the outcomes purely from the broadcasters’ perspective.  
     Similarly, it is important to note the different rates at which public and private broadcasters 
are involved in rights disputes, as I have done in Chapters Five and Six. However, for the 
purposes of quantitative analysis, it is important to analyze whether broadcasters generally are 
empowered, rather than focusing on the public/private distinction.  
     These quantitative results confirm my initial hypothesis that the United States Supreme Court 
has been more willing to empower broadcasters than the Canadian appellate courts. In Canada, 
cases involving broadcasters were decided in favour of the broadcaster(s) on 20 out of 66 
occasions or 30.3% of the time. In the United States these cases were decided in favour of 
broadcasters on 21 out of 43 occasions or 48.8% of the time. This means that in this data set, 
cases had been decided in favour of American broadcasters 15.5% more often than Canadian 
broadcasters had.  
7.3 Qualitative Differences in Judicial Empowerment in Canada and the United States  
     In this section, I will qualitatively explore the differences in the jurisprudence dealing with 
the rights of broadcasters in Canada and the United States. I will examine these differences in 
five distinct areas. In the first part of this section, I will look at publication bans, open courts, and 
open legislatures. In the second part of this section, I will discuss search warrants, subpoenas, 
and production orders. In the third part of this section, I will examine cases dealing with 
defamation, hate speech, and obscenity. In the fourth part of this section, I will look at 
broadcaster advertising. Finally, I will explore the treatment of new media in both countries. 
 
7.3.1 Publication Bans, Open Courts, Open Legislatures, and Prisoner Interviews 
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     In Canada, there are two distinct eras in the case law dealing with publication bans and open 
courts. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dagenais, the Court routinely protected trial 
fairness at the expense of the rights of broadcasters.7 Following Dagenais, however, the Court 
moved decisions concerning discretionary publication bans into the common law sphere. That 
being said, however, there were cases in the latter era dealing with statutorily created publication 
bans that were dealt with under the Charter.8 In that sense, the Court has restricted the cases in 
which the publication bans can be challenged on Charter grounds.  
     In the United States, however, it is antithetical to the First Amendment that broadcasters 
might be prohibited from covering legal proceedings. In those cases, the Supreme Court has 
consistently maintained that the ability to attend and cover trials is inextricably linked to the First 
Amendment. On that basis, the Court has generally rejected these bans on the grounds that prior 
restraint violates the First Amendment.9  
     The approaches taken by Canadian and American courts in regards to publication bans is 
similar to the approaches taken to open courts, open legislatures, and prisoner interviews. In 
Canada, the Supreme Court has not recognized a right to film provincial legislatures. Similarly, 
in the United States, the Court has rejected the argument that prohibiting broadcasters from 
interviewing inmates violates the First Amendment.10  
 
7.3.2 Search Warrants, Subpoenas, and Production Orders 
                                                   
7 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, [1994] 3 S.C.R 835. 
8 See specifically, Société Radio-Canada c. Québec (Procureur Générale). 62 C.R. (6th) 99; R. v. White, [2008] 
ABCA 294; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 1 S.C.R. 19; A.B. v. Bragg 
Communications Inc., [2012] 2 S.C.R 567. 
9 Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, [1976] 427 U.S. 539; Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, [1978] 
435 U.S. 829; Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, [1980] 448 U.S. 555; El Vocero v. Puerto Rico, [1993] 508 
U.S. 147. 
10 Donahoe v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. (1991) 102 N.S.R. (2d) 271; Pell v. Procunier, [1974] 417 U.S. 
817; Houchins v. KQED Inc., [1978] 438 U.S. 1. 
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     In terms of search warrants and subpoenas, and production orders, courts in Canada and the 
United States have taken very similar approaches. In Canada, the courts have dealt with search 
warrants under s. 8 of the Charter which protects against unreasonable search and seizure, rather 
than addressing them on freedom of the press or expression grounds.11 In any event, Canadian 
courts have been reluctant to strike down search warrants on Charter grounds. Similarly, in the 
one case in my data set which dealt with search warrants, the United States Supreme Court 
rejected the associated rights claim.12 Likewise, both the Nova Scotia court of appeals and the 
United States Supreme Court have held that journalists can be subpoenaed.13 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has decided that production orders ought to be addressed through the 
common law, rather than the Charter. In the United States, the Supreme Court has addressed 
production orders through its case law on subpoenas. While the American Court is willing to 
consider the rights issue, it has been less inclined to allow journalists to avoid testimony, 
particularly where confidential sources are involved.14 
7.3.3 Campaign Finance and Election Advertising 
     Canadian and American courts have taken vastly different approaches in terms of campaign 
finance and election advertising. The Supreme Court of Canada has largely upheld limits on 
campaign spending and election advertising.15 The American Court, in Citizens United, has 
adopted the rule that spending money is analogous to expression, and therefore limiting how 
                                                   
11 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 8. 
12 Interestingly, Zurcher informed the Canadian jurisprudence on the topic. See specifically Canadian Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Lessard, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421.   
13 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. Batiot. (1997) 144 D.L.R. (4th) 444; Branzburg v. Hayes, [1972] 408 U.S. 
665. 
14 Branzburg v. Hayes, [1972] 408 U.S. 665. 
15 See e.g. Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827. 
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much someone can donate to a campaign or pay for campaign advertisements is a violation of 
their First Amendment rights.16 
7.3.4 Defamation, Hate Speech, and Obscenity 
     As I noted in chapter five, there was only one case which dealt with hate speech and none that 
dealt with defamation or obscenity, rejecting the rights claim.17 At least in terms of defamation, 
this is primarily because that these are civil law matters.18 However, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the 
United States Supreme Court has held that hate speech was protected under the First 
Amendment.19 The Court has allowed for the possibility that private defamation disputes 
involving broadcasters could be subjected to rights analysis. In that sense, the law on defamation 
in the United States lacks clarity in terms of defining the standard set out in New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan.20 Likewise, the Supreme Court has made it clear that in terms of hate speech and 
obscenity, the First Amendment standard is rather high.21 
7.3.5 Broadcaster Advertising 
     Broadcaster advertising is another area where the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet 
recognized or entertained rights arguments. Conversely, however, the American Court has dealt 
with this issue on two occasions. In Pittsburgh Press, the Court found that the impugned 
advertisements were commercial expression, and therefore rejected the rights claim.22 However, 
                                                   
16 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, [2010] 558 U.S. 310. Note that in the American cases I selected, 
there are no analogs to Canadian cases, such as Bryan which deal with issues such as the early dissemination of poll 
results.  
17 R. v. Andrews, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 870. 
18 See e.g. Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 [Hill]; Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] 3 SCR 640 
[Grant]. 
19 Brandenburg v. Ohio, [1969] 395 U.S. 444. 
20 [1964] 376 U.S. 265 [Sullivan]. 
21 Supra note 13; Papish v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo., [1973] 410 U.S. 667. 
22 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Committee on Human Relations, [1973] 413 U.S. 376. 
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the Court later found that advertising abortions merited protection.23 Therefore, it is unclear how 
the Court will decide similar and analogous cases in the future.  
7.3.6 New Media 
     Neither Canadian nor American courts have dealt with rights claims arising from new media 
posts. In Canada, these cases have been addressed through the civil law or administrative law, 
even though broadcasters have made rights claims.24 As I noted in chapter six, the same is true in 
the United States.25  
7.4 Explaining the Discrepancies in the Judicial Empowerment of Broadcasters 
     Comparing the Canadian and American approaches to the judicial empowerment of 
broadcasters reveals asymmetric results. In these results, there are two broad trends that are 
therefore worth exploring. The first trend is the different approaches taken by the Canadian 
courts and the Supreme Court of the United States in six particular types of cases. Those are 
cases dealing with: publication bans, campaign finance and election advertising, defamation, hate 
speech, obscenity, and broadcaster advertising. The second trend is the types of broadcasters that 
are making rights claims in each country and the extent to which courts in both countries have 
been willing to empower public and private broadcasters. In this section, I will explain those 
trends. 
7.4.1 The Asymmetric Nature of Rights Review in Canada and the United States 
     In a technical sense, rights are conferred broadly and absolutely in the United States. The Bill 
of Rights applies broadly in the sense that it applies to federal and state government actions, but 
also, in certain situations to private conduct. Rights are conferred absolutely in the sense that one 
                                                   
23	Bigelow v. Virginia, [1975] 421 U.S. 809.	
24 Awan v. Levant, 2016 ONCA 970 (CanLII); Pridgen v. University of Calgary. (2012) 350 D.L.R. (4th) 1. 
25 Trout Point Lodge v. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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need simply prove that a rights violation occurred in order for a court to craft some remedy. A 
perfect example of the true scope of rights conferred in the United States or the potential, thereof 
is the Court’s decision in Rosenbloom that the First Amendment applied in purely private libel 
cases.26  
     In terms of the rights of broadcasters, the structure of the American Bill of Rights has given 
the Court wider latitude to employ rights-based analyses in a multitude of contexts in cases 
involving broadcasters. Here, cases dealing with publication bans and defamation are especially 
salient. As I noted above in regards to defamation, the Court has demonstrated a willingness to 
subject defamation awards to First Amendment review. Even if the Court declined to go that far 
and uphold Rosenbloom, the default precedent in that area is Sullivan, wherein the Court held 
that under the First Amendment, public officials could not win jury awards in libel cases.27  
     Similarly, it is settled law in the United States that barring journalists or broadcasters from 
covering judicial proceedings violates the First Amendment. The Court has long held, in this 
regard that protecting the rights of journalists to attend trials and publish the substance of trial 
proceedings is precisely the purpose of the First Amendment.28 Superficially, it might appear as 
though this reasoning does not take into account trial fairness, and the legal rights of defendants 
in criminal cases. However, the rights claims made by broadcasters in these cases have 
succeeded because the First Amendment explicitly prohibits government censorship of 
broadcasters.  
     In Canada, rights adjudication is a three-step process. First, the court has to determine 
whether a particular case can be adjudicated under the Charter. In many instances, this is a 
                                                   
26 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc., [1971] 403 U.S. 29. 
27 Supra note 6. 
28	Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, [1978] 435 U.S. 829; Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, [1980] 
448 U.S. 555.	
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given. However, there are a few cases where the court must still make this determination. Having 
accepted that the Charter applies, the court must then turn to whether or not there is a rights 
violation. In an overwhelming majority of the cases I explored, the courts found that 
broadcasters’ s. 2(b) rights had been violated. Finally, the court must then decide whether or not 
the impugned legislation or action is a reasonable limit on freedom of expression. In the cases I 
explored, the impugned government action was frequently saved at this last stage.  
     As I have argued throughout this thesis, the biggest problem with the Canadian approach 
occurs at the first step of this analysis. The Supreme Court of Canada has not yet recognized a 
framework under which the Charter applies to broadcasters in a uniform manner. This is rather 
peculiar considering that s. 2(b) also contains a distinct clause providing for “freedom of the 
press”.29  
     There are four distinct examples of how and why this is problematic. In terms of broadcaster 
advertising, the courts have held that the Charter does not apply to cases dealing with 
broadcaster advertising.30 In my view, that is unprincipled. In the United States, for example, the 
Supreme Court has distinguished between advertising that is “commercial expression” and that 
which is not. Advertisements that are merely intended to inform, enlighten, and entertain should 
be protected under the Charter. This would also include political advertising or issue advocacy 
for example.  
     Similarly, unlike the United States, the Charter does not currently apply in defamation cases, 
although broadcasters have tried to make rights claims in that context.31 The Gawker case is 
                                                   
29 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 2(b). This particular clause does confer rights and obligations which are 
distinct from freedom of expression. In that sense, the Canadian Court’s approach to broadcasters’ rights runs 
contrary to the free press clause.  
30 Adbusters Media Foundation v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 92 BCLR (4th). 
31 Hill, supra note 12. 
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instructive here. Terry Bollea, also known as the wrestler Hulk Hogan, successfully sued and 
bankrupted the website Gawker after they posted his sex tape.32 Whether it is the United States 
or Canada, broadcasters should still be able to make rights claims, under the Charter or the First 
Amendment in those cases. This should be the case irrespective of how salacious the message is. 
Essentially, the calculus is the value of reputation versus the rights to free expression. The 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions suggest that in defamation cases, greater value ought to be 
attached to the former. Allowing Charter challenges in these cases would not preclude 
defamation plaintiffs from recuperating damages, it would simply mean that the courts would be 
able to conduct additional analysis to determine whether those damages were compliant with the 
Charter.  
     Finally, by moving the analysis on production orders and discretionary publication bans into 
the realm of the common law, the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged that the Charter 
does not apply to broadcasters in those areas. This is troubling. As I discussed in chapter five, 
there is the distinct possibility that a journalist, Ben Makuch, will end up in jail simply for 
protecting his sources.33 That development is problematic as it sets a dangerous precedent for 
similar cases in the future, and also runs contrary to s. 2(b)’s freedom of the press clause.  
7.5 The Future of Media Rights and Broadcasting Policy 
     My analysis throughout this thesis has unveiled discrepancies in how Canada and the United 
States have approached the United States. Broadcasting is of considerable public importance, a 
fact that Canadian and American governments are certainly aware of, and have conceded through 
their policies. For example, in both countries, broadcasters are subject to unique regulators and 
                                                   
32 Bollea v. Gawker, [2016] So. 3d 768. 
33 R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2017] ONCA 231 [Vice]. 
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report to the federal government. And yet, in spite of their importance, broadcasters are not 
recognized as publicly important entities.   
     In Canada, it is clear that the Supreme Court’s current understanding of the Charter is that its 
application to broadcasters is limited. Similarly, in the United States while the application of the 
Bill of Rights to broadcasters is broader although not uniform. This is concerning. There ought to 
be a uniform standard in each country through which broadcasters are allowed to make coherent 
rights claims. This type of framework would enable the courts to consider whether the party 
making a rights claim is a broadcaster, rather than requiring those parties to convince the courts 
that the constitution applies to them at all. Anything less than this standard fundamentally 
undermines the ability of broadcasters to “inform, enlighten, and entertain”. Furthermore, 
imbuing broadcasters with rights obligations would presumably help reinforce confer 
broadcasters with greater legitimacy and force them to attain a higher level of integrity. Finally, 
the rapid technological advancements that have benefited broadcasters, including, for instance, 
new media, as a result of the current legal understanding of the rights of broadcasters, also results 
in considerable uncertainty as to what rights broadcasters actually have.   
     A related benefit of conferring uniform rights protection and obligations upon broadcasters is 
the standards under which courts could review their rights claims. For example, in terms of 
defamation, hate speech, or obscenity, a court would be able to adjudicate rights claims made by 
broadcasters using the same requirements that exist in cases brought by private citizens.   
7.6 Criticisms of the Public Importance Argument 
     As I discussed in chapter five, there are two likely criticisms of my argument that the Charter 
should apply to broadcasters on the basis of public importance. First, there is an argument that in 
defining the Charter’s scope, the Canadian Court has interpreted s. 32 of the Charter with a view 
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to limiting government action exclusively.34 The concern that Charter law would replace 
statutory law is prima facie compelling.35 However, it overlooks the established view that the 
Charter should be interpreted in a broad and liberal fashion.36 Other sections of the Charter have 
been interpreted progressively, why should s. 32 be any different?37  
     Moreover, I am not advocating a radical departure from the current understanding of the 
Charter’s scope. Rather my argument is that the Charter should apply to matters of public 
importance. There is a compelling argument that this should include broadcasters. Beyond such 
an interpretation, however, it is also my view that the Court should, and would, likely limit the 
scope of the “public importance” under s. 32.  
     To some readers, it might appear as though I am advocating for the Supreme Court of Canada 
to adopt a more liberal interpretation of free expression. It follows, according to this argument, 
that I overlook the role, purpose, and importance of the Charter’s reasonable limits clause. I do 
not. My normative argument is that first and foremost, the Charter should apply to broadcasters. 
If the Court adopted such an approach, it would allow it to adjudicate rights claims made by 
broadcasters in the same way that it deals with rights claims made by private citizens. In such 
cases, the Court should continue to define the Charter’s freedom of expression and reasonable 
limits clauses as it has.     
 
 
                                                   
34 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 37-30; Patrick J. 
Monahan, Constitutional Law, 3rd ed (Toronto: Irwin law, 2006) at 406 [Monahan]. 
35 Monahan, Ibid.  
36 Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1929] UKPC 86. 
37 For example, equality rights under s. 15 have been interpreted rather liberally so as to include sexual orientation as 
an analogous ground. See specifically, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, ss. 15(1); Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 
513; Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493; M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. 
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7.7 Explaining Discrepancies in the Types of Broadcasters Making Rights Claims 
     As I discussed above, there are thematic differences in the rights afforded to broadcasters in 
Canada and the United States. There are also differences in the types of broadcasters making 
rights claims in these countries. In Canada and the United States, the overwhelming majority of 
rights claims are made by private broadcasters. However, there are different explanations for 
why this is the case.  
     Public broadcasters in Canada are created by, and report to, the government. They are also 
heavily subsidized by the government. Nonetheless, Canadian public broadcasters, particularly 
the CBC, are required to make up the balance of their budget through commercial advertising. In 
Canada then, the most likely explanation for the underrepresentation of public broadcasters in 
rights litigation is the fact these broadcasters simply have no occasion to be involved in rights 
disputes. In the United States, public broadcasters are also subsidized by the government. 
However, unlike their Canadian counterparts, American public broadcasters are not allowed to 
advertise. Also, American public broadcasters are created for the express purpose of educational 
broadcasting.   
7.8 Conclusion 
     In this chapter, I have compared the rights of broadcasters in Canada and the United States. 
This analysis reveals that in both countries there are areas where courts have not recognized the 
rights of broadcasters. This approach, however, is problematic. The current rights frameworks 
have considerable implications for broadcasters. These implications are further compounded by 
the proliferation of digital and new media. For these reasons, then, courts in Canada and the 





     Broadcasters are important actors in Canada and the United States. They serve three primary 
functions: to inform, to enlighten, and to entertain. They inform and enlighten by covering the 
news. This is not restricted to relaying current events. It also includes investigative journalism 
through which, broadcasters hold governments to account. In this sense, the type of information 
conveyed by broadcasters might be unpopular, but is nonetheless informative. Broadcasters also 
entertain. For example, they produce and disseminate content that might at once be satire, but 
also have a strong political message.1 Their ability to do their job hinges in large part on the 
constitutional protections they are afforded.       
     In this thesis, I focused on the rights of broadcasters in Canada and the United States. 
Previous work on media rights and broadcasting policy has been largely restricted to each 
country. Media rights and broadcasting policy in Canada and the United States has not been 
addressed in a comparative context since 1988.2 The research that has been done in this area is 
limited to the freedom of expression issue. Other work on the topic has focused exclusively on 
broadcasting policy vis-à-vis broadcast licensing.3 In this thesis, I sought to fill that gap in the 
literature by using jurisprudence as a mechanism for evaluating media rights and broadcasting 
policy in Canada and the United States.  
     I also approached this topic from a comparative perspective. At the most basic level, a 
comparative analysis highlights differences between two systems. Comparing the rights of 
                                                   
1 This would include the HBO show “Last Week Tonight”, for example.  
2 Dorothy Zolf, “The Regulation of Broadcasting in Canada and the United States: Straws in the Wind” (1988) 13 
Canadian Journal of Communication 2 [Dolf] . 
3 Corinne Schweizer et al, “Blast From the Past? A Comparative Analysis of Broadcast Licensing in the Digital 
Era”, (2014) 4 Journal of Information Policy [Schweizer].  
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broadcasters in Canada and the United States has helped reinforce the importance of those actors. 
It has also helped reveal the true scope of rights protections afforded to broadcasters in each 
country, and how the courts should deal with broadcasters in the future. In this sense, a 
comparative analysis helps provide a more nuanced understanding of how the courts interact 
with broadcasters, but also of how societal values and norms inform those decisions. 
     My aims in conducting this research were twofold. First, I sought to understand how the 
courts in Canada and the United States have defined the rights of broadcasters. Second, based on 
these understandings, which country’s courts have been more willing to empower broadcasters. 
To understand the relationship between the courts and broadcasters, I looked at cases in which 
courts had been asked to address the rights broadcasters. I evaluated these results quantitatively 
by plotting them in a typology I developed to provide a snapshot of broadcasters’ rights. I also 
looked at the substance of the court’s decisions in those cases to understand why the courts had 
interpreted the rights of broadcasters as they did.  
     At the outset of this thesis, I hypothesized that the United States Supreme Court would be 
considerably more willing to empower broadcasters than Canadian appellate courts would. My 
quantitative findings indicate that within my data set, the American Court empowered 
broadcasters 15% more often than Canadian courts. This finding is supported by the substance of 
the decisions themselves. This is largely a result of the structure and scope of rights protections 
in each country. In the United States, rights are conferred absolutely, whereas in Canada, they 
are subject to reasonable limits. I also found a discrepancy in the types of broadcasters making 
rights claims. In both countries, public broadcasters were underrepresented in rights disputes. In 
Canada, what I found was that public broadcasters other than the CBC simply had not had 
occasion to make rights claims. In the United States, this was largely due to a lack of funding for 
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public broadcasters, a prohibition on commercial advertising, and the fact that public 
broadcasters in the United States are designed to educate. 
     Based on this analysis, I advanced two broad arguments. First, the scope of rights in each 
country should be interpreted in such a way that broadcasters are afforded uniform rights 
protections and responsibilities. Substantively, I argued that the courts should interpret the rights 
of broadcasters in the same fashion that they interpret the rights of private citizens. In Canada, 
for example, I argued that the Charter should apply to broadcasters on the basis of public 
importance. There are two prominent responses to this argument. First, that the Charter was only 
intended to apply to government action. In response, I noted that this is a rather myopic view and 
misunderstands the evolution of jurisprudence in Canadian constitutional law. Second, critics 
might note that I am advocating for an American approach to freedom of expression under the 
Charter. My response here is simply that freedom of expression and other Charter rights 
conferred upon broadcasters should be interpreted in the same way as those conferred upon 
private citizens.             
     This research has two broad implications which ought to guide future research. Inevitably 
courts will be presented with cases similar to Gawker’s where a fringe broadcaster can be 
bankrupted for content that they disseminate. However, this issue is not necessarily limited to 
defamation. For example, a citizen journalist or a niche broadcaster that does not have 
considerable resources might be served with a production order. Suppose that broadcaster 
chooses not to respond, is charged, and is saddled with insurmountable legal fees and might also 
be forced out of operation. These types of issues lie at the core of not only freedom of the press, 
but also freedom of expression. Inevitably, these or similar issues will present themselves, and 
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the courts will be asked to decide what rights, and the scope of those rights that these 
broadcasters ought to be afforded.  
     The second issue pertains to the digitalization of broadcasting. The advent of the internet and 
digitalization have provided broadcasters with increasing space to disseminate content and 
considerably widened the range of types of parties that consider themselves broadcasters. For 
example, it is not uncommon that social movements are organized through, and broadcast online. 
Moreover, internet or digital-based expression is at the nexus of everything I have discussed in 
this thesis. And yet, in the internet era, Canadian and American courts have not really addressed 
the resultant rights implications in any meaningful way. As such, future research ought to focus 
on how the courts do deal with rights claims emerging from internet-based expression. I would 
hypothesize that in the digital age, broadcasters are going to occupy a more precarious space 
than they currently do.   
     This thesis is not without its limitations. The first limitation concerns the cases I selected. 
There might well be other cases that fit my parameters that did not necessarily turn up in my 
searches. I would argue, however, that any discernable trends from the cases I selected, however, 
are more broadly applicable. This is due to the number of cases selected and the manner in which 
they were selected. Rather generally, courts do depart from past precedent for various reasons. 
However, in both Canada and the United States, reversed decisions would not necessarily alter 
my findings in any considerable fashion. The second limitation relates to the typology. This 
typology cannot be used to classify whole cases. Rather, it is most effective for examining the 
role that specific actors play in cases and how that relates to the outcome. Nonetheless, complex 
cases involving broadcasters on both sides of the dispute complicates the analysis to an extent. It 
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